University of Richmond

UR Scholarship Repository
Master's Theses

Student Research

8-1995

Humanitarian Intervention: great expectations and
shattered hopes
Charles W. Peraino

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.richmond.edu/masters-theses
Part of the Political Science Commons
Recommended Citation
Peraino, Charles W., "Humanitarian Intervention: great expectations and shattered hopes" (1995). Master's Theses. Paper 812.

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Research at UR Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Master's Theses by an authorized administrator of UR Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
scholarshiprepository@richmond.edu.

Humanitarian Intervention:
Great Expectations and Shattered Hopes
By
Charles W. Peraino

B.A. Old Domion University

A Thesis
Submitted to the Graduate Faculty
of the University of Richmond

In Candidacy
For the Degree of
Master of Arts
In Political Science

August 1995
Richmond, Virginia

l.IBRARY
IJ,~JV!m$mt OF RICHMOND
"··

~AA-~31V3

Abstract: Humanitarian Intervention: Great Expectations and Shattered Hopes,
By Charles W. Peraino, in Candidacy for the Degree of Masters of Arts at the
University of Richmond, 1995; Thesis Director: John W. Outland, Ph.D.
America faces the moral dilemma of whether to intervene militarily, at great risk, in
states which commit massive human rights violations against their own citizens. A
systematic look at the intellectual ideas guiding international relations reveals such
atrocities to be an established part of international behavior. Ending this structural
violence is difficult because of the epistemological and ethical limits of social science, the
rule of law, political theory, and moral philosophy. The resulting, insolvable problems of
international politics--such as the preference for international order over individual justice,
the unlimited aspirations of nationalism and self-determination, the conflicts of cultural
relativism, and the lack of universal standards for state legitimacy--present obstacles to
Americans changing their traditional foreign policy perspectives into a moral and effective
policy of military humanitarian intervention. But there is hope, for non-military forms of
humanitarian intervention provide the potential for greatly reducing structural violence.
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Chapter I
Humanitarian Intervention:
An American Moral Dilemma
The use of military force against the sovereignty and in the internal affairs of
other states, such as Bosnia and Rwanda, to stop genocide and other human rights
violations is a frustrating moral dilemma for Americans after the Cold War. It is a
dilemma of two compelling moral arguments: one, to intervene because of the
horrific nature and number of atrocities, and, the other, not to intervene because of
the intense violence of ethnic conflict. It is a frustrating situation in which genocide-that unconscionable act of violence striking at America's core values of democracy
and human rights--never seems to end and, therefore, always seems to prey on the
American conscience. It is also frustrating in that, like most idealism at the end of
a major conflict, the idea of military humanitarian intervention--defined here as the
use of military force against another state's sovereignty to stop it from committing
mass atrocities such as genocide or ethnic-cleansing upon its own civilian population
or refusing to respond to the massive starvation and disease of its civilian population
for political reasons--has not fared well recently against the realities of local and
international politics. 1 As a result, the international community is left with the

1

This definition is essentially the same as Jack Donnelly's of" ... [the dictatorial coercive interference

in the internal affairs of another state] in order to remedy mass and flagrant violations of the human
rights of foreign nationals by their own governments." Jack Donnelly, Universal Human Rights in Theory
and Practice (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989), 260; Genocide or the massive, systematic killing

2
option of non-military intervention to stop unconscionable human rights violations.
Although non-military intervention is not a focus of this study because of the almost
infinite forms it takes and the controversy about its effectiveness, it still remains the
best hope to end genocide and other heinous human rights violations.

New Hopes After the Cold War

At the Cold War's end, there were a number of reasons to hope for a new
world order of greater peace and security.

Changes in international politics were

perceived as presenting opportunities for the use of force to stop genocide and
suffering, which were tempting to the West. The increase in democracy, the decrease
in totalitarianism, the dissipation of the nuclear threat, and the end of the
superpower rivalry gave hope for more cooperation among states and a more
effective use of collective security not only to stop aggression of one state against
another but also to stop a state's internal aggression against its own civilian
population by gross, massive human rights violations. Not surprisingly, this optimism
was part due to the hope that a renascent United Nations, once freed from its role

and Practice (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989), 260; Genocide or the massive, systematic killing
of people for racial or religious reasons is its most obvious target. However, the acts covered in this
paper, which I term structural violence, are broader than genocide and include the massive deprivation
of both political and economic rights, i.e., the severe denial of political rights or survival necessities
resulting in massive loss of life, caused by the state's incompetence and/or oppression. Included are
the state's unlawful acts (e.g., the malfeasance of the Serbs ethic cleansing in Bosnia), the state's lawful
acts performed harmfully (e.g., the misfeasance of Russia's preservation of its unity by its war on
civilians in Chechyna), and the state's acts of omission (e.g., the nonfeasance of the anarchic fighting of
the clans of Somalia while the people starve). The issues covered here go beyond the restricted
definition by Adam Roberts and Richard Haass, of short term use of military force, to include the idea
of nation-building or reforming the target state's political institutions causing its massive infliction of
death and suffering. Richard N. Haass, Intervention: The Use of Force in the Post-Cold War World
(Washington, D.C.: The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1994), 132; Adam Roberts,
"Humanitarian War: Military Intervention and Human Rights," Intemational Affairs 60(July1993):445.

3
as an international forum for the superpowers, could play a larger role in eliminating
genocide and human rights violations. 2
Also emerging was the perennial, idealistic aspiration to replace power politics
with a more altruistic foreign policy.3 The opportunity seemed to be there since the
United States as the last superpower was in a unique position to be the world leader
against oppression and atrocities. The relevance of realism and power politics, which
had dominated American foreign policy during the Cold War, was being questioned,
and Americans began to consider more seriously the idea of replacing the narrow
statist version of the national interest with a new focus on the common interest of
humanity.

The emphasis was now on the more highly profiled, and perceived

worsemng, global threats, such as overpopulation, environmental degradation,
economic disparity, crime, disease, and hunger.
In addition, the perception that power politics was on the decline was
accompanied by a greater focus on the idea that governments have a fiduciary

2

A period of idealism after a great conflict is a pattern of 20th century international politics. See
Yale H. Ferguson and Richard W. Mansbach, The Elusive Quest: Theory and Intemational Politics
(Columbia, S.C.: University of South Carolina Press, 1988), 91-7; President Bush's "new world order"
during the Gulf War was a reversion to idealism with its belief in collective security, U .N. restraints on
the behavior of states and authorization of a U.S. led intervention, emphasis on international law and
order, and respect for self-determination hopefully as replacements for the old power politics of the
balance of power. Robert W. Tucker and David C. Hendrickson, The Imperial Temptation: The New
World Order and America's Purpose (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1992), 54-5.
3

ln its basic form, power politics is the reliance of foreign policy on military or economic coercion:
Alexander Deconde, ed. The Encyclopedia of America11 Foreig11 Policy: Studies of the Principle
Movements and Ideas (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1978), s.v. "Power Politics," by Thomas H.
Etold. Also see Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994), 137. Kissinger
defines. power politics in terms of the German conception of realpolitik, which is "...based on
calculations of power and the national interest." Political power, according to Hans Morgenthau, is the
struggle for control among political leaders, as well as between the people and their political leaders;
Kenneth W. Thompson, Traditions and Values In Politics and Diplomacy: Theory a11d Practice (Baton
Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1992), 148, citing Hans J. Morgenthau and Kenneth W.
Thompson, Politics Among Nations: The Stntggle for Power and Peace, 6th ed., (New York: Knopf,
1985), 32.

4

responsibility to their citizens and could no longer excuse cruelty against their civilian
populations in the name of international and domestic order. If they continued to
do so, justice would require the international community to intervene against them
to alleviate the human suffering and unjust treatment of local populations.

Old Realities

In such a world, it was not surprising that Americans felt confirmed in their
sense of exceptionalism that their values and way of life were special and would
eventually become the universal foundation of a stable international system of
economically viable democracies. The liberal world order of democratic capitalism
based on the Enlightenment's ideas of progress, optimism, scientific rationalism,
individualism and equality seemed to have proven itself superior to all other
ideologies.4
But the severity of the global threats and the re-emerging ethnic, religious,
and other conflicts of group identity contradicted America's new idealism. The flareup of ethnic conflict seemed to be a regression into a much more intense, disrupting,
and unconscionable form of violence than that of the Cold War. The ferocity of
ethnic violence increased doubts for Americans about the international community's
ability to preserve peace and order, to stop atrocities, and to encourage democracy.
The hoped for cooperation to resolve both the global threats and the conflicts within

4

Michael Howard, "Cold War, Chill Peace: Prospects for Order and Disorder," 148-53 in Charles
W. Kegley, Jr. and Eugene R. Wittkopf, eds., Tlze Global Agenda: Degrees and Perspectives, 4th ed.,
(New York: McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1995), originally published in World Policy Joumal, Vol. X (Winter
1993-94). Fukuyama, Francis. 111e E11d of History and the Last Ma11 (New York: Avon Books, 1992),
xi-xiii.
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states, which was symbolized by the international alliance against Saddam Hussein,
seemed to be unraveling.5
Power politics, contrary to the hopes for its remission, was taking bold in the
political turmoil of the former Soviet Bloc, the Balkans, and Africa. The result was
the creation of local conflicts and pockets of power within and between the world's
new and old states. Also, the ethnic nationalism and economic failure of Africa
elicited a virulent form of regional disorder that threatened to draw the West
reluctantly into a neo-colonialist role there. This situation was made worse by the
superpowers no longer exercising orderly authority over their former blocs and client
states. In particular, the disintegration of the former Soviet Bloc was threatening to
draw Russia back into expansionism, which would place pressure on NATO to
include former Bloc members in its alliance. 6
Nationalism and self-determination also made an unexpected and malevolent
comeback to challenge the status quo of state sovereignty. The demise of the Soviet
Bloc and the superpower influence in Africa left a power vacuum within states whose
citizens still felt the unfinished business of self-determination. As old grievances of
oppressed groups surfaced, the people of these states became susceptible to

5

See "Russia Blocks Serbs' Censure," Richmond Times-Dispatch, December 12, 1994, Sec. A, p. 4.

6

0ne expert estimated in 1992 that "...there are 125 ethnic or minority disputes in the former Soviet
Union alone, with about 25 classified as 'armed disputes."' See Eugene Robinson, "Communal Violence
Likely to Endure in Post-Cold War Era," 171e Washington Post, 18 August 1992, sec. A, p. 9; According
to the Center for Defense Information, "there are 29 military conflicts in the world today, up from 24
in 1992.... In most of them, the divisions fall along ethnic or religious lines ...." Thomas W. Lippman,
"Ethnic Strife Succeeds Cold War's Ideological Conflict," 17ze Washington Post, 18 December 1994, Sec.
A, p. 36; On NATO and Russian expansionism, see "Russia Jangles Nerves of Neighbors," Richmond
Times-Dispatch, April 22, 1995, Sec. A, p.4; John Hall, "Chill Over NATO Grips U.S. Russian
Relations," Richmond Times-Dispatch, April 2, 1994, Sec. A, p. 4; Yelsin Denounces U.S. Over NATO
Expansion," Richmond Times-Dispatch, December 6, 1994, Sec. A, p.4.

6

exploitation by demagogic leaders preaching nationalism. The resulting mayhem and
hatred arising from the explosion of self-determination and nationalism made the
world appear more unstable and self-destructive than ever, made the task of nuclear
nonproliferation more difficult, and placed less international restraint on potential
rogue states. As the authority of state sovereignty declined, any resulting increase
in humanitarian aid seemed to be more than offset by the emerging secessionist
movements of disintegrating states. 7
Because of these factors, the status of human rights after the Cold War
appeared as precarious as ever, and perhaps even worse, and still subject to the
machinations of power. The old threat of totalitarian order was transformed into the
new threat of chaotic, political decentralization. Because power appeared to be
changing in terms of its allocation rather than diminishing in importance, the form
but not the substance of the threat to political and economic human rights appeared
to be changing. Instead of the orderly oppression of totalitarianism, there was the
disorderly oppression of ethnic nationalism and dissolving states. The demise of state
sovereignty and the ascendancy of nationalism ironically threatened political and
economic human rights as much, if not more than, the old totalitarian order.
Certainly discouraging was the ineffectiveness of the international community and the
West to stop the genocide occurring in Bosnia and Rwanda. Such events appeared
frightfully anti-modern and regressive, and, therefore, disillusioning and frustrating
to Americans.

7

See Robert D. Kaplan, "Into the Bloody New World Order," Washington Post, April 17, 1994, Sec.

c, p.1.
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The Legitimacy of the Post-Cold
War State and Structural Violence

Despite all the hopes and the attainment of a stronger human rights regime,
genocide was happening again, suggesting that it is an inherent element of an
international system that emphasizes the power of the state. The state was still the
primary, political unit of life, and it still carried with it the problem of where to draw
the line on the legitimate use of violence. Even in democracies--as the controversy
over the U.S. use of violence against the Branch Davidians in Waco, Texas attests-the people were not certain of its legitimate limits, but in the non-West, where
genocide or genocide-like atrocities were taking place, the problem was worse. The
situation represented the failure of international politics to end the horrific and
unconscionable mass violence which seemed to be a part of the structure and process
of the conflict between and within states.
The shame shared by the West and the rest of the world was that
international politics still involved a form of structural violence in which states
committed genocide, atrocities, and other unconscionable, massive human rights
violations against their own civilian populations predicated either upon general
principles held by humanity about international politics--e.g., beliefs in nonappeasement, the sanctity of the state, and the preservation of credibility--or
inexplicably upon hatred without any rational political purpose--e.g., genocide and
ethnic-cleansing. Such acts involved the deprivation of both political and economic
rights caused by the state's unlawful acts (e.g., the malfeasance of the Serbs in
Bosnia), the state's lawful acts performed harmfully (e.g., the misfeasance of Russia

8

in Chechyna), and the state's acts of omission (e.g., the nonfeasance of the conflicted
tribes of Somalia). And that shame is still there today as genocide and similar
atrocities are de jure illegal while de facto tolerated several years after the demise
of the Soviet Union.8
Not only is the shame of structural violence still prevalent, but the
pervasiveness of the media, especially television, reminds Americans daily of the
world's atrocities and suffering and, likewise, the cost of stopping it.

Hence,

whatever the discomforts and pressures on foreign policy practitioners and citizens
to make moral and practical decisions about international politics, the emotional ante
is raised by television pictures of both starving Africans and dead U.N. personnel.
The actual effect of the media on foreign policy after the Cold War is a matter of
controversy and a subject beyond the scope of this study, but it nonetheless impinges
on the conflicting feelings Americans have about humanitarian intervention. 9

8

Johan Galtung also uses the idea of structural violence, though differently than used above, to
mean a violence beyond direct physical assault in which exploitative political systems of the rich and
powerful employ indirect coercion to take the world's resources for themselves. The term is used above
in a more elementary and less ideologically burdened sense to ask why masses of people are killed and
terrorized as a result of deprivation of their political and economic human rights by political authority.
See Johan Galtung, "Nonterritorial Actors and the Problem of Peace," in On the Creation of a Just World
Order: PrefelTed Worlds for the 1990s, ed. Saul H. Mendlovitz (New York: The Free Press, 1975), 151-5.
9

See James F. Hoge, Jr., "Media Pervasiveness," Foreign Affairs 73 (July/August 1994):136-44. Also
see Nika Gowing, "Behind the CNN Factor," The Washington Post, July 31, 1994, sec. C, p. 1. Gowing's
thesis, based on a research project that he did at the Joan Shorenstein Barone Center at Harvard
University's John F. Kennedy School of Government, is that the ability of television's shock value to
influence foreign policy decision-making is grossly exaggerated. Gowing's thesis is probably correct in
that, If anything, the pressure of the media reinforces the sense of dilemma without improving decisionmaking and aiding resolution of the problem. Certainly in the 1990s, we have ridden the highs and lows
of humanitarian intervention on television from the moral outrage of ethnic-cleansing in July of 1992
to the euphoria of intervention in Somalia in December of 1992 to the pictures of dead American
Rangers being dragged naked around Mogadishu. More than anything, however, these events show how
we, though well intentioned, get caught up in what Geoffrey Stern calls the "fashionable conscience" in
which we adopt a cause celebre only to later recognize the horrific consequences of both action and
inaction, leading to our disillusionment. Geoffrey Stern, "Morality and International Order," in Alan
James (ed.) 17ie Bases of Intemationa/ Order (New York: Oxford University Press, 1973), 138, 144.

9
The Limits of Moral Action:
American Foreign Policy Adrift

As a result of a political world transfigured but still morally wanting,

Americans began to agonize even more than usual over their traditional
preoccupation of matching their ideals to the real world. It was the classic inner
tension of American exceptionalism where its greatest strength, its liberal aspirations,
confronted its greatest weakness, its unrealistic idealism. Doubts were rising about
the place of democracy and social justice in the world and about the eventual
universal acceptance of liberal ideas.

There was a confluence of hope and

disappointment which was taking its toll on the development of ideas by Americans
about the future of international politics. The United States was failing to take the
moral and diplomatic lead with its allies. The situation eventually manifested itself
in a vacillating U.S. foreign policy subject to moral uncertainty and lack of political
will.
Certainly the failure to produce realistic policy prescriptions for the use of
humanitarian intervention against structural violence and human rights violations has
played a significant role in the drift of American foreign policy. This failure is due
in part to the genuinely difficult issues involved but more importantly to the tension
in international politics between international order and individual justice. It is the
thesis of this paper that an ambitious use of military, humanitarian intervention will
not end structural violence, which is an established part of international relations and
which is seen as a means of preserving international order and the power of the
state. The termination of structural violence is greatly inhibited by a number of

10

fundamental political issues that the best of human knowledge and moral values
about politics--as embodied in social science, the rule of law, political theory, and
moral philosophy--cannot resolve in the foreseeable future. These issues are the lack
of predictive theory in the study of international relations, the unbridgeable divide
in understanding between the various socio-political cultures of international politics,
the preference among foreign policy practitioners for international order and justice
in terms of the state and not the individual, the influence of state-centric thinking
and realism on international behavior, the lack of consensus among states on what
is the legitimate relationship between a state and its people, and the aspirations of
justice without solutions presented by the problems of self-determination and
nationalism. With such significant obstacles to ending structural violence, intervenors
cannot find the political will, i.e., the national, psychological and moral commitment,
for the sustained effort needed for successful humanitarian intervention.

For

Americans, these obstacles prevent the various U.S. foreign policy perspectives of
liberalism, conservatism, neo-isolationism, realism, and internationalism from
developing a moral and effective policy of military humanitarian intervention.
To reconcile the U.S. foreign policy perspectives on humanitarian intervention
with political reality, a systematic look at the problems of ending structural violence
and human rights abuses is presented in the chapters that follow.

Chapter II

examines the failure of the rule of law and social science to provide either
enforceable values or prescriptive and predictive theory in international relations to
end human rights violations and genocide. Chapter III examines the reasons why
international order and the power of the state eclipse individual justice. Chapter IV

11

analyzes the problem of basing humanitarian intervention on the state's legitimacy
in terms of its actual representation of its people, while chapter V looks at the
inability of humanitarian intervention to penetrate the intractable, local problems of
self-determination and nationalism. Chapter VI examines the effect of humanity's
limited abilities concerning international politics and justice on America's traditional
foreign policy perspectives as they relate to humanitarian intervention. And the
concluding chapter analyzes the inabilities and obstacles to resolving structural
violence and human rights abuses in terms of the possibilities of future moral and
epistemic changes in international politics.

The conclusion is that humanity's

incremental acceptance of ideas advancing human rights is working, but, for the
foreseeable future, the end of structural violence and oppression, especially by the
use of force, is beyond humanity's abilities.
To set their foreign policy free from intellectual drift, it is important that
Americans

resolve their moral dilemma over humanitarian intervention and

recognize their true limits of moral action. The way to do this is to acknowledge that
military, humanitarian intervention, except as a temporary expedient such as safe
zones for the dying and suffering, is unworkable and ineffective. Americans need to
recognize intellectually what they know intuitively, which is that there are
transcendental limits to moral, political action and that the incremental steps toward
a better world and against evil are always part of an uphill battle. 10
Recognition of their limits would allow Americans to keep their political
values, despite a world of suffering and despair. Otherwise, the continued ad hoc

10

See Michael Howard, "Cold War, Chill Peace: Prospects for Order and Disorder," 153.

12
toying with the idea of military intervention, which is destined to fail, is likely to
result in terrible cynicism and disillusionment for Americans about the future of
democracy and human rights.
Historically, states have not exhibited the political will to intervene except
under very limited conditions and mostly based on self-interest. 11

Despite the

idealism of American exceptionalism and the humanitarian impulse of Americans,
the United States also has no tradition of humanitarian intervention. This is not to
say that America is a moral failure as a nation. Rather, the point is that the U.S.
failure to assert influence over structural violence is not an excuse for humanity's
moral deficiency but is a reminder that humanitarian intervention is an attempt at
policy beyond the limits of those good people who see the end of genocide as a
desirable, primary goal of foreign policy.
But that moral political action is limited in today's world does not mean that
an effective human rights' policy is impossible. A coherent political philosophy of
morality, constituting a vision and strategy for strengthening justice for the individual
within the arena of international politics, would provide Americans the psychological
and moral foundation, i.e., the political will, for a more assertive foreign policy in
favor of human rights while avoiding cynicism and disillusionment. The result would
be small but realistic intrusions against suffering that are not possible by the use of
force. In this way, Americans can use the only viable option for strengthening the
international human rights regime, which is the incremental infusion of individual

11

Micbael Akehurst, "Humanitarian Intervention," in Hedley Bull (ed.), Intervention in World Politics
(Oxford: Claredon Press, 1984), 95-9; Robert Cooper and Mats Berdal, "Outside Intervention in Ethnic
Conflict," Survival 35 (Spring 1993):134-5.

13

justice into international politics. For Americans, a stronger, international human
rights regime consistent with our political values and the world's realities is necessary,
with the hope that one day there will be knowledgeable and moral change which
ends structural violence. It must be a regime which allows us to cope with the world
as it is but motivates us to pursue the world as it might be.

Chapter II
Social Science and the Rule of Law:
Ineffective Sources of Humanitarian Intervention
The transition to a new configuration of international politics is difficult for
Americans because two of their most important societal values, the belief in science
and the rule of law, provide no immediate answers to genocide and oppression.
Consequently, the debate on humanitarian intervention is, by default, based on
ideology, intuition, moral reasoning, and emotion. More specifically, there is a
problem with the epistemological weakness of international relations. None of the
field's major approaches to theory resolve the fundamental issues of international
politics to the extent that an intellectually sound basis for the moral and political
justifications of military humanitarian intervention exist.

The Failure of the Legalistic-Moralistic Approach
The rule of law's application to international relations is termed the legalistmoralistic approach and is the product of America's great legal tradition and 20th
century idealism. Its legal, positivist principles assume that the law can be shaped
auspiciously through scientific rationalism to resolve humanity's serious social
problems, including those of international politics. Hence, the central idea of the
legalistic-moralistic approach is that rules, norms, international altruism, cooperation,

14
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and collective security can replace power politics, expand the international human
rights regime, devise a world of states under the rule of law, and infuse international
politics with humanistic values. 1
The influence of these principles on international relations can be seen within
the academic literature of the American legal community where legal scholars have
searched for the appropriate legal and moral norms to achieve these goals. Even
before, but especially after the Cold War's end, law review articles have proposed the
use of force within the territory or against the sovereignty of another state to protect
its population against genocide and mass atrocities. Most recently, these writings
proposed legal theories for enlarging the legitimate targets of intervention to include
human rights denied by ordinary oppression.2
The legalistic-moralistic approach, however, despite contributing an
intellectual history of idealistic thought to the study of international relations, denies
the realities of conflict and power, even when viewed from a non-realist perspective.
Ignored are all the complex paradoxical problems of international politics, such as
the conflicting values of different cultures, the fanaticism of political extremists, the
relative power of states, the lack of a centralized restraint on states, the unfinished
business of nationalism, the many meanings of self-determination, and the heavy
burden of responsibility placed on both states and citizens to protect themselves. It

1

Hans Morgenthau terms the rule of law idealism in international relations as the "legalist-moralist
approach." Hans Morgenthau, "Political Power," in John A. Vasquez Classics of Intemational Relations,
2nd ed. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1990), 34.
2

Guenter Lewy, "The Case for Humanitarian Intervention," Orbis (Fall 1993): 62-7. For a
reasonably comprehensive list of law review and other articles on the doctrine of humanitarian
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is an idealistic approach which, if viewed as the primary path to justice m
international relations, is a passion for scientific law and ethics without acceptance
of the realities of political power. As a result, legal theorists concentrate passionately
and idealistically but seldom pragmatically on the problems of genocide and other
atrocities, which is evidenced by the words of law professor Arthur Leff concerning
aid to those suffering in Biafra:
I don't know much about the relevant law. My colleagues, here, who
do, say that it's no insurmountable hindrance, but I don't care much
about international law, Biafra or Nigeria. Babies are dying in
Biafra... We still have food for export. Let's get it to them any way we
can, dropping it from the skies, unloading it from armed ships, blasting
it with cannons if that will work. I can't believe there is much political
cost in feeding babies, but if there is, let's pay it; if we are going to be
hated, that's the loveliest of grounds. 3
Whether Leff is naive about the realities of international politics or a moral
dissenter against a world of amoral power politics is an open question and one that
gets to the heart of the humanitarian intervention debate.

It is a conundrum

especially for legalist-moralists because they have no reality-based prescriptions for
resolution of the complex, paradoxical problems of international politics which
precipitate the complex relationship between justice and order and provoke the
conflicting visions betWeen realism and idealism. Instead, legal scholars either ignore
or poorly refute them, although they must be resolved before the law can become the
main pillar of international order and justice. As a result, the legalist-moralist
approach, other than in law journals, is conspicuous by its absence from the

3Yale law professor Arthur Leff quoted in Michael J. Bazyler, "Reexamining the Doctrine of
Humanitarian Intervention in Light of the Atrocities in Kampuchea and Ethiopia," Stanford Journal of
International Law 23 (Summer 1987): 570, citing the New York Times, 4 Oct. 1986, sec. A, p.46.
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humanitarian intervention debate and receives limited attention by international
relations scholars and foreign policy practitioners.

Its unpopularity reflects the

conventional thinking that laws and norms are effective in assisting those already
interested in peace but not those on whom peace has to be imposed. But, as will be
seen later, the outright rejection of such idealism is the cynical acceptance of power
at the expense of achievable moral goals in foreign policy.4

The Failure of Social Science
The other field ·to which scholars and practitioners alike look for answers is
social science.

Unfortunately, intervention faces the same limits of theory, or

"conceptual jails" as Rosenau calls them, that restrict the whole field of international
relations. As a result, the field has not developed operational and measurable
concepts capable of providing a predictive theory of humanitarian intervention.5
Just as happened during the Vietnam War, the issue of intervention has again
become a compelling issue, this time on matters of genocide, at a time when social
science offers little predictive theory.

In fact, social science has been receiving

increasing criticism for its failure to discover any intersubjective laws of political
behavior. Adding to the doubts about the ability of social science to verify theories

4

Guenter Lewy, "The Case for Humanitarian Intervention," 628.

5

James N. Rosenau, Turbulence in World Politics: A Tlico1y of Change and Continuity (Princeton,
NJ.: Princeton University Press, 1990), 5, 22, 37-44.
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and to provide prescriptions was the recent failure of political science to predict the
Cold War's end and the Soviet Union's demise. 6
According to John Lewis Gaddis, the efforts of behaviorists to proceed "from
a determinedly inductive 'bottom-up approach,' deferring the construction of theory
until they have collected, measured, and compared as much observable evidence as
possible... " in order to verify the results, failed. Unfortunately, political science is not
past the deductive, intuitive stage of reasoning, with its endless heuristic theorizing
as a substitute for valid and reliable empirical studies. Thus, scientific forecasting is
not able to assist with the problem of humanitarian intervention. Although the basis
of Western thought is scientific rationalism, those suffering today's atrocities cannot
afford to wait for behaviorists to collect data for replication and verification through
their inductive '"bottom up' approach"' with the hope that one day scientific laws of
international politics will be discovered to better their lot. 7
The unfulfilled promise of political science is indicated by the field's inability
to find a consensus approach to the systematic study of humanitarian intervention.
&rhe last great intervention issue of Vietnam foreshadowed for Americans the disillusionment of the
1960s about the relevance of political science. In the 1980s, the field's general advancement was
questioned. Now the relevance of political science to post-Cold War problems is being raised. Recently,
Ferguson and Mansbach concluded that "... the nature of theory in international relations and the
manner in which it evolves, along with the subjectivity in the field, make progress in theory construction
difficult, at best, and, at worst, improbable." Yale H. Ferguson and Richard W. Mansbach, The Elusive
Quest: 171eory and Intematio11al Politics (Columbia, S.C.: University of South Carolina Press, 1988),
8-9; Similarly, a recent article by John Lewis Gaddis provided a comprehensive review of international
relations theory in light of its failure to forecast the Cold War's end. Gaddis noted that behavioralism
and quantification have "... produced neither theory nor forecasts, nor usable policy recommendations."
John Lewis Gaddis, "International Relations and the End of the Cold War," Intemational Secun'ty 17
(Winter 1992/93): 20.
7

John Lewis Gaddis, Ibid., 13, citing J. David Singer, "The 'Correlates of War' Project: Interim
Report and Rationale," World Politics 14 (January 1972), 249-51. The many defects of social science do
not mean, however, that it should be fully discounted in political studies such as that of humanitarian
intervention. Quantitative and behavioral studies can inform the moral questions of politics but not to
the extent suggested by Rosenau.
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Over two decades ago, James Rosenau decried the absence of scientific explanations
as to what conditions make intervention legitimate and maximize its probabilities of
success. He argued that an overemphasis on normative, legal and strategic studies
and the infusion of a "...vast array of unrelated matters ... " confused the study of
intervention, which was dominated by "... the common discourse [of] common sense,
general understanding, and metaphoric suggestion ... " instead of science.

Major

problems to be overcome in devising a systematic study of intervention were the
difficulties in defining the national interest, measuring motivation, i.e., the
fundamental goals of the intervenor and the attitudes of the target state's citizens,
and influence, i.e., the degree of effect the intervenor's intentions had on the target
state.8
At the core of the problem, according to Rosenau, is intervention's morally
neutral nature, which he hoped to escape by clarifying its meaning within a boundary
appropriate for scientific study. Intervention as a concept represents acts that may
be either good or bad depending upon one,s view of desired ends. The same act of
intervention often represents a "double standard," i.e., it could be argued as being
both desirable and undesirable by the use of opposing but equally compelling moral
reasoning because of the diversity of values among states. Nevertheless, subjective
thinking about intervention could be reduced if the individual case studies were
analyzed and compared according to a common standard of scientific inquiry using

8James N. Rosenau, "Intervention as a Scientific Concept," Joumal of Co11flict Resolution 23 (1969):
150-1; James N. Rosenau, "The Concept of Intervention," Joumal of lntemational Affairs 22 (1968): 173.
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a common basis of communication. He thought that intersubjective rules might be
discerned to assist intervention in achieving desirable goals. 9
Other scientific disciplines, charged Rosenau, had separated values and
opinions from the technical meaning of empirical observation. In political science,
however, the subjective conceptions of the public and the politicians substituted for
concepts specifically designed for operationalization.

Because of the numerous

definitions of intervention, there was a confusing mix of approaches to its study.
Rosenau's response was to propose a definition of intervention which he argued
allowed for its operationalization. Rosenau's hope was that subsequent studies would
uncover patterns and theories of behavior capable of informing what Rosenau
referred to as intervention's moral question, i.e., the determination of intervention's
desirable ends. Though science could not define these ends, he claimed that it could
assist humanity in this area by providing greater knowledge about "... the sources,
processes, and consequences of interventionary behavior ... "10
To Rosenau, intervention constituted certain human activities which could be
measured to determine whether they were achieving their intended results. Hence,
he proposed a set of operations to identify intervention's existence and suggested two
generally accepted universal characteristics of intervention that are manifested by
human behavior. First, there must be a flagrant break with conventional behavior
lasting until the unconventional acts cease or become conventional over time.
Intervention, thus, is finite and transitory in nature. Second, intervention is aimed

9

James N. Rosenau, "Intervention as a Scientific Concept," 150-2.
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lbid.
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at the target state's authority structure, its leaders, bureaucracy, etc., as opposed to
its policies or capabilities.

This characteristic gives intervention its political

component because the authority structure is the source of the target state's political
control over its civil population. According to Rosenau, the target state's source of
political authority is the political leaders and/or the political processes, e.g., the
bureaucracy, through which the decisions binding on society are made. 11
Essentially, Rosenau views the process of directing intervention at the target
state's authority structure as any convention breaking activity by another state
designed to alter in any significant way the farmer's authority structure. Rosenau
cites examples, such as outside influence on elections and pressure for human rights
which challenge the target state's authority structure.

On the other hand, the

bolstering of an oppressive regime or countering its foreign policy is not intervention
since the activities involved are conventional. Similarly, colonialism and imperialism
involve a continuing control or occupation of the target state which is essentially
conventional behavior outside Rosenau's conception. 12
Rosenau claims that the ambiguity of meaning is greatly resolved by his
definition. The study of intervention is made manageable by eliminating many
interventionist activities irrelevant to operationalizing the subject. Eliminated as
intervention are a lot of foreign policy activities which may break convention but

11

Ibid., 161-2, 164. According to Richard Little, Rosenau's definition met an unfavorable response
apparently because it did not fit either the traditional thinking or ideological preferences of the attending
scholars; Richard Little, "Recent Literature on Intervention and Non-Intervention," in Ian Forbes and
Mark Hoffman, eds., Political Theory, Intemational Relations and the Ethics of /11terventio11, (New York:
St. Martin's Press, Inc., 1993), 16.
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James N. Rosenau, "Intervention as a Scientific Concept," 161-2, 164-5.
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seldom are aimed at another state's authority structure. Also eliminated is equating
ideology with intervention. The problem of the national interest, though difficult to
solve, is reduced by improved empiricism. The unmeasurable factor of motivation
can be avoided in determining interventionary phenomena. Neither the intentions
of the intervenor nor the attitudes of those within the target state need to be
examined to identify behavior composing intervention.

As a result, with

unmeasurable factors, such as motivation, eliminated and the focus placed more
narrowly on the casual connection between sharp changes in behavior, i.e.,
intervention, and the changes in the target's state's authority structure, measuring
influence is made easier. 13
Because intervention is defined in terms of its operations, Rosenau argues that
behavior can be observed systematically.

Thus, statements by the intervenor's

political leaders hostile to the target state's authority structure could be observed as
evidence that intervention is aimed at the target's political system.

Dictatorial

interference could be measured by the visible protest in the target state against
intervention. The change in the target state's authority structure could be observed
during the intervention process. In this way, imprecise terms and normative concepts
could be avoided while observable criteria could be discovered to measure
intervention's success in terms of whether it achieved what it intended.

More

specifically, an observer could develop operations to determine if a particular military
action was serving its intended purpose. 14

13

Ibid., 155-6.

14

lbid., 155.
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Although Rosenau's writings provided valuable material on intervention, the
boundary between science and the moral question has yet to be found. Subsequent
studies failed to fulfill his hopes that scientific analysis would one day inform the
moral complexity of intervention.

Today, normative theory still dominates

international relations as well as intervention. Richard Little recently surveyed the
literature on intervention and concluded that "The research required to develop a
general theoretical understanding of intervention ... is simply limited."15 Similarly,
David A. Welch, in his generally favorable review of one of the more recent and
informative anthologies on intervention, wrote about the problem of definition:
... although a number of essays note that the concept of intervention
can refer to a wide variety of acts and relationships (and, in its most
liberal interpretation, is coextensive with international politics as a
whole), no two essays seem to use the word in precisely the same way.
It is therefore often difficult to know exactly what problem the book
is seeking to explore. This indeterminacy raises particular difficulties
for the authors of the case studies, all of which are interesting and
informative, but none of which is truly a "hard case" in the absence of
a clear definition of the phenomenon. 16

The Moral Issue of Intervention

The problem that Rosenau and other behavioralists could not transcend is the
inability of social science to grasp the non-measurable components of intervention,
i.e., those related to values, ideology, power and motivation. Rosenau's reasoning is

15

Richard Little, "Recent Literature on Intervention and Non-Intervention," 14; also see Richard
Little, "Revisiting Intervention: A Survey of Recent Developments," Review of Intemational Studies 13
(1987): 49-50.
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mistaken in the assumption that observable acts constituting intervention can be
separated from the motives, i.e., the values, which inform intervention. As a result,
social science cannot satisfactorily overcome the problem of measuring influence.
Political behavior within the target state, or more specifically the behavior of its
authority structure, still cannot be linked causally to intervention by empirical study.
That the behavior in the target state may have occurred anyway or was caused by
factors other than intervention cannot be disproved by empirical observation.
Rosenau's definition of intervention is also disadvantaged by being limited to
conventional behavior. Such conventional acts as bolstering an oppressive regime or
exploiting other states politically and economically are generally considered
intervention, but even if Rosenau is correct that such acts should not be included in
an operational definition, he still has the problem of separating their capacity to
precipitate and generate the impulse for intervention from the operational behaviors
he designated for study.

By defining intervention as unconventional behavior,

Rosenau

operationalization

gained

some

but

dismissed

other

important

interventionary factors which still must be studied as part of the whole picture.
Rosenau is a social scientist who accepts the improvement of the human
condition as a primary goal of social science, 17 and he has demonstrated in his own
preferences for order and moral imperatives that there cannot be any analysis of
intervention without prior assumptions of what are desirable ends. Empirical data,
in fact, is of little help in resolving intervention's moral issue concerning which ends
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are desirable because data and any resulting intersubjective laws are of little help in
resolving moral conflicts. For example, the increasingly accepted and scientifically
validated principle, at least according to Western thinking, that democracies do not
go to war with each other does not solve the problems of moral and cultural
relativism among states. 18 Rosenau's analysis cannot help but fall into the logical
paradox of assuming certain desirable ends of ultimate good that cannot be
scientifically demonstrated, e.g., international order and a world devoid of atrocities
and racism, as part of his behavioralist goals. Further, he would not likely abandon
these desirable ends even if empirical findings were to bring them into question.
Rosenau's analysis of intervention showed him feeling seriously constrained
by the moral problem involved. This constraint was reflected in his acceptance of
normative studies on moral, legal and strategic issues as important to the study of
intervention. Obviously, his inability, and reluctance, to escape intervention's moral
significance, despite his desire for an operational definition, was influenced by the
controversy of America's involvement in the Vietnam War, which was one of the
great political issues of the day and one to which political science was accused of
being irrelevant. Thus, Rosenau wrote at the time that intervention is the political
community's most pressing moral issue involving "... the human spirit, the liberty of

18
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individuals, the structure of groups, [and] the existence of order," which affects the
dignity of people and the amount of control they have over their destinies. 19
Rosenau attempted to separate science from values with the noble aspiration
that the former would inform the latter. In the final analysis, however, he could not
resolve the problems of moral and cultural relativism. He could not help but retain
certain core values, such as international order and the evil of genocide. Rosenau
assumed the necessity to condemn intervention generally for the sake of international
order while allowing for appropriate exceptions for the sake of morality.

His

acceptance of nonintervention as a norm implied order as a desirable end. He based
exceptions to the nonintervention norm on the assumption that some acts against it
preserved international order and human rights. Rosenau's examples of the U.S.
intervening in Latin America as "unwarranted" while intervening against Hitler's
Germany as "justified" implied certain moral imperatives for the international
community, such as the need to stop and punish genocide even at the expense of
state sovereignty and the risk of international disorder. 20
Neither could Rosenau escape the ethic of consequences, i.e., the demands of
the real world. He assumed the need to avoid the harmful effects of intervention
and that there are situations in which the preservation of international order must
supersede a generally perceived moral imperative. To Rosenau, sometimes a leader
must place prudence above principle. For example, he agreed with the failure of the
West to intervene in Hungary's 1956 revolt against the Soviet Union for fear of a
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nuclear holocaust. As a result, he ultimately relied on the same utilitarian reasoning
and ethic of consequences that realists adhere to. He returned to thinking in terms
of preferred ends and the national interest. 21
His assumption of desirable ends proved that he could not get past social
science's inability to find which ends are the more desirable and which actions are
in accord with them. Hence, the inability of human observation to separate political
values from political behavior left all politics in the realm of moral and cultural
subjectivity. This situation is manifested in the recent return to the forefront of
intervention issues involving nationalism, self-determination, and ethnic conflict.
During the Cold War, they were considered in decline in the face of cosmopolitan,
social progress brought about by science and universal values, such as democracy and
Marxism. The only question was whether Western or Marxist universalism would
prevail.

However, ethnic nationalism and self-determination, even in the West,

intensified with a vengeance to the extent that humanitarian intervention was
contemplated and found wanting. Exacerbating the problem was the admission by
scholars that they could not identify a clear set of factors for making reasonably
certain predictions on where ethnic conflict would strike next, on the degree of
popular support it would receive, on the intensity it would possess, and on its
probable duration. 22 Such unexpected changes in international politics served to
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illustrate that it was precisely because Western thought had no effective method of
comprehending the complexities of societies with different political and cultural
values that it substituted theorizing on political and moral philosophy for predictive
theory. For Americans today, the lesson is that there is no systematic and reliable
method of determining the consequences of humanitarian intervention.

Humanitarian Intervention:
Intrusion into the Unknown
Another way to view the problem of intervention not being susceptible to
scientific measurement and predictive theory is to recognize that intervention
produces local undulations which can never be separated in any clear way from the
periodic outcomes of the local political process. For instance, Michael Walzer and
his critics during the late 1970s debated the efficacy of possible U.S. intervention in
Nicaragua between the time of the Sandinista defeat in 1978 and Somoza's ouster in
1979. To Walzer, the efficacy of nonintervention was shown by what he saw as the
internal adjustments of self-determination and local responsibility leading eventually
to Somoza's defeat. Luban, on the other hand, saw these factors as being neutralized
by oppressive force in 1978, making nonintervention immoral, as the Nicaraguan state
made war on its own people who, he alleged, suffered needlessly and irretrievably for
another year.

As it was, who could have foreseen the defeat by ballot of the

Sandinistas? Who could have seen, and even today say, at what point intervention
would have worsened or relieved the suffering of the Nicaraguan people? The
complexity of the political process and the denouement in Nicaragua since Somoza's
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defeat makes the intervention issue of 1978 appear insignificant. 23 Unfortunately,
a state's internal, political conflict is difficult to analyze in a systematically empirical
manner at the international, state, and individual levels except in studies of limited
historical context because, as Walzer argues, self-determination is an open-ended,
historical process.

The Delusion of Scientific Prescription and
the Hope of Vision

The refusal to recognize the limitations of social science has serious
implications for both the study and practice of international relations and
humanitarian intervention.

The belief in science can be seductive, such that

normative theorists might mistake their approach as scientific in nature and
behavioralists might see their limited quantitative studies as supportive of their
ideological positions. Thus, by self-deception either might mistake their ideology for
scientific findings about international relations based on behavioral studies. Those
desiring progress might become so convinced of the righteous nature of their cause
that they imperceptibly manipulate quantitative studies in the pursuit of normative
goals, i.e., the masking

of idealism with scientism.

Contemporary evidence that ideology is susceptible to being mistaken as social
science and behavioralism is presented in the ideas of the recently defunct World
Order Models Project (WOMP).

23

During the 1980s, it was an approach to
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international relations by a number of highly respected scholars who used statistical
and empirical data to compare past, present, and future international systems. The
goal was to develop projections and trends that could be analyzed for remedies to
approaching world catastrophes. Starting with a worldwide group of scholars and
tentative conclusions general enough for consensus, WOMP advocates sought to
develop "a framework of world order values," which over time would raise the
consciousness of the elite of international society. The idea was that eventually new
values of international politics would be accepted by states, international
organizations (10s) and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), regional, cultural,
and ethnic groups. As a result, international politics would progress toward a world
order absent the direct violence of killing and the indirect violence of social,
environmental and political oppression. 24
Richard Falk envisioned WOMP as a world order of minimal collective
violence and maximum economic and environmental well-being, social and political
justice.

The values of the international system of states would in effect be

transformed with NGOs acting as interest groups for the people and not their abusive
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governments and elites. WOMP, however, was susceptible to the same criticism
placed upon the current trend of multicultural education, i.e., that its goal of
consciousness raising was designed '"to give an academic gloss to an implied power
struggle and to organize ... on a political basis without seeming to do so."'

25

Thus,

WOMP advocates could have it both ways. They could become political activists
without forsaking social science.
On the other hand, WOMP's ideas helped create a vision of global problems
that, as will be seen later, developed a new appeal after the Cold War. In addition,
its emphasis on justice is part of the same idealism that is behind the ideas of the
post-Cold War interventionists. Yet that military humanitarian intervention other
than other than very limited actions appears to be a failure is no reason to become
cynical, for it is the very Western idealism of the rule of law and the belief in
scientific progress which, while failing to stop structural violence, provides the hope
for incremental advances in the protection of human rights.
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Chapter III
The Conflict Between International Order and Justice
Three Kinds of International Justice
Justice, as the goal of humanitarian intervention, is clearly described in the scholarly
and popular literature in terms of justice for the individual. Yet, in international politics,
justice has three conceptual meanings. Initially, Hedley Bull gives its fundamental
meaning, which is as applicable in the international arena as it is within states, as "... the
class of moral ideas ... which treat human actions as right in themselves and not merely as a
means to an end." Bull, however, in writing about international justice, further divides it
into three categories, interstate justice or the reciprocal recognition by states of each other's
rights and duties, human justice or the respect shown for the rights and duties of individual
human beings by the state, and cosmopolitan justice or the rights and duties people and
their states owe each other for "the world common good" as members of a global
community. I

I See note 11 below on the issue of individual justice as the core value ofhmnanitarian intervention;
For a discussion of the different concepts of international justice, see Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society:
A Study ofOrder in World Politics (New York: Colmnbia university Press, 1977), 78-86. It must be
remembered, however, that Bull is a realist.

32

33
Individual Justice: Obstacle to International Order?

But the traditional view within the field of international relations is that the
pursuit of individual justice by states conflicts with international order, because the
latter cannot exist without a state-centric international politics based upon interstate
justice. As the idea goes, some minimum degree of international order is considered
a precondition to all the other desirable goals of international politics, including a
reasonable degree of international justice, but the pursuit of individual justice
conflicts with international order and interstate justice, and therefore, threatens all
forms of justice.2 The question then for humanitarian intervention is whether the
international community is willing and able to balance individual justice more
equitably with international order and interstate justice for the purpose of reducing
human suffering and atrocities?

The outlook for the foreseeable future is not

optimistic.
The role of order in international politics is complex and often vaguely
alluded to, but its general acceptance as the framework within which international
relations is studied makes it important to the analysis of intervention. It is an
important theoretical concept because it is viewed as both the objective behavior of
international politics and the ideological aspirations and accomplishments of a state
or a concert of states. 3

2

As will be seen, the literature of international relations and foreign policy, including that of many
of the foremost thinkers in both fields, is replete with the assumption that international order and
individual justice conflict. See Hedley Bull, Ibid., 86-98.
3

As will be seen, RJ. McKinlay and R. Little have a very subjective view of international order in
contrast to James N. Rosenau's objective view.
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The Definition of International Order

In its normative sense, international order is the world which states view as
most closely reflecting the attainment of their desirable goals of foreign policy.
It is an ideological interpretation of international order. That is to say, states desire
their core values to have as much influence over the world as possible. The closer
the world approaches each individual state's ideal world order, the more it feels
secure, self-fulfilled, and confirmed in its core values. In this way, a state's view of
world order structures its foreign policy choices. The goals and the methods for the
achievement of international order are, therefore, a matter of the state's political and
cultural values. In this respect, it is difficult to dismiss the ideological aspects of
international order.

This is why American exceptionalism plays an important role

in U.S. efforts for a liberal world order.4
In its empirical sense, international order, as aptly described by James
Rosenau, is the impersonal, causative forces of world politics whose reoccurring
patterns of individual and collective human behavior are molded by cultural,
environmental, situational, and historical factors. Rosenau assumes order to be an
objective reality. There is a cause for every effect. Nothing happens at random.
World order and intervention are empirical phenomena.

4

At present, however,

McKinlay and Little have a subjectivist view of world order as constituting goals, structural
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humanity does not have the skills and scientific tools to observe the underlying causes
of international political behavior and must take them on faith. 5
International order is also thought of in a far deeper philosophical sense as
a precondition to all the other desirable goals of international politics. Just as
domestic order is a societal arrangement which minimizes violence and lawlessness
and assures the basic goals of organized social life within the state, the same is true
for international order except that states which are in a contentious decentralized
world must limit their competition to protect those goals. 6 As a result, international
politics utilizes different mechanisms than domestic politics to keep order.
Accordingly, Hedley Bull defines international order "... as patterns or dispositions of
human activity that sustain the elementary or primary goals of social life among
mankind as a whole." These "common goals of all social life," in Martin Griffith's
words, are security of human life, sanctity of contract and stable possession of
property. As John Vincent notes in discussing Bull's definition, states attempt to
secure these goals in order to assure human existence, cooperation and economic
development. 7 Obviously, international order is a valued entity not to be put at risk
except for the most compelling reasons.

5James

N. Rosenau, "Intervention as a Scientific Concept," Joumal of Co11flict Resolutio11 13 (June
1969): 23; James N. Rosenau, Turbulence i11 World Politics: A Theory of Change and Continuity
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1990), 50.
James Q. Wilson, The Moral Sense (New York: The Free Press, 1993), 13-15; Patrick M. Morgan,
Theories and Approaches to Intemational Politics: U!lzat Are We To Think, 4th ed., (New Brunswick:
Transaction Books, 1988), 261.
6

7RJ.

Vincent, No11i11terve11tio11 and !11tematio11a/ Order (Princeton, NJ.: Princeton University Press,
1974), 329; Hedley Bull, 171e Anarchical Society, 4-5, 20; Martin Griffith's, "Order and International
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The Status Quo of International Order
Over Individual Justice

Because it is so highly valued, there is no mystery as to how states currently
act, both individually and as an international community, in balancing international
order with individual justice. That genocide is a byproduct of the state's protection
of order is evidenced by the strength of the nonintervention norm even when its
violation could stop atrocities by other states and political groups.

Not even

unconscionable atrocities stop individual justice from receiving mostly formal
recognition while the threats, if not the acts, of power politics still control the pursuit
of world order.

This priority is evidenced from the general condemnation by the

society of states of the interventions in Kampuchea, Uganda and Bangladesh, despite
their humanitarian results and by the lack of collective sanctions against most of the
acts of genocide subsequent to the Second World War. Clearly, a certain sacrificial
level of structural violence by states against each other and their civilian populations
is perceived as necessary to the maintenance of international order. 8

In addition, the nature of justice itself prevents it from becoming a highly
desirable goal of foreign policy. To begin with, justice means many things to many

8

Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society, 96-7; R.J. Vincent, Nonintervention and Intemational Order,
310; also see Samuel Kim, Toward A Just World Order (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1984), 239;
Tom J. Farer, "An Inquiry into the legitimacy of Humanitarian Intervention," in Lori Fisler Damrosch
and David J. Scheffer (editors) Law and Force in the New Intemational Order (Boulder, Colorado:
Westview Press, 1991), 193-4; The noxious but difficult to refute idea of structural violence, as an
explanation of the base cruelty of international politics, holds that the existence of genocide and/ or other
forms of violence are a necessary part of the development of the state system and the maintenance of
world order. RJ. Vincent, Nonintervention and I11tematio11al Order, 332; Barbara Harft Genocide and
Human Rights: Inaction and Political Issues, Monograph Series in World Affairs, ed., Karen A. Feste,
Vol. 20 (Denver: University of Denver Graduate School of International Studies, 1984), 12-13.

37
people and is often subject to double standards, which presents an insurmountable
problem in its enforcement for world leaders.9 As a result, justice is generally
accepted not as a universal truth but either as the aggrieved wrong or the preferred
set of values held by a people within a particular political subgroup. That it is
"universal" only within the political subgroup is expressed in the hackneyed Cold War
expression that one man's terrorist is another's freedom fighter. Put another way,
people tend to be realists concerning their own interests and moralists concerning the
interests of others. Consequently, social scientists devalue its usefulness in the study
of political behavior just as practitioners do in the formulation and implementation
of foreign policy. 10
But humanitarian intervention is usually discussed in terms of human or
individual justice and, to a lesser extent, in terms of cosmopolitan justice or the
common good.

It is usually defined in terms of remedying mass and flagrant

violations of human rights, stopping and preventing outrageous, mass atrocities, acts
of oppression, and unnecessary suffering, and, more recently, in terms of protecting
basic political, cultural, and economic human rights.

The goals of humanitarian

intervention are based on the idea that the inherent value of the individual human
being is not negated by the exigencies of international politics. The meaning of

9

Compare the double standards of justice with those of intervention, the latter which James Rosenau
attempted unsuccessfully to ameliorate by developing an operational definition for intervention. Both
justice and intervention are burdened by their subjective natures which necessitate disagreement by
people and political communities over the choices of desirable ends. See above, p. 12.
10Stanley Hoffmann, Duties Beyond Borders:
On the Limits and Possibilities of Ethical International Politics (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1981), 31, 196; Geoffrey Stern, Morality and
International Order,"in Alan James (ed.) The Bases of lntematio11al Order (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1973), 144.
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humanitarianism is the sole concern for the welfare of the human race, which is
primarily based on cosmopolitan morality or the common good, derived from that is
the idea of individual justice.11

The Desire for Justice and
the Values Distribution Among States

The various meanings of justice and the difficulties of applying them to ideas
such as humanitarian intervention do not, however, negate the omnipresence of the
desire for justice in international politics.

As Bull points out, the actors in

international politics hold specific values and beliefs on justice which affect the
course of events.

According to Oran Young, the structure of the international

political system is characterized by motivational, systemic factors or variables such
as ideological and conceptual norms of order.

There is in effect a "values

distribution" within the international system which influences political behavior
including intervention. 12
For examples of the "values distribution" among states, Young points to the
historical tension between radical and status quo states and competing visions of
world order including the interventionary propensities of the "crusading or

usee Jack Donnelly, U11iversal Huma11 Rights in T71eory and Practice (Ithaca: Cornell University
Press, 1989), 260; Thomas Weiss and Thomas J. Watson, "Tangled Up in Blue: Intervention and
Alternatives," Harvard intematio11al Review 26 (Fall 1993): 31; Adam Roberts, "Humanitarian War:
Military Intervention and Human Rights," /lltemational Affairs 60 (July 1993): 445; Charles A. Beitz,
Political 171eory a11d /lltemational Relatio11s (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1970), 181-2;
See the definition of humanitarianism in T71e Random House College Dictionary.
Hedley Bull, T71eA11archical Society, 78; Oran R. Young, "Intervention and International Systems,"
Journal of /11tematio11al Affairs 22 (1968): 182-85.
12
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proselytizing syndrome" of states. Such norms may relate to a state's internal factors
such as its form of government and ideology or to international factors such as the
values of the international community, e.g., toward conservative or revolutionary
intervention. 13

Cultural Relativism and the Lack of Consensus on Justice
The distribution of values within the international system of states, however,
is a function of cultural relativism.

States, consequently, are in conflict over

interstate, individual, and cosmopolitan justice.

Each of the culturally distinct

political communities constituting the subcomponents of states possesses a collective
sense of justice based on its own referential experiences. Hence, the community's
cultural history determines its political values, including its collective sense of justice
which may exist at the state or substate level depending upon the state's degree of
political homogeneity. Yet, paradoxically most states are part of larger socio-political
cultures, while domestically they

are often

not

culturally homogeneous.

Consequently, socio-political conflict of varying degrees between and within states,
which is justice based and culturally induced, is not uncommon. 14
This collective sense of justice, is a source of both unity and conflict. It draws
the culturally distinct political community together against outsiders but also incites
ethnic and other group identity conflicts, especially within states, because the

13

0ran R. Young, Ibid.

14These observations are supported by arguably strong theories about the issues of state legitimacy,
the nature of the state and its subgroups, the conflict of cultures within and among states, and how the
ideas of justice relate to these questions, which are dealt with in subsequent chapters.
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differing perceptions of collective justice among groups result in an enduring feeling
of deprivation and the desire for retribution of an aggrieved wrong. Hence, the
festering of ethnic groups' resentments is explosive and is a fomenter of violence.
The implication for those attempting to balance justice and order is that the
analysis of other political communities is made difficult by the fact that the bonding
of values of the civil populations within states both promotes and disrupts order. The
sense of collective justice held by communities encourages a form of nationalism in
the West based on the rule of law and individual and cosmopolitan justice that
discourages local conflict and disunity within states, but the sense of collective justice
also provokes an ethnic variety of nationalism which is a cause of unusually
malevolent civil war making the moral discrimination between victim and culprit
difficult for outsiders. 15 In addition, the desire for justice encourages moralism or
the group's belief that it possesses the sole truth on its particular issue or issues of
grievance. As Hedley Bull argues, it is the uncompromising pursuit of justice which
provokes arbitrary interventions and displaces those devices necessary to the
preservation of order, and hence leads to disorder and paradoxically to greater
injustice.
With its lack of consensus on meaning, valuing justice equally with order is
seen as a threat to stability by state and world leaders, whether in terms of ideology,
self-determination or human rights. Bull points out that the lack of consensus by
states concerning the desirable ends of foreign policy makes international politics

Hedley Bull, 171e A11arcltical Society, 87-90.

15

41
"inhospitable" to the idea of the world common good or cosmopolitan justice. 16
For the same reason, international politics is inhospitable to the idea of human
justice as well. With the incongruity of justice, it is order, Bull states, that is the
precondition for the existence of the "selective and partial" justice, which is the
maximum that humanity can achieve in the world of politics as it is today. 17 Indeed,
a main argument against humanitarian intervention is that states cannot give
individual justice priority over international politics without producing disorder from
the many resulting conflicts and interventions.
Another reason for the preference of order over justice in international
politics is the traditional, philosophical presuppositions about the nature of
international politics held by political leaders and scholars derived from how they see
human nature and behavior. Scholars and practitioners, arguably through no fault
of their own, view international relations in a way which makes them justice
agnostics. World leaders assume that nonintervention protects state sovereignty
which protects world order. The pursuit of universal individual justice, on the other
hand, is seen as an impossible task, which would violate state sovereignty and the
nonintervention norm to the detriment of international order. International order
is associated with security and stability for the state both at home and abroad. To
scholars in particular, order must exist as an "initial premise" to the scientific study
of international relations. Scholars see international order as a behavioral entity

16RJ. Vincent, Nonintervention and Intemational Order, 387; R.D. McKinlay and R. Little, Global
Problems and World Order, 8-9; Rosenau, "Intervention as a Scientific Concept," 151; Hedley Bull, The
Anarchical Society, 87-90.

Hedley Bull, 17ie Anarchical Society, 86, 93.
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existing in a different domain than international justice. Since values and science
supposedly are separate entities, scholars think in terms of theories about structure
and order. They see international politics in terms of the big picture and see the
pursuit of individual justice at best irrelevant to and at worst conflicting with the
maintenance of order because of the structure and nature of the world of states.
Because practitioners and scholars alike work from theory, whether it is working
theories like appeasement and deterrence or structural theories such as neo-realism,
they tend to see the preservation of international order in dispassionate and
utilitarian terms. 18
The Dispassionate Mindset on International Politics

With this dispassionate macro view, disorder within and among states is quite
logically susceptible to being viewed as an observable, impersonal political event
demanding analysis rather than as acts of cruelty against large numbers of people
deserving of a humanitarian response. According

to

Rosenau, disorder, which he

terms turbulence, results from the impersonal forces of the human interaction of
many actors in a complex process, which has an emerging behavioral pattern. Some
of the reoccurring patterns and responses of individual and collective human
behavior, when isolated and viewed at any particular point in time, involve conflicts

As to order as an initial premise to make the systematic study of international politics possible, see
James N. Rosenau, Turbulence, 50; This observation of the distraction by international relations'
theorists and policy makers away from the principles of individual and cosmopolitan justice is similar
to the argument that the principles of group morality, i.e., the morality of political communities and
states, sanitizes the standard morality generally accepted by individuals. It is the idea that the conscience
of the individual dissolves into the amoral, opportunistic political goals of the group. See Mary
Maxwell, Morality Among Nations: An Evolutionary View, IO, 23-5, citing Reinhold Niebuhr, Moral Man
and Immoral Society (New York: Scribners, 1932), 84-5, and 123-6.
18
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and fluctuations, which are normally perceived as disorder.

However, Rosenau

argues that they are actually adjustments in the international system in transition
from an old to a new order. 19
Rosenau's dispassionate response to today's turbulence of premising order out
of disorder does not lend itself to ideas about humanitarian intervention. This is not
to criticize Rosenau's level of compassion in any way but rather to demonstrate the
mindset of those attentive to international relations, which, regardless of whether a
justifiable view or not, is a barrier to the political will needed for effective
humanitarian intervention.

Realism and Justice

Another barrier to thinking in humanitarian terms is the mindset and
influence of realism.

Few practitioners and scholars deny that relative power,

cultural and ideological diversity, and the national interest are indispensable factors
of international politics. The problem with realism, however, is not that it has been
a predominant part of American foreign policy since the Second World War but
rather that, no matter how strong idealism penetrates its theories, the realities of
power and self-interest, at least through perception, remain with us. That realism
cannot be fully excised from international relations implies serious limits on the
ability of states to end structural violence.

James N. Rosenau, "Intervention as a Scientific Concept," 23; James N. Rosenau, Turbulence in
World Politics, 50.
19
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According to realists, based on the presupposition that human nature is selfaggrandizing in a world unconstrained by any central authority, states are egoistic
entities of varying degrees of power trapped together in a "security dilemma" of
mutual fear of aggression.

A current example of this dangerous game is the

thousands of nuclear warheads still available even after the Cold War to the U.S. and
Russia which, though not currently targeted at each other, can be retargeted in about
thirty minutes. The only effective response by states to the "security dilemma,"
according to realist theory, is the rational and measured use of force on issues either
of survival or of vital interests and, otherwise, the mutual restraint of force through
the international structuring of certain stability devices, which are the balance of
power, diplomacy, world leadership by powerful states, international law, negotiation,
interstate justice, and at times, when necessary, war. 20
Structuring this equilibrium of relative peace against the vicissitudes of
international politics, realists believe, is a matter of skill. Since power and interest
are objective realities self-evident from the nature of international politics, they can
be discerned in the real world, albeit imperfectly and too often unskillfully, but,
nonetheless, the opportunity is there for pursuit of an effective foreign policy. By
skillful and objective threat perception, the focus and expenditure of state power can

Thompson, Traditions and Values In Politics and Diplomacy: Theory and Practice (Baton
Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1992), 89; Hedley Bull, Tlze Anarchical Society, 91-3, 101,
127, 162, 184, 200; R.D. McKinlay and R. Little, Global Problems, 74-7, 78-80; The balance of power
is an alliance of states with similar interests counterbalancing a threatening state. The natural response
in a decentralized world of relative power, according to realists, is for states to align themselves in blocks
so that no one state becomes predominate enough to threaten others and world order; Philip Wiener,
Dictionary of the History of Ideas: Studies of Selected Pivotal Ideas (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons,
1973), s.v. "Balance of Power," by Herbert Butterfield; J. Hare and Carey Joynt, Ethics and
International Affairs (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1982), 48-9; sec George F. Kennan, "Morality and
Foreign Policy," Foreign Affairs 64 (Winter 1985/86): 206, 207.
20 Kenneth
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effectively protect the state's national interest. The inescapable implication of this
theory, however, is that, between fortuity and blunder, the world, imperfect as it is,
allows for structural violence.21
Realist theory favors interstate justice over individual and cosmopolitan justice
because the state is assumed to be the only political entity capable of structuring an
equilibrium of relative peace by a moderate pursuit of the national interest. It is
considered the most capable instrument to use the stability devices needed to
maintain international order.

The state, therefore, is seen as having a special

fiduciary relationship with its citizens, like that between agency and principle, to
pursue the national interest.22
Although the national interest is criticized for being almost infinite in
meaning, realists view it as an elastic concept similar to the general concepts of
American constitutional law, which grows and changes with the demands of
international politics. For realists, the indefinite nature of the concept does not
negate its reality. Elasticity of concepts is part of the nature of politics.

For

example, survival, like free speech, remains a core value, though how it is defended
changes with history.

Therefore, an effective foreign policy adapts its threat

perceptions realistically and skillfully as time and circumstances change.

State

Michael Joseph Smith, Realist 1710ught from Weber to Kissi11ter (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State
University Press, 1986), 154-5; Hans J. Morgenthau, "Another Great Debate: The National Interest
of the United States," 171e American Political Science Review 46 (December 1952): 972.
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leaders are accountable for pursuing the national interest skillfully. 23 Realists admit
that concepts like the national interest and power may be ambiguous but nonetheless
represent the reality of political behavior.
At the core of the national interest are the state's survival interests around
which its citizens coalesce in support and for which they are willing to die. Survival
interests are the "irreducible minimum" of the state's physical and moral integrity in
contrast to the state's historically variable wish list of non-survival interests advanced
by the conflicting desires of its special interest factions, political elites, and publics.
In addition to

domestic pressures, there is also the influence of supranational

organizations. Supporters of particular variable interests, claiming economic benefits
or affective sympathy abroad, often attempt to elevate their agendas to survival
interest status. Variable interests, argue realists, are highly susceptible to negative
factors such as moralism, arrogance of power and egoism. An obvious variable
interest, according to realists, is human rights. Under these circumstances, the state's
moderate pursuit of its survival interests maximizes interstate justice which also
obtains the greatest possible justice for its citizens. Since survival interests include
the state's moral integrity, the national interest relates to more than physical survival.
It is also a matter of protecting a state's core values, which includes the state's

political institutions and cultural values. It is these core values that give the state's
political community its sense of meaning, self-identity and self-fulfillment, and feeling
of virtue along with its sense of physical well-being. Thus, within that "irreducible

~ee Hans J. Morgenthau, "Another Great Debate," 972; George F. Kennan, "The National Interest
of the United States," Illinois Low Review 45 (January-February 1951): 730, 736, 738; Kenneth
Thompson, Traditions and Values, 81.
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minimum" of survival interests are those core values which give moral self-fulfillment
to the state's political community and which are worth the costs in lives and money
to defend, even overseas in intervention, as exemplified by the willingness of the
American people to defend their democratic institutions by interventionist policies
during and after the Second World War.24 Clearly, under this reasoning, the state's
protection of its moral integrity by realist principles provides its citizens the optimum
satisfaction of their collective sense of justice.
Realism also serves justice, claim its advocates, because the moderation it
requires for a rational determination of the national interest also protects the
diversity among states. According to Morgenthau, the citizens and leaders of the
world's states prefer their policies to be consistent with a reciprocal respect of each
others cultural and political values. Thus, they recognize that the respect of diversity
is pragmatic and a matter of enlightened self-interest. Although realists do not see
the protection of diversity a desirable end unto itself, its protection, nonetheless, is
an important ingredient of international order because it is consistent with
moderation and compromise among states. 25
When, however, the collective perception of justice, whether in a state as a
whole, e.g., Nazi Germany, or within the subgroups of a state, e.g., the former
Yugoslavia, takes precedence over the pursuit of interstate justice, rational thinking
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on the use of power and the pursuit of the national interest is disrupted. Realists
claim that the tenets of realism encourage the mutual trust and respect among states
needed for peace and discourage the state's corrupt, unbridled pursuit of its selfinterest through either moralism or moral skepticism. Realists like Hans Morgenthau
reject the criticism that their theory of international politics is amoral and a form
moral skepticism. To the contrary, they claim that realism, by avoiding the irrational
zeal of moralism, prescribes an effective, moderate structure of equilibrium for peace
which maximizes the influence of morality and justice in international politics.26
The danger of moralism and moral skepticism is that either can easily erupt
in many states and their political subgroups. The earnest pursuit of justice can
change with political conditions into either deceptive moralizing to rationalize
egoistic policies or delusional thinking to affirm fanatical beliefs. The result is a
radicalized, and often violent, policy toward those with different interests and values
which works against the trust required between states for peace and international
order. As either moral hypocrisy or fanaticism displaces the national interest, the
survival of the state and, consequently, the maintenance of world order are put at
unnecessary risk. 27

~ee Charles R. Beitz, Political Theory and I11tematio11al Relations, (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton
University Press, 1979), 15-17; also see Marshall Cohen, "Moral Skepticism and International
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Because of the state's importance, strong international norms in its favor,
including one of nonintervention, are seen as necessary to international order.
Because realism is a state-centric theory, some violence is morally defensible as a
tool for structuring stability devices, and a high degree of noninterference in favor
of the state is necessary to keep it viable enough to play a positive role in the
structuring. As bluntly put by Hedley Bull, violence is traditionally used in power
politics as a stabilizing device for the maintenance of world order.28
Yet it is the nonintervention norm that allows the state to abuse its citizens
with impunity. As a result, realism's assumption that the state is the rightful and
most efficient political unit to protect the world's civilian populations presents a
serious obstacle to the development of human justice in today's world. The price
that humanity pays for an orderly world of states is a reluctance of the international
community and its most powerful states to interfere in a serious way, and especially
militarily, not only against ordinary oppression but also against atrocities and severe
human rights violations.29
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Bull admits that this state-centric conception of justice does not conform to
the popular individual and cosmopolitan connotations of justice. He accepts that the
stability devices violate the ordinary sense of justice held by many people, groups,
and even states, because they depend upon the use of violence, power, and the
pursuit of the national interest, but sometimes violence must be used to save a viable
state and hence to maintain order. Accordingly, Bull writes that "...war... plays a
central role in the maintenance of international order, the enforcement of
international law, the preservation of the balance of power, and the effecting of
changes which a consensus maintains are just."30
This tradeoff of some violence for order, which supposedly maximizes peace
in an imperfect world, is the core of realist morality, although Marshall Cohen argues
that it is no morality at all. Paradoxically like the strategy of setting a fire to fight
one, a controlled disorder of violence is thought

to

be sometimes useful to prevent

a disorder of much greater magnitude. Because the success of the stabilizing devices
requires some war or what Bull describes as "... organized violence carried on by
political units against each other," it is generally accepted that the greater good of
social order among states allows for some unjust, in the popular sense, and violent
behavior .within and between states. This use of violence to defend the "islands of
order" that constitute international order maximizes world justice by, as Vincent
describes it, the "... the laying down of life to protect life." Because of the importance
of the stability devices in maintaining order, it is paradoxically their displacement by
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the foreign policy goals of individual or human justice, which, because of the its
inherent divisiveness, would cause greater disorder and, consequently, greater
injustice.31
Violence as a Stability Device in a State-Centric System

This morality is a utilitarian perception of the moral dimensions of world
order, which assumes that the maintenance of the appropriate general rules, i.e., the
nonintervention norm and the stability devices of realism, despite the cost of some
structural violence maximizes world order because there are no alternative, effective
restraints on violence and power. The moral thinking is that the nonintervention
norm cannot prevent individual acts of violence and injustice, but, instead, it can
keep the lid on the greater, potential injustice of widespread chaos and war. This
view of the relationship between international order and individual justice prevails,
though unspoken, within the American foreign policy establishment. 32 However,
once violence is accepted as a stability device, the distinction by states between just
and unjust war, although intellectually and philosophically established, is in practice
blurred because of the subjective nature of justice.
The state-centric nature of realism causes a mindset among state leaders and
their loyal citizenry that encourages international resistance to fighting genocide.
Historically, states assumed the power to take lives for their own purposes just as
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today the civilian populations who identify with and want the survival of their states
fear loosing their monopoly over violence, which they see as necessary to meet the
exigencies of power politics, to preserve international order, and to satisfy the appeal
of nationalism. The effect is, to some degree either surreptitiously or subconsciously,
the acceptability by most states of genocide. The inaction of states to stop genocide
within some of their peers indicates the importance to them of their sovereignty.
Hence, the fear of states that intervention, even in countries committing the most
offensive atrocities, is a precedent against the authority and sovereignty of the state
in general. Under such circumstances, a reasonable argument can be made that
states view genocide as one of the more extreme forms of their authority to take lives
in the defense of the state and to use systematic and deliberate violations of human
rights as an integral part of the governing process under the veil of realism. In this
regard, the evidence is strong that states fear an international norm of humanitarian
intervention as a threat to their authority to use violence in their behalf, even to an
extent as extreme as genocide.33
~his argument is presented by Irving Louis Horowitz in

Taking Lives: Genocide and State Power
(New Brunswick, NJ.: Transaction Books, 1989), xiii, 10-13; Horowitz defines genocide as the state
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354; for a discussion of the theory that states accept genocide as necessary to their development and
to the maintenance of world order, see Barbara Hariff, Genocide and Human Rights: I11actio11 and
Political Issues, Monograph Series in World Affairs, ed., Karen A. Feste, Vol. 20 (Denver: University
of Denver Graduate School of International Studies, 1984), 7-8, 12-13, 65. Hariff argues, however, that
life is of such value that it should not be a negotiable entity which can be traded for order and
development of the state. The problem here is bridging the gap between her abstract argument and the
reality of the world; also see Barbara Hariff, Ibid., 7; for an overview of the weak international and
regional human rights regimes among states, see Jack Donnelly, Universal Human Rights in Theory and
Practice (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989), 205-28; Richard Falk, Human Rights and State
Sovereignty (New York: Homes and Meier Publishers, Inc., 1981), 53, 154.
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State-centric thinking that the state possesses the special abilities and holds
the unique position to protect and represent its citizens' political interests and values
in international politics clearly ignores the irresponsible behavior of the ruling
factions of many states toward their citizens. 34 The idea that the state is the main
provider of justice to its citizens is a theory giving the state inherent moral value, but
implicit in the actual behavior of states is that the majority of them are oppressive
and many commit atrocities because both their leaders and citizens are conditioned
to the realist view of international relations. At the same time, factions and elites
in control of the government use the state's fiduciary responsibility to its citizens as
a justification for pursuing their own interests. It follows then, as WOMP advocate
Samuel Kim argues, that the political and economic exploitation of people results
from state-centric assumptions about international relations. Separate moralities
exist for states, subgroups, and individuals which are constantly in international and
domestic conflict through socio-political grievances and the struggle for rights.
Essentially, the cost of assuming that the state is the most realistic protector of its
civilian population and the most moral, because it supposedly protects the greatest
number of individuals from the violence and chaos of international disorder, is the
high level of human suffering and oppression. 35
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Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations (New
York: Basic Books, 1977), 53-5, 60; Gerard Elfstrom, "On Dilemmas oflntervention," Ethics 93 (July
1983): 714-15; George F. Kennan, "Morality and Foreign Policy," 205-6.
35

Sarnuel Kim, Quest for a Just World Order (Boulder, Colo.: Wcstview Press, 1984), 242.
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Walzer's Legalist Paradigm and State-Centric Violence
The Right to Moral Autonomy
In addition to the realist arguments in favor of the state, there is the rights
based argument of Michael Walzer whose legalist paradigm holds that the rights of
state sovereignty and political association are derived from the citizens' right, more
in a collective than individual sense, to moral autonomy. These rights are best
protected in a stable world order upheld by the states' structuring of the appropriate
stability devices, despite some sacrificial events of injustice.

Walzer's "legalist

paradigm" presents the most widely discussed theoretical basis for the traditional
post-World War II relationship between order and justice and the international
community's prohibition of aggression. In so doing, he presents a strong theoretical
argument in support of a state-centric nonintervention norm based on a preference
for world order as the optimum assurance of international justice. Accordingly, the
one essential exception to the nonintervention norm is the state's right to self-defense
against aggression, but because the legalist paradigm accepts the necessity of the
state to assure international order, it also accepts tradeoffs of individual justice and
the use of violence to ·maintain realist stability devices. As a result, the legalist
paradigm generally prohibits intervention and protects state sovereignty. Its purpose
is to preserve international order and the citizens' right to moral autonomy.

The

objective is to balance order and justice at the optimum point of the least sacrifice
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of human rights under the imperfect conditions of international politics by providing
an accommodating definition of legitimate interventions. 36
The Theory of Aggression

The primary exception to the legalist paradigm's strong intervention norm is
Walzer's theory of aggression that the state has the right of self-defense against an
assault on its territorial and political sovereignty. The prohibition of aggression is
based on the right of the state to protect the communal and individual rights of its
citizens. Walzer's legalist paradigm and theory of aggression present the moral basis
for the protection of the "sovereign equality" and "domestic jurisdiction" of states by
the United Nations Charter and its accompanying international legal precedents.
Consistent with Walzer's ideas, aggression is outlawed by the United Nations
Charter's prohibition on the use of force by states except for self-defense. The
Charter's bias against intervention except in self-defense reflects the international
community's view that state sovereignty and international order have priority human
rights and individual justice. The state's right of self-defense in the U.N. Charter is
described by Fernando Teson as a "quasi-absolute prohibition" on the use of force,
which proscribes its use in support of human rights. 37

36According

to Walzer, "Though states are founded for the sake of life and liberty, they cannot be
challenged in the name of life and liberty by any other states. Hence the principle of non-intervention.
[Other than aggression] Nothing...warrants .. force in international society... Domestic heresy and injustice
are never actionable in the world of states: hence, again, the principle of non-intervention." Walzer,
Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations (New York:
Basic Books, 1977), 58-9, 61, 62, 89.
37

RJ. Vincent, Nonintervention and Intemational Order, 331; Fernando Teson, Humanitarian
Intervention: An Inquiry Into Law and Morality (New York: Transnational Publishers, Inc., 1988), pp.
24-5.
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The Morality of States
The legalist paradigm balances order and justice by presenting philosophical
arguments for a proposed threshold of intervention claimed to maximize both, but
in doing so, it of necessity presents a state-centric position. Like realists, Walzer
assumes that the state is currently the best instrument to achieve the goals of world
order, security, self-determination, and the wishes of its citizens.

The state is

assumed to provide the best environment within which the struggle for liberty and
self-determination can take place and to be the only instrument of international
politics powerful enough to pursue effectively the goals of its political community.
These assumptions provide a tilt toward the state and against international justice
known as the "morality of states." According to Charles Beitz, the morality of states
is the product of the "modern natural law tradition" that accepts "... moral judgment
[as] appropriate in the global state of nature, but that the standards to which moral
judgment should appeal are relatively weak ... [in particular, that justice holds an
inferior position to international order]." Because the power and expertise to make
foreign policy is seen as natura1ly gravitating to the state, the individual has limited
empowerment in the conduct of foreign affairs. States, acutely aware of the lesser
role of the individual in international politics, regard each other as the primary
sources of power in their relations. 38
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Charles Beitz, Political 171e01y, p. 181; Michael Walzer, Just and U11just Wars, 59; Michael Walzer,
Just and Unjust Wars 61, 89; Michael Walzer, "The Moral Standing of States: A Response to Four
Critics," Philosophy and Public Affairs 9 (Spring 1980): 210; Gerald Doppelt, "Walzer's Theory of
Morality in International relations," Philosophy a11d Public Affairs 8 (Fall 1978): 9; R.D. McKinlay
and R. Little, Global Problems, 71. Walzer's ideas on intervention arc supposedly different from those
of realists because he views the nonintervention norm as a principle of justice ultimately protecting the
rights of individuals while realists view intervention in terms of the national interest and the uses of
power. See Leo McCarthy, "International Anarchy, Realism and Non-Intervention," in Ian Forbes and
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The Conflict Between the Goals of
the State and Ending Structural Violence

That the moral reasoning of the legalist paradigm is dependent upon the
sanctity of the state makes Walzer look like a closet realist. The state's special
abilities and unique position in international politics is a fiduciary position of moral
and legal responsibility to its citizens.

The state, therefore, has the right of

sovereignty, to protect the rights of its citizens to their autonomous, culturally distinct
political communities. In addition, the existence of the citizens' right to a state
reflecting their political, cultural and economic interests requires universal respect
for interstate justice. This "formal sovereign equality between[ sic] all states," called
the equality of states, is deemed necessary to protect interstate justice, although
Walzer's critics see its purpose as more to validate statim. 39
Mark Hoffman (editors) Political Theo!)~ Intemational Relations and the Ethics of Intervention (New
York: St. Martin's Press, Inc., 1993), 82. Concerning the idea of the state as the best representative
of its culturally distinct political community, Gerald Elfstrom argues that states traditionally treat each
other as individual entities and that the international community views the relationship between the state
and its citizens like a guardian relationship between parent and child. The position of Elfstrom that the
elements of this relationship include a "genetic bond" between citizen and state appear to equate with
Walzer's ideas of the culturally and politically cohesive community, of the natural dependence of the
citizen on the state, and of the citizen's inability to pursue his international interests as effectively as the
state. Elfstrom claims that this paternal idea of the state is in accord with the international community's
assumptions that the rights of the state are derived from either the actual or passive consent of its
citizens and that the state is in the best position to pursue the interests of its citizens. Only the state
possesses the power, the unity, and the machinery to pursue its citizens' interests in international
relations. This representative superiority of the state is in part due to the failure of its citizens to
recognize that some of their most important international interests are of greater than indirect concern
to them. The state also is in a superior position to play the role of final arbiter on issues of foreign
policy which greatly divide its citizenry. Gerald Elfstrom, "On Dilemmas of Intervention," Ethics 93
(July 1983): 714-16.
39

Charles Beitz, Political Theory, 75, 134: Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, 53-5; RJ. Vincent,
Nonintervention and International Order, 41-4, 345-46; Gerard Elfstrom, "Dilemmas," 713; Caroline
Thomas, "The Pragmatic Case Against Intervention," in Ian Forbes and Mark Hoffman (editors)
Political Titeory, International Relations and the Ethics of Intervention (New York: St. Martin's Press,
Inc., 1993), 91; Michael Walzer,Just and Unjust Wars, 53-5, 60; Gerard Elfstrom, "Dilemmas," 714-15;
George F. Kennan, "Morality and Foreign Policy," Foreign Affairs 63 (1985):
205-6; Walzer's
original idea of the legalist paradigm implies that interstate justice, i.e., the fair treatment that states owe
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It is because realism and the legalist paradigm emphasize interstate justice and
view the pursuit of individual justice as deleterious to international order that no
strategy and set of institutions capable of ending structural violence can be devised.
Humanitarian intervention essentially is limited by the paradox of international
morality that cultural relativism cannot be resolved by international politics.
Humanity can generally make the rightful condemnation of genocide, but it cannot
convince large numbers of its species not to take such depraved action in conflicts
perceived as matters of collective grievance and survival.

George F. Kennan, "Morality and Foreign Policy," Foreign Affairs 63 (1985):
205-6; Walzer's
original idea of the legalist paradigm implies that interstate justice, i.e., the fair treatment that states owe
each other, is derived from human justice, i.e., from the rights of the individual, because the state's right
of sovereignty is derived from the individual right to moral autonomy, but later his derivative basis of
state sovereignty, as a result of coming under attack for logical inconsistencies, evolves toward a
collective right of moral autonomy. Walzer's writings subsequent to Just and Unjust Wars abandon the
individual's right of moral autonomy as the basis of the state's right to sovereignty and simply makes
it a collective right of people to form their own political community in preservation of a common way
of life; Michael Walzer, ''The Moral Standing of States," 212, 225; Sec Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust
Wars, 98-9; For a short, concise discussion of the equality of states, see Gerhard von Glahn, Law
Among Nations, 127-9.

Chapter IV
Humanitarian Intervention and the People's
Right To Their Own State

A significant part of the tension between order and justice which influences
the intervention threshold of states, both individually and communally, involves the
nature of the relationship between the state and its people. Most states claim to
represent the will of their people and to be democratic in some fashion. Many claim
representative status, with the apparent approval of their civilian populations, without
democracy, but, in any event, the official acceptance by states of republican principles
seems to be nearly universal.

Hence, those debating humanitarian intervention

generally assume that a state's legitimacy is most accurately determined by its high
degree of responsiveness, though not necessarily in democratic terms, to the sociopolitical aspirations of its people. In this regard, intervention is generally considered
legitimate when directed against a state whose government no longer represents the
desires and aspirations of its people. Questions then arise, however, as to who are
the people, what are their desires and aspirations, and what are the rights of
dissenters against the majority?

In most cases of internal conflicts over justice

grievances, these questions cannot be answered adequately enough to justify
humanitarian intervention.
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Walzer's Representative Fit and
the Debate Over State Legitimacy
Even describing the relationship between a state and its people is problematic.
Michael Walzer thinks that the legitimacy of the state in a world of diverse, nondemocratic political communities is too complex to explain other than in terms of a
metaphor for consent, which he calls "representative fit" between a state and its civil
population. Accordingly, he defines representative fit as the "... degree to which the
government represents the political life of its people" who claim through their state
a right of sovereignty against all other states and " ... govern in accordance with their
own traditions." 1 Walzer's definition, however, presents a "black box" model which
never makes clear just what type of political community is legitimately derived from
either individual or communal rights, but neither do his critics. This impasse is not
surprising since it involves the traditional conundrum of whether self-determination
equates with democracy and human rights or other forms of national and civic selffulfillment for political communities.
Walzer's legalist paradigm, on the one hand, is based on the culturally distinct
political community's rights of self-determination and moral autonomy which do not
necessarily include democracy. Walzer's critics, on the other hand, contend that a
state cannot be legitimate without protecting the political and economic rights of its
citizens. Walzer's assumption that the state's right of sovereignty is derived from

1

Michael Walzer, "The Moral Standing of States," A Response to Four Critics," Philosophy and
Public Affairs 9 (Spring 1980): 212; also see Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Af8Ument
with Historical Illustrations (New York: Basic Books, 1977), 54.
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either the individual's or the citizens' rights of self-determination and moral
autonomy is challenged on the basis that most state leaders, in fact, fail to protect
their citizens' human rights. Instead, they value sovereignty's rights based rationale
in international relations to hold power against other states but devalue it at home
to hold power against their citizens.

Thus, states ignore their domestic

responsibilities towards human rights which accompany sovereignty. As a result,
critics charge that the individual right of moral autonomy is a contrivance to protect
the state for realist more than moral reasons. Charles Beitz argues that many states
currently deny their citizens the rights of association that rational citizens free to do
so would demand, which he claims is proof of the Jack internationally of the
individual's rights of moral autonomy and self-determination. 2

The Culturally Distinct Political Community
The culturally distinct political community, according to Walzer, is the social
bond citizens form over several generations because of their peculiar historical and
cultural conditions which becomes a "common life" for them and their government.
Past, present and future generations are connected by the social, economic and
cultural history of their political process. The reification of the people's historical
political process is their contemporary political community. As. a result, the right to

2

Charles Beitiz, the idealist who advocates reform intervention interprets Walzer to say that "...war
cannot be justified as a means to destroy, conquer or reform a regime ... " but only to restore it to the
status quo ante; Charles Beitz, "Bounded Morality: Justice and the State in World Politics."
International Organization 33 (Summer 1979): 412, 414; Charles Beitz, Political Theory and
International Relations (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1979), 80-1, 82; Gerald Doppelt,
"Walzer's Theory of Morality in International Relations," Philosophy and Public Affairs 8 (Fall 1978):

8.
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sovereignty is based on the right to self-determination which does not necessarily
include democracy.3
Walzer's critics, however, see his idea of representative fit as legitimizing
oppressive states. For instance, Beitz argues that people in the real world are not
bound to their states by choice. Rather, the organization of the state's "common life"
and the citizens' participation in the national defense are often involuntary, and
Walzer's horizontal contract of a people bonding into a political community over
time is in contrast to reality.4 Indeed, Beitz has a strong argument in that the
history of a state's origin and growth is a complicated process.

Often, the

development of a state involves much greater oppression than the building of
communal integrity. Instead of people developing a common bond, states often
develop through conquest and inadvertent political events that throw people
together.5

The Horizontal Contract

Walzer and his critics have different conclusions about what is representative
fit based on their differing views of the nature of the consent of the people. Walzer's

idea of state legitimacy is based on a horizontal social contract among the people
which emphasizes a set of values not always consistent with democracy. Hence,
Walzer marks the boundary between sovereignty and intervention such that citizens

3Michael

Walzer,Just and Unjust Wars, 53-5; Michael Walzer, "The Moral Standing of States," 2245; Also see Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, 94, where he states that ".. .it is not our purpose in
international society...to establish liberal or democratic communities, but only independent ones."
4

Charles Beitz, "Bounded Morality," 413.

5Any

doubt on this point can be resolved by reading any reliable history on Russia, India, and Africa.
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have a right to possess a loyalty to an "inherited culture" of values inconsistent with
Western democracy. 6 Walzer's critics respond by charging that he is confusing the
horizontal contract among the people of a state with the vertical contract between
a state's citizens and their government.

The horizontal contract is a multi-

generational process in which the people are voluntarily brought together into a
political community. The vertical contract is a process of consent by the people to
their rulers' authority. Walzer confuses the mutual consent of the people among
themselves to form a political community with their consent to be governed, which
ignores the possibility that the people who formed their political community may,
nevertheless, be oppressed by their state. By Walzer's reasoning, the state derives
its right of sovereignty from the very people it oppresses. Walzer's theory is accused
of accepting the mere existence of a sovereign state as proof of a vertical contract
while denying the proof of a state's abusive behavior against its citizens as proof of
its absence. A broken vertical contract, say his critics, makes the state illegitimate.
Hence, Charles Beitz and others mark the boundary between sovereignty and
intervention, including the legitimate use of force, such that the status quo of
oppressive states can be rightfully changed by reform and human rights intervention. 7

6Michael

Walzer, "The Moral Standing of States," 211-12, 214; Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust
Wars, 54; The social contract is termed a "procedure of collective choice," which has become one
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Walzer's Indicators of Representative Fit
Much of the debate between Walzer and his critics involves his three
indicators of representative fit presented as proof of its existence. They are, first, a
citizenry's mental preparedness to defend its state, i.e., its desire to resist invasion;
secondly, the state's very ability to remain stable and to control its own citizens, i.e.,
its ability to survive; and, thirdly, the state's maintenance of enough political
consensus such that there is an absence of rebellion, civil war, and atrocities.
Essentially, Walzer argues that a legitimate state is managing a stable society,
satisfying coexisting groups of citizens, and reflecting its citizens political desires and
aspirations, not-withstanding any lack of democracy and human rights. 8
Those prepared to defend their state, Walzer believes, by standing in readiness
to protect their consensual relationship with their government and their common way
of life, are exercising their right of moral autonomy. They see their government as
the protector of their rights. They are prepared to risk their lives because they value
the right to their own culturally distinctive political community within the context of
their state. In fact, the readiness of citizens to risk their lives to keep what they
rightfully possess and value is implicitly recognized as an indicator of representative

8Michael

Walzer, "The Moral Standing of States," 212, 213, 215, 216-218; Also see Gerald Doppelt,
"Statism Without Foundations, "Philosophy and Public Affairs 9 (Summer 1980): 399; Lawrence
Mayer writes that " Legitimacy does not refer to dissatisfaction to specific performance ...Rather, it
connotes a feeling of being part of and perceiving that one has a stake in the well-being of the system
itself, irrespective of one's satisfaction or lack thereof with specific output or performance. The idea
is that legitimacy enables a system to withstand the inevitable performance failures and citizen
dissatisfactions faced sooner or later by all systems without losing the level of support necessary for the
maintenance of public order." Lawrence C. Mayer, Redefining Comparative Politics: Promise Ver.ms
Perfomiance, Sage Library of Social research, Vol. 173 (Newbury Park, Calif.: Sage Publications, Inc.,
1989), 135. While Mayer is writing about democracy in "demand overload" from its citizens, his
definition of legitimacy appears relevant to issues of survival within non-democratic states.
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fit by the international community when it legally confirms the state's right of selfdefense against aggression.9
In addition, for states to respect equally each others rights, they must presume
that citizens are prepared for whatever reason to defend their state whether or not
this is actually true. Of course, citizens may not desire to defend their state, but
outsiders cannot make this judgment for them and act on it without demeaning the
right of moral autonomy of the target state's citizens. Citizens may choose to defend
their state's oppressive government for a varied and complex number of reasons, but
only the citizens of that state have the right to determine the legitimacy of their
representative fit. It is this "expectation of resistance" from the right to defend that
Walzer claims makes aggression immoral and illegal. 10
Walzer is challenged here, however, on the basis that the citizens'
preparedness to defend their state should not be assumed to reflect their desire to
protect their right of moral autonomy. That the preparedness to defend implies
choice is often in conflict with reality. Instead, the real test is the deeper question
of whether or not citizens are free to choose to defend their state, i.e., the citizens
actual motivation for resistance. Participation in war by oppressed citizens is argued
to be so common as to make it a meaningless test of moral autonomy. Further, for
there to be real choice, there must be some form of democratic process within the

Walzer,Just and Unjust Wars, 54-5; "The Moral Standing of States," 212-13. Charles Beitz,
"Nonintervention and Communal Integrity," Plti!osoplty and Public Affairs 9 (1980): 388.
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citizens' state.

Citizens of authoritarian states cannot defend individual and

communal rights which are denied them in the first place. 11
Even if the preparedness to defend has the element of choice, however, the
citizens actual decision to defend may be related to matters other than consent.
They may be protecting their families, local communities, homes, property,
independence, and economic well-being. Citizens may reject their own government's
legitimacy but clearly see that defending their state is necessary to their physical and
cultural survival. Often, oppressed citizens may have to choose the lesser of two
evils. 12
The Soviet resistance to German aggression during the Second World War
shows the complexity of consent. The Soviet people were caught between two
oppressors raising doubts about the legitimacy of Stalin's government, although large
numbers of citizens eventually rallied to its defense. Both nationalism and Hitler's
cruelty probably rallied the Soviet people, but the facts make the determination of
motivation difficult. The Soviet people reacted to the German invasion by what can
be termed political schizophrenia. The large number of Soviet prisoners taken,
especially at the beginning, was, in part, the result of a lack of will to defend a
harshly dictatorial government. Soviet citizens in many areas, .including some Great
Russian populations, welcomed the German invaders until the full force of their
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Charles Beitz, "Nonintervention and Communal Integrity," 388-89; also see Michael Walzer, 'The
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cruelty was felt. And the Russian Liberation Army, aided by the Germans to fight
the Soviets, did not find a shortage of recruits and could have been of more use to
the Germans if they had provided earlier support. Some Russian guerrillas fought
both the Nazis and the Soviets, but Nazi atrocities eventually mobilized most of the
Soviet people around Stalin.

In fact the heroic resistance, great suffering and

disloyalty in the same citizenry led one historian to write that "Seldom did a country
and a regime do both so poorly and so well in the same conflict." 13
Walzer's other two indicators are also criticized on the basis that a stable
society whose citizens are under state control is as likely to be the result of the state's
ability to master its population through intimidation than through representation and
that the lack of rebellion within a state is just as likely to reflect the citizens' lack of
power to change their political system as their satisfaction with the status quo. Many
states today rule by power and intimidation rather than by consent and loyalty.
Certainly, actual consent and participatory democracy exist only in a small number
of states. In the Third World, many states are governed by indigenous elites who
represent industrial interests instead of their citizens and who are propped up by
foreign capital, technology and weapons. 14
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Nicholas V. Riasanovsky, A History of Russia, 4th ed., (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984),
524-6; Richard Wasserstrom, "Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument," 542, 544.
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The Value of Diversity
Walzer's representative fit is also founded upon the value of diversity.
Walzer, in effect, believes that to direct those of an alien political culture toward any
universal political truth is often another form of authoritarianism. 15 Intervention
is an assault upon the right of moral autonomy, according to Walzer, because the
contrast in cultures is sharp enough to prohibit serious transcultural understanding.
Outsiders, therefore, have neither the right nor the intellectual understanding to
judge the peculiar "loyalties and resentments" of another state's culture and political
process.

The scholarly and popular literature of politics, which is replete with

examples of the gulf of understanding between cultures, provides much support for
this argument. According to Edward Said, outsiders often have simplistic views of
other cultures. 16

The American media and academia, he writes, paint a false

impression of the Middle East, especially concerning the divisions of fundamentalism,
modernism and the authoritarian state. He notes that most of the Moslem world is
a secular and multi-layered culture of worldliness, ordinary life and adaptation to
Western technology. He also describes the Egyptian government as oppressive,
corrupt and overburdened economically and, consequently, very unpopular.
However, the Islamic terrorists who kill indiscriminately are more unpopular than the
government and are finding little support among the Egyptian people. In addition,
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Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, 89; Michael Walzer, The Moral Standing of States," 211,
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Said charges that the U.S. interpretation of Egyptian political conflict is ruled by a
sense of self-interest which results in aid to the corrupt ruling elite who in response
make an ostensible show of democracy.
The Western fear that Islam is a monolithic contender for power misses the
crucial point, claims Said, that societies, including the U.S., involve a competition of
ideas on the meaning of national identity. In the contemporary climate of the Arab
world, the contention of ideas and factions represents a form of self-determination,
which is the process of the people coming to terms with what they are, though
certainly not in the Western democratic sense. Therefore, in the Middle East as
elsewhere, there is a gray area in politics concerning representative fit between the
extremes of unconscionably harsh dictatorial rule and liberty in which people learn
to balance the imperfections of their government with their loyalties to their culture.
The idea that oppressive states have some form of legitimacy is indicated by the
common observation that a dictatorial or totalitarian state's government fell because
it lost the support of its people. For example Pearson, in analyzing the reasons for
the Soviet Union's demise, alluded to the eventual "... universal belief in the moral
bankruptcy of the supranational state authority" in the Soviet Union because of
official corruption and incompetence which gave the moral .high ground to the
liberals and the nationalities.17
Strong advocates of diversity see representative fit as a morally necessary
presumption to prevent uninformed, moralistic interventions against the sovereignty
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Raymond Pearson, "The Geopolitics of People Power: The Pursuit of the Nation State in East
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of the state and to protect the right of the people to make judgment on when and
if to rebel for their own practical and moral reasons. 18 Otherwise, outsiders would
presumptuously think they know enough about the "loyalties and resentments" of
other socio-political communities to judge the righteousness of their values and
politics and to think themselves capable of effectively intervening in their complex,
political processes.
Walzer's gulf of understanding between cultures, however, is taken by his
critics to mean that only those having a deep and enduring experience with another
culture can provide the knowledge needed for determining which states are
legitimate. The implication is that, for outsiders, perhaps only a T.E. Lawrence can
truly understand other cultures, but Walzer's critics argue that there are many
traditional ways of studying other cultures, such as scholarly research, intelligence
gathering, and travel, which are adequate for judging the moral legitimacy of other
states.19

Democracy and Representative Fit
The crux of this debate, however, is the disagreement between Walzer and his
critics concerning whether self-determination and representative fit equate with
political freedom or include non-democratic political arrangements. The existence
of an "unfree" state in and of itself, Walzer argues, is not a reason to deny the
existence of representative fit. The initiative of citizens to change their political
system rightfully remains with them and not foreigners. While Walzer's critics claim
18
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his argument to be one of might makes right, Walzer contends that there are a
number of legitimate reasons for not rebelling against an oppressive state, including
too high a cost in lives and domestic order, special social and political loyalties by
the majority to the state, and the biding of time by citizens for the right moment to
rebel.

Other ideas such as ethnic nationalism may be valued by citizens over

democracy and human rights. 20 In accord with Walzer, and despite the suffering of
the Arab people, Said implies, that most Arabs would reject intervention for social
justice. Arab nationalism is a powerful force, and Islam, including for non-Muslims,
is at the center of Arab identity. Instead of a desire for rebellion, there is an Islamic
way of life, i.e., another reality of life if you will, of tradition and conformity which
acts for the people as a retreat from oppression and economic deprivation.
Essentially, religious observance acts as an alternative life to the reality of oppression
and as a realistic alternative to the costly struggle for the alien concept of democracy.

Interstate and Individual Justice
Walzer's critics see his representative fit as displacing individual justice with
interstate justice and as valuing the nonintervention norm and the right of selfdetermination "above

all else," including freedom.

Therefore, Walzer's conception

of consent is criticized as unrealistic and thus as a false foundation of state
sovereignty. His alleged preference for self-determination over democracy is seen
as giving the state the twin rights to abuse its citizens and to be left alone. In
addition, if, contrary to Walzer's position, representative fit cannot exist in
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combination with oppression, Walzer's theory of aggression fails to differentiate
external from internal aggression. His critics argue that there is no moral difference
between assisting those being abused by their own state, which they term internal
aggression, and those being abused by another state, which is the traditional
definition of external aggression. Both types of defenders are forced by the aggressor
to defend their individual and communal rights. If, as Walzer's critics argue, his
theory of representative fit confuses the horizontal contract with the vertical contract,
then his theory of aggression only deals with half the problem. Not only is there
external aggression justifying a state's self-defense and the aid of others against the
aggressor but also internal aggression against a state's oppressed groups deserving of
humanitarian intervention when the citizens' vertical contract is broken by human
rights violations.21

Minority Rights

One of the most serious weaknesses of Walzer's representative fit is his failure
to appreciate minority rights.

In Walzer's words, ".. .individuals are sometimes

sacrificed ..." to protect the independence of political communities. The problem of
minority rights is an egregious divergence of values between Western and nonWestern values, for democracy and human rights cannot exist without rights both for
minorities and the powerless, and even actual consent by the majority, according to
Western values, confers no legitimacy upon the state unjust to its minorities. In
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addition, state's often commit gross, human rights violations against minorities in
accord with the popular will of their civilian populations. Most glaring were the
policies of Nazi Germany, more specifically the Holocaust, which were representative
of its citizens' anti-Semitism and repressed nationalism. In other cases, a state's
minority, ruling subgroup may be legitimate among its members while committing
atrocities and other human rights violations against a powerless majority, as in the
South Africa case of apartheid. According to Walzer's critics, state sovereignty
cannot be based on either individual or communal rights which the state is
suppressing. 22

The Right of Moral Autonomy and Actual Freedom
The overall failure of representative fit is seen by Beitz as mistakenly equating
a state's mere autonomy from foreign interference with the rights of its citizens to
articulate their interests and to approve their government. Walzer's metaphor of a
contract for consent, he argues, fails to dispel the obscure description of the
"...process of association and mutuality ... [which the state protects] ... against external
encroachment." The problem is that few civil populations are free to form or to
terminate their states. · Walzer's test of legitimacy, Beitz argues, is suspect because
of the state's coercive nature. Legitimizing the state by such an abstract test as
representative fit is really an attempt to transform the reality of state coercion into
the sham of voluntary association. The authoritarian state suppresses actual consent
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but is excused by the artifice of tacit consent. Consent, argues Beitz, to be valid must
come from people really free to give it. 23
The Doctrine of Self-Help
Also part of Walzer's idea of representative fit is his adoption of John Stuart
Mill's doctrine of self-help that citizens are wholly responsible for their political
destiny. Self-determination is a corollary to the citizens' right of moral autonomy and
consent. According to Walzer, respecting the right of others to determine their own
political system is a way of treating them as equals and of honoring their reasons,
whatever they are, for how they relate

to

their state.

As Walzer states,

".. .intervention is not justified whenever revolution is." Representative fit then is
mostly an internal affair. This citizens' right to moral autonomy leaves people with
the responsibility to earn their own preferred, political arrangement, which Walzer
terms "freedom," although he actually is referring to self-determination that may not
include political freedom. That is to say, Walzer interprets Mill to mean that people
essentially get the government that they deserve.

Mill and Walzer view self-

determination as the right and the necessity of a political community to earn its
freedom. 24
But self-determination is more than the group's final, political arrangement
of national self-fulfillment but is also an open-ended and historical political process
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whose structure, stability and degree of freedom are endogenous in nature. As
already mentioned, a people reject or endure their government for their own reasons.
A dictatorial government may be popular or unpopular and also tolerated, but
achieving a free government takes a special commitment during the process of
striving, usually over a long period of time, and keeping it takes special qualities.
Therefore, freedom, like virtue, according to Mill, must be cultivated from within.
The test of a political community's commitment to freedom is its ability to throw off
its oppressors, and the likelihood of its having enduring, popular, and hopefully
democratic, institutions is based on its commitment to freedom. 25
The self-help doctrine's implication for intervention, according to Walzer, is
that those ready to undertake the arduous task of earning their freedom should not
be impeded by outsiders. Accordingly, outsiders must not alter the state's balances
of forces. As to those not willing and able to earn their freedom, they cannot be
helped by intervention because outsiders cannot replace the commitment needed to
earn and sustain their freedom, and although not every self-determined state is free
in terms of democracy, self-help is the only arena within which to reach that point.26
Walzer's critics, however, see his adaptation of Mill's self-help doctrine as
logic carried too far. Mill's assumption that the balance of domestic forces when left
alone results in an autonomous representative fit between a government and its
people is questioned when applied to contemporary international politics. It is
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admitted that Mill is correct in the sense that members of a popular rebellion must
develop the "political capacities" for the establishment of popular, stable, and
hopefully democratic institutions after achieving freedom, but it is not true that
intervention is a natural inhibitor of the will to self-determination and democracy.
For instance, those who would otherwise win their freedom on a level playing field
but who are oppressed by governments of powerful minorities and elites assisted or
propped up by foreign states are rightfully due outside assistance. Yes, Mill and
Walzer allow for intervention to counter such assistance, but intervention is so
prevalent and circuitous in international politics that legitimate counterintervention
loses its meaning, but even without outside help to the oppressor, Walzer's critics
charge that the culmination of domestic, political struggle, which is based more often
on the skillful and advantaged use of force rather than the strength of the people's
will, makes indigenous freedom fighters deserving of outside help. 27
To Beitz, self-help is not the protector of those fighting for freedom, but
rather of those fighting against social justice. Beitz takes the view that self-help lacks
relevance to those state populations today suffering life threatening poverty and
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systematic racial discrimination. Unfortunately under the self-help doctrine, those
so disadvantaged that democracy is incomprehensible would, nevertheless, be
required to earn their freedom. The contemporary application of Mill's doctrine is
also seen as a blame the victim mentality. Here, Walzer's critics have a strong
argument against the self-help doctrine's circular reasoning, which holds that those
who fail to earn their freedom do so because they do not have the desire or will to
throw off their oppressors, contrary to those who are successful. Also, the question
arises as to why those who make repeated, valiant but unsuccessful attempts at
freedom must continue to suffer oppression without intervention? The self-help
doctrine's harshness, say its critics, means that even those severely disadvantaged by
oppression must look to their own efforts. 28 Certainly, the doctrine of self-help has
discomforting implications, which support the idea of injustice as a by-product of
world order.
Representative Fit and the Intervention Threshold

The nature of representative fit is important to the issue of humanitarian
intervention because the assumptions of the two applicable political philosophies
suggest different intervention thresholds or standards for infringement of the
nonintervention norm. If representative fit is indeed a matter of the collective
consent of culturally distinct political communities, regardless of the degree, other
than genocide, to which they are oppressive, then states abusive of their citizens'
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human rights are protected by the nonintervention norm. But if representative fit is
valid only in Western style democracies, then most states, and especially those of
non-Western cultures, are subject to legitimate intervention.

Walzer's Unconscionable Acts Standard Versus
the Ordinary Oppression Standard
According to the legalist paradigm, in a world of little moral and political
clarity, intervention in the complex problems of other states even to enforce human
rights and social justice, other than when representative fit is clearly broken by
genocide, is immoral because it undermines the struggle for self-determination and
freedom. Thus, the intervention threshold is set high. For Walzer, without a clearer
understanding of the reality of representative fit by humanity, intervention is
susceptible to arbitrary use, which threatens state sovereignty and, consequently,
international order. This situation can be avoided only by the presumption that there
is a legitimate representative fit between a state and its citizens justifying most acts
of the state, even those generally considered oppressive, as consistent with the
traditions of its people until the fit is radically broken by the state's massacre or
expulsion en masse of its people. Hence, Walzer's intervention threshold is an
unconscionable acts standard, i.e., one that, in his own words, "shocks the conscience,"
allowing intervention against genocide and genocide-like acts, such as ethic cleansing.
Here, Walzer believes himself more attune than his critics to political reality since
he sees his standard as both pragmatic and moral, for he argues that an international
moral consensus for humanitarian intervention against unconscionable acts is easier
to obtain than one against ordinary oppression. His message to Americans today is
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that the complexity of representative fit requires them not to be so judgmental and
not to view it unrealistically in terms of democracy but instead to concentrate on its
violation by mass slaughter and expulsions.29
Walzer's critics, on the other hand, accuse him of setting the intervention
threshold too high, allowing self-determination and diversity to outrank liberty. They
also reject the idea that a broad nonintervention norm allowing some oppression and
atrocities is necessary to minimize disorder, especially when based on the rationale
that doing so maximizes the achievement of individual justice in an imperfect world.
Instead, they argue that reform and human rights intervention can be used to change
the status quo of oppressive states. This argument is strengthened by the world's
traditionally weak response to genocide. 30

Reform Intervention

With genocide still taking place, it is no surprise that, shortly after the Cold
War, the idea of reform intervention or nation-building, including the use of force
if need be, came into vogue among a number of foreign policy intellectuals.

According to these new interventionists, because of internal conflict, refugee flows,
natural disasters, environmental degradation, and other causes of political instability
and anarchy, which cross borders and are inclined to expand, the many emerging
failed and failing states, once propped up by the superpowers but now unable to take
care of themselves, are becoming a threat to international order and the West. The
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result is that traditional approaches and conventional remedies such as bilateral and
international aid no longer work. Instead, there is a need for the West and the U.N.
to go further, such as voluntary conservatorship of failed or failing states, or in the
case of major human rights violations, genocide, and impending regional conflict,
forced conservatorship. In addition, there is the need to globalize democracy since
democratic states are believed to stay at peace with one another. 31
Reform intervention has important implications concerning the validity of the
legalist paradigm. Representative fit equates with democracy and human rights and
is hindered by the oppression of people worthy of freedom. The political philosophy
of reform intervention directly contradicts the self-help doctrine by assuming that the
civilian populations of states, despite their intense desire to be free, are too burdened
and intimidated to earn their freedom. Clearly, reform intervention is a political
vision of cosmopolitan morality which equates individual justice with international
order as well as the individual national interests of the world's states.
The fundamental political philosophy of reform intervention, even as it is
suggested today, is presented by the earlier writings of Charles Beitz. He bases
reform intervention on the core value of cosmopolitan morality that all humanity is

31

Nation-building is intrusive intervention requiring defeat of the status quo government to rebuild
a state's political process and institutions. Richard N. Haass, Intervention: The Use of American Miitary
Force in the Post-Cold War World (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,
1994), 61, 134; See generally Gerald B. Helman and Steven R. Ratner, "Saving Failed States," Foreign
Policy No. 89 (Winter 1992-93): 3-20; Barbara Harff, "Bosnia and Somalia: Strategic, Legal, and Moral
Dimensions of Humanitarian Intervention," Philosophy and Public Policy 12 (Summer /Fall 1992): 6;
Larry Diamond, "The Global Imperative: Building a Democratic World Order," Current History 93
(January 1994): 2, 6; also see Stephen John Stedman's criticism of reform intervention; Stephen John
Stedman, "The New Interventionists," Foreign Affairs 72 (America and the World 1992/93): 1-2.

81
of equal worth and dignity. 32 Beitz turns realist assumptions about human nature
on their head to present an ideology of social justice in international politics. He
rejects Walzer's representative fit as statist and argues that the state's right to moral
autonomy is secondary to individual justice. Faith in interstate justice based on the
state's duty to its own citizens and the idea that the welfare of the people equates
with the welfare of the state Beitz sees as misplaced. Instead, justice is a duty that
all people owe each other. Thus, the purpose of reform intervention is to achieve
social justice.33 The assumption is that international politics can be transformed by
incremental changes in humanity's social consciousness and conscience from a
preference for power to one for socially just political and economic structures.
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Eventually, this progression toward individual justice is seen as having longrun,
positive consequences for humanity.
Criticism of Reform Intervention

Yet, the U.N.'s tentative and unsuccessful efforts in Somalia and failure to act
in Rwanda show the world not ready for such an ambitious form of humanitarian
intervention.

This moral failure exists because achieving social justice faces

tremendous barriers, is time consuming, and requires worldwide cooperation.
Reform intervention, as proposed by Beitz, is based on theories of change similar to
those of WOMP. The intellectual argument in favor of such major changes in the
intellectual and popular thinking on international politics would have to erode the
traditional, realist intellectualism, still dominate after the Cold War, which holds that
cosmopolitan morality and justice are, for the most part, unrealistic, utopian
aspirations for the conversion of states from egoism to cosmopolitanism with its
deleterious impact on international order. 34
Beitz in discussing distributive justice admits that there is at this time no
global community capable of confirming a worldwide sense of justice, but he argues
that what is impossible today is still possible tomorrow as long as the impediments
to individual justice are alterable over time. With this argument, Beitz is back to the
ultimate plea of idealism that change is possible. He is dependent upon the same
vague idea held by WOMP of consciousness raising incrementally transforming the
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international system into a new international politics of justice. Like the architects
of WOMP, who see no other way to change the world's violence and oppression, he
is left to believing in and to actively pursuing an evolution of values over time that
theoretically will result in global justice. 35 But the slow evolution of an idea is not
a basis for reform intervention, and, based upon the current mass loss of life and
suffering because of international and domestic politics, is of little relevance to the
problem of structural violence, at least for the foreseeable future. In this context, the
ideas of Beitz and WOMP are arguably extreme forms of idealism based on a
problematic theory of change.
Beitz betrays his utopianism by setting difficult conditions on the use of reform
intervention. To make social justice its sole goal, the curse of power politics must
be excluded from the motivations of interventionists. Therefore, despite the natural
inclination of states to pursue their own interests, he requires the target state's
protection from selfish intervention and does not allow for mixed motives on the
intervenor's part, although the few of true humanitarian results during the Cold War,
e.g., Vietnam in Cambodia, India in Bangladesh, and Tanzania in Uganda, involved
primarily selfish political motives. Beitz misses the point that the survivalist nature
of the state obviates the political will needed, either individually or collectively, to
designate and to reform socially unjust states.

In addition, Beitz responds

unrealistically to the conflict between individual justice and order by placing
restrictive preconditions on the use of reform intervention which would make
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intervention rare. Despite the low degree of predictability in international politics,
he requires the probability of achieving social justice.

Although, in almost every

case, the costs and risks of intervention are high and moral behavior degenerates
quickly in combat, he requires the costs in lives and immoral behavior to be low. 36
Beitz's arguments also fall into some of the traditional traps of contemporary
liberal idealism. His belief in purely altruistic motives is dependent on his faith in
collective intervention by international organizations, despite the proven inadequacy
of the U.N. in this area, and the lack of a coalition of states having the moral
consensus and political will to commit to humanitarian intervention. Successful
reform intervention and nation-building requires an international standard of
substantive justice which states both individually and communally do not have. The
cooperation and consensus among states needed to build such a standard is
nonexistent today. This set of affairs is evidenced by the weak international human
rights regime and the inept response of states to acts of genocide.37
Beitz also cannot produce another political entity to replace the state's role
in providing justice. The lack of will and consensus among states needed to reform
unjust states points out their importance in providing justice-- the reality which
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Beitz's critics claim he too easily dismisses in his insistence on cosmopolitan morality.
Because international politics and justice grievances are contentious, states still
constitute the main instruments of what little individual justice there is
internationally. Humanity's sense of justice, although arguably subject to distorted
values, is often invoked through the state, especially when it involves the desire of
people for their own culturally distinct political community. There is in effect today
little capacity for individual justice and cosmopolitan morality in international
politics. For these reasons, the state is still the principal, political entity capable of
achieving a modicum of social justice. 38
It is questionable that citizens any time soon are going to abandon the state
as the vehicle for their interest and sense of justice. In fact, the trend seems to the
contrary. As the recent upheaval of ethnic nationalism indicates, today's citizens in
areas of unresolved ethnic conflict equate their destiny with that of either preserving
the old or finding a new state in disregard of any concept of universal justice or
desire to end structural violence, and those particularly obsessed with achieving their
own ethnic state perceive themselves as seeking social justice no matter the atrocities
which accompany it. 39

~tanley

Hoffmann, Duties Beyond Borders, 57.

39por a discussion that nationalism may be the dark side of idealism which works against a
progressive view of history and in favor of criminal behavior, see William Pfaff, The Wrath of Nations:
Civilization and the Furies of Nationalism (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1993), 232-8.

86
Intervention for the Enforcement of Human Rights
Other scholars, however, attempt to avoid the pitfalls of utopian idealism
while fashioning a supposedly more realistic form of humanitarian intervention. In
this regard, Terry Nardin and Jerome Slater propose the less ambitious and idealistic
exception to the nonintervention norm of intervention to enforce human rights as
prudence may allow, which they claim is more in tune with the reality of
international politics than both the reform intervention of Beitz and the
unconscionable acts standard of Walzer. First, they argue that mass atrocities may
mean something other than Walzer's assumption of a radically apparent violation of
representative fit.

In fact, they argue to the contrary that atrocities can be an

indication of a totalitarian representative fit in which it is the people's collective will
to commit genocide and mass expulsions against a minority. They cite as an example
the support and acquiescence of the German people to the Holocaust. To Nardin
and Slater, intervention against all human rights violations is legitimate, regardless
of the idea of representative fit, because the emphasis should be on the acts
themselves and because any substantive distinction between unconscionable acts and
lesser abuses is arbitrary.40
Nardin and Slater argue that separating those human rights violations that
shock the conscience from those that merely offend the intuitive sense of justice
negates the credibility of the whole human rights regime since there is no way to
rank a moral hierarchy of human rights transgressions. Their response to Walzer is
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that "substantial and systematic" violations of human rights, which they define as
"massive" but less than genocide, must share equal moral condemnation with
unconscionable acts from the international community and, like genocide, cannot be
excluded from intervention where practical. Nardin and Slater recognize, however,
that the worse the violations, the less claim the offender has to sovereignty and
legitimacy, and, therefore, it follows that force, but not moral censure, is more
justified the greater the severity of the human rights violations. This allows for a
proportional response which increases the justification for military intervention as the
severity of human rights violations increases. Thus, military intervention would in
most cases still be limited to those rare occasions of genocide but also would be at
least theoretically legitimate against significant but less than genocidal violations. In
essence, they place the average authoritarian state on notice that it risks the
possibility of intervention and loss of legitimacy and sovereignty, where practical, as
a result of its human rights violations.41
A lower intervention threshold means that all human rights violators are at
risk to lose the nonintervention norm's protection. The goal is greater opprobrium
for them from the international community, despite military, humanitarian
intervention to enforce human rights remaining rare. The goal of a general human
rights exception to the nonintervention norm is the strengthening of the international
human rights regime by the avoidance of wasteful, harmful interventions, the
incremental increase in non-violent pressure on violators, the selective use of force
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when plausible, and a more liberal interpretation of Article 2, Section 7 of the
United Nations Charter.42
International order is protected by subjecting intervention to the pragmatic,
as well as moral, restraints of the just war doctrine. Force is not used until less
drastic remedies are tried without success. The purpose of the intervention must be
to protect human rights, although the sometimes positive results of mixed motives are
acceptable as a reality. There must be a high probability of obtaining the moral
goals of military intervention and a low probability of force harming the peace,
security, and stability of all the states involved, the practical effect of which would
be the rare use of force only in those cases where armed resistance is minimal.43
Slater and Nardin's reasoning is that their exception by not recognizing a
hierarchy of moral accountability for human rights violators and by putting them on
equal moral footing gives greater credibility to diplomatic and nonmilitary
interventions by states and the international community against such acts. This
argument is in accord with the idea that small, incremental changes in the
international human rights regime will gradually erode realism's amorality and will
eventually lead to a seachange in international politics in favor of justice for the
individual.

The will of those enforcing human rights by aggressive military

intervention may still be weak, but the will of those pursuing the meaningful, little
victories, like Helsinki, may increase, leading to eventual, drastic changes like the fall
of the Soviet Union.
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In attempting to equalize the moral culpability of all human rights violators,

however, Slater and Nardin place a premium on practicality and the ethic of
consequences. They acknowledge intervention's harmful potential by recognizing a
gap in its use between practice and principle, which they say increases with the
intervenor's increased use of violence. In other words, the dangers of acting both
immorally and unproductively increase as intervention becomes more a matter of
violence. They also assume that international order is less threatened if oppressive
states are pressured nonviolently to liberalize, which is the reason that they combine
the moral imperative of stopping human rights abuses with the ethic of consequences
or the practical limitations of intervention. Thus, arbitrary interventions would still
be rare, thereby safeguarding order, but also lesser forms of intervention against the
more prevalent, less severe human rights violators would be more acceptable and
effective. With a reduced fear of humanitarian intervention's negative repercussions,
states and international organizations supposedly would focus on violators over whom
they have influence. Raising the moral ante against oppression in general, and not
just atrocities, is argued to encourage diplomatic and other nonviolent pressures
against human rights violators, while military humanitarian intervention would be as
rare as under Walzer's unconscionable acts exception.44

Criticism of Intervention for Human Rights Enforcement

Nardin and Slater's rules on the interventionary use of force, however, may
be a distinction without a difference. Determining what conditions actually meet
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Slater and Nardin's "massive" human rights violations required for military,
humanitarian intervention against ordinary oppression seems almost as obscure as
Walzer's unconscionable acts standard. The use of military force against structural
violence will still be rare because of their highly restrictive pragmatic limitations on
military intervention while their idealistic theory of incremental change, though
certainly a reasonable longrun aspiration, will be of little help to the suffering for the
foreseeable future. Although they envision their lower intervention threshold as
providing a greater opportunity than Walzer's to intervene against ordinary human
rights violations, they fail to resolve what Walzer has indicated is the major obstacle
to intervention against ordinary human rights violations, namely the substantive
weakness of the international consensus on human rights. 45 Also, the argument that
nonmilitary intervention against ordinary oppression is less risky than military
intervention against atrocities is suspect. The dangers of using force have a more
visible and immediate appearance of danger, but the complex value tradeoffs relating
to matters of ordinary oppression are as difficult, and may be as costly in the longrun,
as those concerning force, e.g., a U.S. denial of China's most favored nation status
in response to its human rights violations may be riskier than the ill-fated
intervention in Somalia.
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Michale Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, 107; also see Jack Donnelly, Universal Human Rights in
Theory and Practice (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989) 210-13. He pretty much sums up the
generally accepted view of the international human rights regime as a strong declaratory one which is
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Representative Fit and the Limits of Understanding

The problem, however, iri determining an appropriate intervention threshold
is that neither Walzer nor his critics provide clear criteria for determining
representative fit. The best that can be said is that the evidence presented by both
sides is circumstantial and inconclusive. The idea of the social contract, which is an
important part of the theory of democracy and the debate on representative fit,
appears to be more myth than reality even in the West let alone the Third World.
Nor is democracy a concrete reality. Few governments today are consensual in
nature, and historically, states by Western, democratic standards have been
illegitimate and oppressive. In addition, democracy is an important but not universal
value in international politics. The civilian populations holding political and cultural
values different than the West have focused on demands having nothing to do with
democracy. Instead, nationalism and self-determination are currently the powerful
ideas of local politics. Both produce contentious grievances for justice, which have
come to the surface with the breakdown of the old international order and which are
beyond the understanding of states with a tradition of civic nationalism.46
The idea of representative fit also evokes the insoluble problem of self-help.
During the Vietnam War, liberals used the idea first to support intervention as aiding
a people struggling for freedom and later opposed intervention as aiding a corrupt,
authoritarian regime's opposition to the people's nationalistic desires. In the late

~ee Michael Walzer, ''The Moral Standing of States," 211-12, 218; Richard Wasserstrom, Review
of Just and Unjust Wars, 539; Anthony Smith, "The Ethnic Sources of Nationalism," Survival 35
(Spring 1993): 56-9.
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1970s, Walzer's critics presaged the reasomng of Post-Cold War liberal
interventionists by rejecting self-help as blame the victim and might makes right
social Darwinian excuses not to intervene on behalf of the oppressed. Now, self-help
is largely ignored as a test for humanitarian intervention while suffering and
practicality are important considerations. The Bosnians, who have proven their
political endurance, have received no help while the Somalis, who have proven little
politically, have.

Self-help is an ideological dispute rather than a concept of

systematic study.47
Finally, those on all sides of the humanitarian intervention debate merge the
moral and the practical arguments such that force
seldom used.

to

stop structural violence is

All see military interventions as risky behavior and a threat to

international order.

Despite their fundamental disagreements, because of the

practical limitations of prudence by Walzer, of the ethic of consequences by realists,
and of pragmatic constraints by Beitz, Nardin and Slater, all of which could easily
support national interest reasons for not intervening, the intervention threshold is
drawn at a point that makes intervention seldom useful for humanitarian purposes,
including the cessation of structural violence.
In a sense, representative fit is the right of a state's citizens to participate free
of outside interference in the pursuit of self-determination.

47
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Concerning the change on support of the Vietnam War by liberals, see David Halberstam, The
Best and the Brightest (New York; Penquin Books, 1983), 9-15, 776-8; Now many liberals seem to see
the Bosnian conflict similarly to how they first viewed intervention in Vietnam as the need to help an
abused people desiring freedom. Nonetheless, the principle of democracy and the opposition to
genocide have not received priority in such decisions by the West. Certainly, the Bosnians through three
years of resistance and atrocities have met Walzer's secessionist and unconscionable acts standards of
broken representative fit with the former Yugoslavia. On the other hand, the clans of Somalia have not.
Yet, humanitarian intervention was tried in Somalia only.
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representative fit as a long-term, open-ended process as well as a final, political
arrangement. When his view is joined with Rosenau's recent theorizing that world
politics involves an unexplained and spontaneous, political turbulence, there are
compelling arguments both that protecting the moral autonomy of a state's citizens
maximizes individual justice internationally and that states, which are not really
representative of their people, unnecessarily accept structural violence as a buffer
against international disorder. The problem is that the political philosophy which
makes a state's civil society most nationally complete and representative of its
citizens has never been agreed upon by the world's political philosophers, national
leaders, and people. As a result, the idea of representative fit, its attendant issues,
and the arguments of its critics do not provide enough systematic knowledge about
the nature of the relationship between states and their civilian populations to support
the moral and political will needed for successful humanitarian intervention.

Chapter V
Humanitarian Intervention, Self-Determination, and
Nationalism in a World of Failed States:
Aspirations without Solutions

The issue of representative fit is embodied today in the problems of selfdetermination and nationalism taking place in the world's many nonviable, multiethnic states. The dissolution of these "dysfunctional" or "failed" states is more than
demographics influenced by the legacies of colonialism and the Cold War. Also
involved are the ramifications of the introduction in Eastern Europe and Africa of
the Western ideas of self-determination and nationalism, which unfortunately are
aspirations for justice without solutions.

As a result, the West perceives that

providing justice by humanitarian intervention in states with the demographic
problems of ethnically intermixed populations separated by intense hatred and with
non-democratic cultures is too costly in lives and money and not likely to be
successful.

The result is the lack of political will on the part of the West and the

international community to stop genocide and relieve suffering and a distrust of
Western purpose on the part of Third World leaders. That the West resolved its
moral dilemma by not intervening militarily leaves it wondering whether its inaction
is the rightfully prudent avoidance of quagmire or the wrongful acceptance of
genocide.
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The Meaning of Self-Determination

To begin with, it is not unreasonable to see intervention in another state's
conflict over self-determination as promising little success because the grievances
involved are aspirations for justice with their many meanings. Self-determination,
therefore, is one of the great problems of international justice. Among its many
meanings, its most generic is the group's desire for cultural, social, political and
economic self-fulfillment. In its more specific, political meaning, it merges with the
idea of nationalism and approximates the desire of a people to achieve a sense of
group identity and self-worth, which is most often actualized by either the desire or
the development of preferred political institutions and statehood. Consequently selfdetermination can be viewed in one of two ways; one, as the process of achieving
these institutions, and the other as the arrangement of the institutions itself. While
Mill and Walzer see it as the group's right to pursue whatever arrangement it desires
and to achieve whatever arrangement it deserves, others see it as the end result of
the achieved institutions.

Thus, to liberal internationalists, it is a capitalistic

democracy. To Marxists, it is a classless, socialist society. To Wilsonian idealists, it
is a state with a democratically chosen civil society which is composed of harmonious
groups satisfied by their participation within the state's political process. To ethnic
groups holding grievances, it is the achievement of retribution and freedom in regard
to other groups, out of which they hope to find their own social, cultural, political,
and economic arrangement, but it is not necessarily freedom of the individual in the
Western sense. In parts of the non-West, or what is the traditionally perceived as the
Third World, it is the right of the group

to

be left alone even if political necessity
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requires violence abhorrent to the West. Therefore, for many, contrary to the ideas
of Wilsonian idealism, self-determination equates democracy with the communal
rights of the ethnic group to the exclusion of minority rights. 1 The danger of selfdetermination then is that it is an idea of feeling with little intellectual consistency
and no guarantee of democracy. Yet that feeling is also a real sense of justice held

1

Wilson's idea of self-determination naturally divided into two conceptions. One was external selfdetermination from foreign control and the other was internal self-determination to provide citizens
the right to choose their civil society. Unfortunately, self-determination came to mean equating ethnicity
with statehood and democracy. Today, the prevalence of ethnic nationalism in the Third World directly
contradicts Wilson's original idea that the self-determined state would be a democratically chosen civil
society of harmonious groups satisfied by their participation within the state's political process. Morton
H. Halpin and David J. Scheffer, Self-Detemziantion in the New World Order (Washington, D.C.:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1992), 16-8. For other perspectives on self·
determination, see the following: John Stuart Mill, "A Few Words on Nonintervention," in Richard Falk
(editor) The Vietnam War and Intemational Law (Princeton, NJ.: Princeton University Press, 1968-76)
36; Michael Walzer, lust and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations (New
York: Basic Books, 1977), 87-8; Hedley Bull, "The State's Positive Role in World Affairs," in Stephen
R. Graubard (ed.) The State (New York: W..S. Norton & Company, Inc., 1990), 113-14; Ibid., n.6;
For more specific definitions of self-determin-ation, see the following: Alexander Deconde ed. The
Encyclopedia of American Foreign Policy: Studies of the Principle Movements and Ideas (New York:
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1978), s.v. "National Self-Determination," by Betty Miller Unterberger; Kevin
Ryan, "Rights, Intervention, and Self-Determination." Denver Jounzal of Intenzational Law and Policy
20 (1991): 60-6; The most violence over self-determination is found in the former Soviet bloc and the
Thirld World. However, the Cold War definition of the Third World of economically and politically
backwards states not aligned with either Cold War superpower is obviously obsolete. The Third World
is no longer unrealistically considered a monolithic entity playing the superpowers against each other
for advantage. Many states of the former Soviet Bloc have Third World problems. They now join the
formerly non-aligned states to be described as "failed" or "dysfunctional." It is more accurate to see the
Third World as those states threatened with disorder and dissolution as a result of a multitude of
overwhelming social problems, including the newly profiled global emergencies, such as poverty,
overpopulation, environmental degradation, political instability, ethnic nationalism, and social injustice.
The Second World can be accurately described as those states in reconstruction after loss of the Cold
War and former Third World states which have accomplished some measure of the prosperity and
security of the West. See Kenneth C. Davis, Don't Know Much About Geography: Everything You Need
to Know About the World but Never Leamed (New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc.,1992)
248-50; for other perspectives on self-determination, see the following: John Stuart. Mill, "A Few
Words on Nonintervention," in Richard Falk (editor) Tlze Vietnam War and Intemational Law
(Princeton, NJ.: Princeton University Press, 1968-76) 36; Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A
Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations (New York: Basic Books, 1977), 87-8; Hedley Bull, "The
State's Positive Role in World Affairs," in Stephen Rher perspectives on self-determination, see the
following: John Stuart. Mill, "A Few Words on Nonintervention," in Richard Falk (editor) The
Vietnam War and Intemational Law (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1968-76) 36; Michael
Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations (New York: Basic
Books, 1977), 87-8; Hedley Bull, "The State's Positive Role in World Affairs," in Stephen R Denver
Joumal of /ntemational Law and Policy 20 (1991): 60-6.
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by members of groups which cannot be ignored by the international community.
Unfortunately, it is a sense of justice based on localism instead of universalism. In
sum, the intractable complexity of local conflict is derived from the fact that selfdetermination is the justice the group feels it is due.

State Versus Secession Oriented Self-Determination

Self-determination presents one of the great paradoxes of international
politics. Because states are made of subgroups often with conflicting senses of
justice, states are paradoxically both based on and threatened by the idea of selfdetermination. Further, the desire for self-determination becomes explosive when
merged with the desire for national self-fulfillment. Because of self-determination,
ethnic and religious secessionist movements are still seeking their own states. The
result is conflicting groups clashing over how to define the self in terms of the state.
States desiring the status quo accept the self as a state-oriented self-determination
based on the civilian population's loyalty to a unified state in lieu of loyalty to any
particular group. On the other hand, those against the status quo of the state see the
self in terms of a subgroup, which is often in terms of ethnic nationalism, with selfdetermination based on an unqualified right of statehood for nationalities. This
secession-oriented self-determination is based on group loyalty superseding loyalty
to the state. Internal conflicts within the state, many of which divide along ethnic
lines, result. 2

2

Alex Heraclides, "Secession, Self-Determination, and Non-intervention: In Quest of a Norma- tive
Symbiosis." Joumal of Intemationa/ Affairs 45 (Winter 1992): 399-420. 404-6; Stephen Ryan, Ethnic
Conflict and Intemational Relations (Brookfield, Vt.: Dartmouth Publishing Company, 1990), 28-9;
Robin Wright and Doyle McManus, F/asltpoints: Promises and Peli! in a New World. New York:
Alfred A. Knopf, 1991), 221.
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Nationalism

Nationalism is another great problem of international justice which exacerbates the
divisions of self-determination and ethnic identity.

As an important part of

international politics since its inception in its modern sense in Europe in the early
1800s, it also is a Western idea of unfinished business in much of the world.
Essentially, it is the idea that nations have both the right and the duty to become
states.

Consequently, it naturally appeals to those holding ethnic grievances.

Nationalism is especially a serious problem today because of its strong potential to
fill the power vacuum within those post-Cold War, fragmenting and moribund states
engulfed in ethnic battles over self-determination. 3
Nationalism also represents one of those gaps in understanding between the
West and other political cultures, emphasized by Walzer, which calls into question
the morality and practicality of intervening in another state's political issues. In the
West, civic nationalism--which is based on a community of a shared civic culture, the
rule of law, and the idea of territorial citizenship--developed. Western states have
been reasonably successful at transcending internal ethnic divisions by substituting
a less obsessive form of nationalism.

Essentially, conflict is constrained in a

relatively successful manner in societies built on pluralism, consociationalism,

Conflict and Intemational Relations (Brookfield, Vt.: Dartmouth Publishing Company, 1990), 28-9;
Robin Wright and Doyle McManus, Flashpoints: Promises and Pe1il i11 a New World. New York:
Alfred A. Knopf, 1991), 221.
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Sills, David L. ed. The Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences. np: The MacMillan Company, 1968.
S.v. "Nationalism," by Hans Kohn; Deconde, Alexander. ed. The Encyclopedia of American Foreign
Policy: Studies of the Pniiciple Movements and Ideas. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1978. S.v.
"National Self-Determination," by Bettey Miller Unterverger; William Pfaff, The Wrath of Nations:
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multiculturalism, human rights, and the acceptance of dissent. As a result, the
priorities of Western states are a liberal world order of economic interests,
democracy, and regional and cultural identity as the desire for national selffulfillment has taken hold in a civic form.

Unfortunately, many non-Western

multinational states have failed to develop the unifying values of a civil society As
a result, nationalism in such states has developed along ethnic lines based more on
a common language, genealogy, and group loyalty in lieu of loyalty to the state's civic
culture. Festering grievances and ethnic resentments result. Often, a conquered or
expelled nation has feelings of unfinished busines and a deep sense of grievance.
People see themselves as morally deserving of a denied national self-fulfillment,
which can only be satisfied by national independence.
surprisingly malevolent ethnic nationalism of secession. 4

The result today is an
Therefore, it is not

surprising that foreign policy practitioners and scholars reject humanitarian
intervention as a solution to one of history's most difficult and enduring political
problems.
In fact, post-World War II foreign policy practitioners and scholars have
already been disillusioned on the issue. The legacy of the European state system and

4

Smith, Anthony D, "The Ethnic Sources of Nationalism," Survival 35 (Spring 1993): 55.
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Discipline Divided: Schools and Sects in Political Science (Newbury Park, Calif.: Sage publications,
Inc., 1990), 281-3: George Schopflin, "Nationalism and National Minorities in East and Central
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Lela Garner Noble, Ethnic Conflict in Intemational Relations (New York: Praeger, 1977), 6; Anthony
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Communism's consolidation policies were expected to resolve the conflicts of ethnic
nationalism and grievances within emerging, troubled states, but, once the Cold War
was over, such conflicts reemerged, proving that they were dormant rather than dead.
This phenomenon has led to a certain disenchantment in the West with ethnic
conflict and has reduced the will of outsiders to become involved. 5

Ethnic Conflict

Ethnic conflict is a merging of the struggle for power, the drive for survival,
the search for justice, and the quest for national self-fulfillment, i.e., selfdetermination and nationalism. Therefore, it involves a history of violence, festering
grievances for justice, feelings of group survivalism, and the fundamental collision of
nationalistic secession against preservation of the state. It, therefore, gives the
impression of being solvable only from within but draws outside, affective sympathy
for a number of reasons. In addition, ethnic nationalism, because it is historically
resilient, is ready to erupt when the configuration of international politics can on
longer constrain the search for justice, as happened in the Balkans and the former
Soviet Union after the Cold War. 6
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See Stephen Ryan, Etlmic Conflict and Intemational Relations, 56-7, 59, 64-5; according to Anthony
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Survival Nationalism

The conflict between status quo and secession is a quintessential struggle for
justice in its most subjective sense. To supporters of the status quo, state unity is
viewed as both necessary and convenient for the government under the authority of
the traditional dominant group to maintain continued subjugation over the state's
other groups. The dominant group desires its unity to save its advantages and itself
while the seceding nation, which feels oppressed and alienated from its culture,
desires its own nationally inclusive state. The subgroups and nationalities of the state
see themselves as victims of tyranny and want the same justice and right of selfdetermination as the dominant group. As a result, the dominant group adopts
whatever means necessary to survive and maintain control of the state.

The

secessionist group also sees its independence as a matter of survival and acts in the
same manner. Both unity and independence become core values for which people
are willing to die. Consequently, ethnic conflict is often a violence of unsurpassed,
savagery. 7
Survival nationalism, as it is termed by Anthony Smith, with its high stakes,
develops its own malevolent kind of political morality. One aspect of its special
savagery is that groups which see themselves as conquered o.r expelled nations seek
retribution for perceived past wrongs. Members of the group holding this sense of
grievance then justify in their own minds their atrocities. Such conflicts are resistant
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to compromise, the rule of law, and constitutionalism. The respect for the rule of law
is already weak in such states, which seldom have a democratic tradition to begin
with, and only worsens as the conflict intensifies. Any sense of fair play is lost to the
exigencies of the moment. Compromise among the warring parties is a necessary
component to an orderly and just peace but is disparaged by the group's
militarization for survival. Essentially, survival nationalism takes priority over the
target state's progress and the suffering of its civilian population. The idea of
reciprocity, i.e., the belief in the give and take needed for an orderly society, fades
before the dogmas of nationalism and self-determination.8
Of course, the sense of grievance leads to a cycle of unconscionable violence
and exploitation of the people's fears by local leaders. Because the conflict is over
core values and physical survival, victory becomes a moral imperative resulting in the
group's defense mobilization. The warring parties become militarized into garrison
communities of zealously and fanatically loyal populations seeking revenge for past
blood invested, which leads them down a spiraling path of hatred and revenge of
unrestrained destructiveness. The violence is both random and controlled but takes
on a life of its own in a seemingly meaningless, reciprocal spiral of atrocities,
although it is seldom without political purpose. 9 It is the perceived intensity and
8

Anthony Smith, "The Ethnic Sources of Nationalism," 57, 59-60.
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Astri .S. Suhrke and Lela Garner Noble, Ethnic Conflict in I11temational Relations, 6; Hedley
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irrationally of it that discourages the West from intervention. It is this intensity of
ethnic conflict and its accompanying fears which are susceptible to elite manipulation.
The discontent, the zealousness, and the strong group loyalty of the alienated masses
create fertile ground for manipulation by nationalistic demagogues like Serbia's
Slobodan Milosevic and Bosnia's Serb leader, Radovan Karadzic, who exploit ethnic
hatred to consolidate power. Leaders such as Somalia's Mohammed Farah Aideed
command significant support because of the deep domestic grievances within their
own societies. 10

The Threat to International Order and the
Fear of Infinite State Dissolution

In addition to the negative characteristics of ethnic conflict perceived as
barriers to humanitarian intervention by the West, there is also the view by states
that self-determination, nationalism, and ethnic divisions are serious threats to

of human reasoning and that emotions such as fear are deeply ingrained in brain circuits through
evolution. This leads to the hypothesis that the group's desire for justice manifested in the lingering
grievances, the historical resilience, and the malevolent proclivities of ethnic conflict is an emotion like
fear, hate, love, and jealousy, which would account for the illogical, self-destructive behavior and
protracted nature of ethnic and other emotionally charged political conflicts. Of course, even if brain
biology is verified as the culprit, there would seem to be no cures for ethnic hatred other than placing
the latest version of prozac in the drinking water of the warring parties. Anthony Smith, "The Ethnic
Sources of Nationalism," 59; Sandra Blakeslee, "The Biology of Emotions," Richmond Times-Dispatch,
19 January 1995, sec. E, p. 2; Stephen Ryan, Ethnic Conflict and I11temational Relations, 38-9, 54-5, 56-7,
59; George Schopflin, "Nationalism and National Minorities," 54, 58; Donald M. Snow, Distant
Thunder, 46; Raymond Pearson, "The Geopolitics of People Power," 505-6, 514; Astri .S. Suhrke and
Lela Garner Noble, Ethnic Conflict in lntemational Relations, 6; Anthony D. Smith, "The Ethnic
Sources of Nationalism," 57, 60; Stephen Ryan, Ethnic Conflict and llltemational Relations, 59.
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international order, which favors the status quo. The logic is that an unqualified right of
political communities to statehood presents the danger of infinite state dissolution. This
view was recently made concrete by the Russian attack on Chechnya. Also, a world of
many small states is seen as incapable of political or economic viability and appears
destabilizing internationally. An increase in the number of nonviable states would make
the resolution of the worsening, newly profiled global threats more difficult, and the
worsening of these threats would further aggravate the nonviability of states. Because of
the difficulty of obtaining interstate cooperation from a larger number of weak states, the
nonviability problems of inadequately apportioned resources, environmental degradation,
overpopulation, disease, crime-causing urbaniz.ation, transmigration and refugee flows, the
short supply of water, and even the ethnic intennixture of populations would be
exacerbated, leading to increased suffering and opportunities for conflict. Because the
nonintervention norm is seen as conducive to state unity and a state-oriented interpretation
of the right of self-determination, the international community and most states are not
inclined to weaken it, even to go much beyond officially cond.ernning the genocide and
oppression within such areas as the former Yugoslavia and sub-Saharan Africa. u

llAlexis Heraclides, "Secession, Self-Determination and Nonintervention," 407-8; Amtai Etzioni, "The
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Similarly, because of all the perceived negative consequences of ethnic and
survival nationalism and secession-oriented self-determination, the potential for
infinite state dissolution and disorder, the legacy of colonialism, and the strong hold
of realism on international politics worldwide, most of the Third World states favor
a strong nonintervention norm which is not very receptive of humanitarian
intervention and human rights. Third World leaders see the nonintervention norm
as protecting their authority to defend the multinational state's unity by dictatorial
rule if need be, which appears to be most of the time, in light of the potential for it
to self-destruct from the problems of nationalism and self-determination. Their
antagonism to intervention and their inclination toward authoritarian rule are not
only for the selfish reasons of maintaining an elite's power and privileges or a
predominate group's control over other groups but also because of their states'
demographic frailties requiring special measures. They are, therefore, especially
aware that power is necessary to the preservation of the status quo and to meeting
the exigencies of international as well as domestic concerns. The perception is that
of realism that the state's unity is equated with the possession of the power necessary
not only for its survival domestically but also internationally. Therefore, secessionoriented self-determination is seen generally as a threat to the realist stability
devices. 12

12

Because the historical basis of state sovereignty in the Third World is so precarious and the threat
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Mayall, "Nonintervention, Self-Determination and the New World Order," 525.
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The Realist View of Intervention in the Third World

According to Caroline Thomas, the Third World is still working on problems
for the most part already resolved in the West and still is just as influenced by
realism as are state leaders worldwide. She argues that the Third World is in an
earlier stage of development involving ethnic conflict, authoritarianism, disorder, and
great suffering already passed by the Western democracies. These are problems that
can only be solved through the moral autonomy of the Third World states. In the
Third World, according to Thomas, "politics must be played out." Therefore, quite
logically, Third World leaders see the nonintervention norm as assuring the equality
of states. It helps to assuage their fears that their former colonial masters might
continue an undue influence in their societies on economic, military, and cultural
matters. Hence, concentrating power may be a necessary step toward the obtaining
of domestic stability and legitimacy by dysfunctional states whereas intervention even
for humanitarian purposes might aggravate indefinite state dissolution. Hence, the
West needs to accept that failing states may have to go through authoritarianism as
part of the process of sorting things out. 13
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As realists, leaders in the Third World and of fragmenting states are also

skeptical of any professed altruism in foreign policy, especially from the West with
its colonial and Cold War past. They probably also see it this way from an intuitive
feeling of the validity of realist thinking. Consequently, the leaders of both the status
quo states and the secessionist nationalities see intervention as selfishly motivated
and as an activity ripe for exploitation. For instance, the various factions in Somalia
attempted to exploit politically the U.S. efforts to find and punish Aideed as a war
criminal. In Bosnia, the government, which was always at the disadvantage against
the Serbs, continually called for Western intervention. 14

Humanitarian Intervention and Realism
Third World leaders also recognize that the problems of realism will arise in
humanitarian intervention because the intervenor cannot use force without
influencing or appearing to influence the warring parties' political conflict. Thus,
leaders of target states will probably act and perceive others as acting in their
national interests, which translates into their distrust of Western intervention. The
argument is that the immense power of the West, its high valuation of capitalism, and
its realist tendencies make it inevitable that humanitarian intervention will eventually
become a matter of self-interest. Because of the nature of international politics, even
the sincere desire of the West for altruistic policies cannot escape the pursuit of its

14
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own interests. The Western conception of world order is seen as developed by the
most powerful states to preserve their interests.

Even the supposedly benign

economic assistance of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank
appears heavy-handed to Third World leaders. 15
Hans Morgenthau, the preeminent realist, warned that unavoidable
circumstances arise in international politics forcing the state to attend to its national
interest.

The good intentions of the intervenor have a propensity to turn

unconsciously toward matters of self-interest as its peacemaking breaks down among
the complexities of the political conflict.

This situation is no less true for

intervention today. Regardless of the intervenor's quality of leadership, humanitarian
intervention is at risk of being rerouted from altruistic intentions to matters of selfinterest and power politics.

For instance, as the U.N. search in Somalia for

Mohammed Farah Aideed progressed, U.S. efforts to criminalize and to punish him
changed the mission from one of humanitarian relief to one of upholding U.S. and
U.N. credibility in the handling of international problems.

At that point of

international involvement in the local political process, U.S. power and security
interests became unintentionally, and perhaps unconsciously, entangled in the
humanitarian mission: Another example is the fall of Bihac, in which NATO's
credibility, rather than help for the suffering, became the problem. 16
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Thomas argues that states always act in their national interests, that the
powerful will always exploit the weak, and that intervention will always be
"predatory."

Another scholar has noted the "hypocritical heritage of European

nations" to proclaim democracy at home while "systematically destroying others."
That the West is democratic does not negate its susceptibility to power politics.
Therefore, even in a world of failed, dysfunctional states, state sovereignty and the
nonintervention norm cannot be relaxed without great caution by the international
community and the fragmenting states in need themselves. As Thomas sees it,
altruistic intervention will always be "self-seeking humanitarianism." 17

Intervention in Ethnic Conflict: A Hobson's
Choice for the International Community

The greatest indicator that humanitarian intervention is a nonviable option for
ending structural violence and finding justice for conflicted, ethnically intermixed
groups is the hobson's choice that self-determination and nationalism present to the
international community. Preserving the status quo is not likely to resolve the serious
grievances of injustice held by those separatist groups which have not achieved their
national self-fulfillment, but remedying these grievances by an unqualified right of

Couldn't: The Real Reasons for the U.N.'s Retreat in Bosnia," Washington Post, 11 December 1994,
sec. c, p. 1. Even the possibility of the U.N.'s withdrawal from Bosnia has become a credibility problem
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See Jim Hoagland, "Out With a Bang," Washington Post, 11 December 1994, sec. C, p. 7.
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self-determination is not likely to end the creation of new grievances by those status
quo groups who lose power. Under such circumstances, the few options available to
local and world leaders are either ineffective or morally reprehensible for resolving
these problems. Three of these options--forced expulsion of populations, dictatorial
annexation of land, and the systematic killing of target groups--are currently being
applied in Bosnia. 18

Limited Choices: Expulsion of Populations, Dictatorial
Annexation of Land, and Systematic Killing Versus Trusteeship
The morally reprehensible options have worked because of the lack of
political will on the part of the West and the international community to stop
genocide. In Bosnia and Rwanda, the lesson has not been lost by ruling elites and
secessionists alike that ethnic cleansing is an effective tool for uniting the conflicted,
multi-national state. As a consequence, the genocidal, ethnic cleansing in Bosnia is
less a random violence of hatred and more a tactical genocide of purpose. Its a
purposeful, controlled hatred which achieves its goal of exterminating and expelling
political opponents by exploiting the natural tendency of people, when convinced that
their national survival is at stake, to devalue others.

It is a policy which also

effectively exploits the goodwill of the West as the Serbs continue to make and then
break promises of peace while incrementally removing their enemies. 19
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Because ethnic conflict involves survival nationalism in societies without
democratic traditions, the prospects for two other options of a moral and peaceful
character, partition and power sharing, are not promising. They involve either a new
balance of power between the warring parties or a total victory of one of the parties.
They are also costly and acquiesce in structural violence since both options usually
involve intended or collateral atrocities until victory or a new balance of forces takes
place. A new balance of forces also leaves much unfinished business waiting to erupt
again into violence, as in Cyprus. 20

Trusteeship

The remaining option is trusteeship which amounts to nation-building and
reform intervention by the international community. It involves the establishment
of Western, political and economic values and institutions reflecting constitutionalism
and the rule of law, which are anathema to today's typical dysfunctional state of
survival and ethic nationalism, authoritarianism, and xenophobia. The obstacles here
are considerable since infusing Western values into the political complexity and the

particular have used U .N humanitarian purposes to their advantage. They have by their '"policy of
accomplished fact'" alternatively accepted and broken cease-fires as they gradually increased their control
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stiff military resistance of the target state's survival nationalism requires a strong,
political will on the part of a reasonably united international community. 21

Choosing Victims and Culprits
Also a problem in attempting to provide social justice to another political
process is the inability to separate the victims from the culprits. Some outrageous
acts of cruelty, as in Bosnia, when viewed in their longrun, historical context and not
in their particular point in time, are part of a political process of savagery, mutual
mayhem, and recriminations in which all are culpable, making a just punishment of
the guilty difficult. Often, the actions of warring parties are both a matter of just
grievances and unjust violence. In particular, such judgments are made difficult by
the effectiveness of propaganda and disinformation, the affective nature of the
conflict, and the complexity of the reciprocal violence. It is difficult, therefore, to
judge the fairness of an aggrieved group's proportionality of response to social
injustice. 22 This view is not intended to negate the vile cruelty which takes place
in structural violence, but rather to point out that the world of states, both as an
international community and as separate political units, will judge the criminality of
those committing structural violence like the judges at the Olympics did during the
Cold War. Regardless of the level of cruelty involved, those to whom the judges feel
favorably disposed will score a 9.9 moral rating and others will score much lower.
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The difficulty of resolving these issues and judging moral accountability
returns the analyst of intervention to the same, fundamental questions. Of these, the
most important are what crimes based on what moral standards justify humanitarian
intervention? The discussion of the difficulties in resolving these issues, however, is
not an argument to excuse the failure of states to stop genocide and other atrocities
but rather is a reminder of the difficulty that outsiders have in playing moral referee,
adjudicating self-determination, gaining trust within troubled states, and overcoming
their own selfish natures. As a result, the world's states, either in the aggregate or
individually, seldom have the political will or the legitimacy to use military
humanitarian intervention against structural violence.

Chapter VI
American Perspectives on Intervention

Without resolution of the issues of cultural and moral relativism, order and
justice, the legitimacy and the power of the state, self-determination, and nationalism,
the American foreign policy perspectives of conservatism, neo-isolationism,
liberalism, realism, and internationalism offer little intellectual and moral vision on
the issue of military humanitarian intervention. Moreover, two of America's most
important approaches to studying and analyzing international politics--namely social
science and the legalistic-moralistic approach to international relations--do not
provide adequate prescriptive advice on the issue. As a result, with few answers and
many questions on military humanitarian intervention, Americans cannot reconcile
their idealism and belief in the rule of law with the ethic of consequences and cannot
find the political will to use military intervention against structural violence and
human rights abuses. As a result, its use is likely to be restricted to the most limited
cases of temporarily relieving atrocities and suffering where little sacrifice is involved.
But this conclusion is difficult for Americans to accept since, for them,
international politics has historically been connected to their principles of democracy
and constitutionalism. Thus, Americans feel a sense of moral obligation beyond the
responsibilities states normally associate with international politics. In the words of
Michael Novak:
114
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No European nation that I know of feels that its national mission is to
protect human beings elsewhere, to intervene (like St. George) to save
innocents from evil dragons. They do not regard other peoples in
distress as part of their national obligation.... Since World War II, we
Americans have grown up knowing that we are powerful. We are
confident (sometimes too much so) that America is good. For
Americans, it is as obvious as 2 plus 2 equals 4 that power plus
goodness equals national obligation. 1
American Exceptionalism and the Traditional
Inner Conflicts of American Foreign Policy
Novak's words echo the unique way that Americans define the moral basis of
their political association.

Known popularly as American exceptionalism, it is,

according to Kenneth Thompson, "the foreign policy corollary of the American
dream" and the rejection of "power as reality." 2 It rejects European power politics
with its corrupt alliances and balance of power manipulations and is the legacy of
America's beginning revolutionary commitment to building a liberal world order of
peaceful republics in the place of war prone monarchies. Its fundamental values are
commerce, free markets, and limited constitutional government. The resulting selfperception of Americans is one of moral superiority to European politics and a belief
that freedom everywhere depends on them. 3 But such a burden makes it difficult
for Americans to reconcile their rejection of power politics with the realities of
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power, and this inner conflict of U.S. foreign policy still haunts Americans on the
issues of human rights and humanitarian intervention.
Historically, while Americans were idealists abroad, they were nationalist and
expansionist at home. What came to be called "manifest destiny" brought forth a
policy of realism and power politics against Indians, Hispanics, and those European
powers still involved in North America after independence.

According to

Morgenthau, American expansionism on the continent was unbridled realism whose
history was later suppressed with the illusion that the U.S. was the product of
idealistic isolationism rather than power politics.

Yet Americans remained

isolationist in regard to Europe for much of the 19th century thanks to Great
Britain's enforcement of the Monroe Doctrine and America's remoteness from a
relatively stable European political order. America's degree of isolationism has been
exaggerated, however, as indicated by Paul Johnson's recent argument that America
has always been internationalist, at least in specific acts if not by general policy.4
But few would argue that the U.S. view of intervention was historically a narrow one
directed at keeping markets open and looking out for America's national interest by
temporary alliances of convenience. Thomas Jefferson summed it up by the phrase,
"Commerce with all nations, alliance [of permanence] with none." Isolationism and
American exceptionalism allowed Americans to have it both ways by harsh expansion
at home, which eventually came to include American imperialism in Central
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America, and idealistic detachment from power politics abroad, when it suited
them.5

It was near the end of the 19th century when American realism expanded into
Central America and the Pacific with imperialistic interventions as the U.S. looked
to expand its markets, recognized the decline of British power, and felt threatened
by European imperialism and industrialization. As the American desire for a sphere
of influence in the Western Hemisphere increased and Capt. Alfred T. Mahan's
geopolitical ideas on naval superiority became popular, economic and then political
imperialism became more reconcilable with American exceptionalism. Although
there was considerable domestic controversy evoked over the policies of territorial
expansion and coercive interference in other countries, most rationalized America's
new overseas involvement as a continuation of manifest destiny and the frontier ethic
rather than as a move toward European power politics and imperialism. Except for
the First World War, when Neo-Hamiltonian realists feared a threat to the national
interest and neo-Jeffersonian idealists feared that a German defeat of Britain and
France would lead to a U.S. national security state, America, especially with the
failure of Wilsonian idealism, remained essentially isolationist until the impending
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threat of fascism, beginning in the 1930s, gradually forced the U.S. towards a new
internationalism. 6
The Second World War and the Cold War, of course, changed America into
an interventionist power for reasons of both idealism and realism. The dramatic
political changes resulting from the Second World War and its aftermath drew the
United States by necessity away from any thoughts of isolationism and toward the
national security state and the realism of European politics, which Jefferson so
greatly feared. After the Second World War, the idealistic hopes of the end of
power politics and the beginning of a cooperative and peaceful liberal world order
became central issues of American foreign policy only to be displaced by the
exigencies of the Cold War. At the Cold War's end, the same hopes emerged again.
One issue that struck a cord with most Americans initially was the horrendous
suffering worldwide, which raised the issue of whether the U.S., as the remaining
superpower, should intervene for humanitarian reasons.
While tempting, it is too simplistic to write off American idealism and
exceptionalism as hypocrisy and utopianism because of America's realist past. Even
Morgenthau inadvertently provides a defense against the charge of American
hypocrisy when he argues that idealism is often sincere but delusional and that the
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ethic of consequences excuses acts which are popularly seen as immoral. 7 Whether
delusional or not, Americans have earnestly felt the desire to promote their version
of a liberal world order.
In regard to European power politics, Americans historically dealt with two

inner conflicts in their foreign policy. One concerned the desires, on the one hand,
to reform the world and, on the other, to remain separate from it. The second
conflict concerned the dilemma of whether to intervene, even to the extent of
military force to enlarge democratic capitalism--the expansion of which has always
been seen as a matter of the national interest--or to remain aloof and provide a
noninterventionary example of America's freedom and prosperity. Indeed, many
Americans still believe that republicanism will spread throughout the world as the
fruits of the American experience became apparent. 8
These conflicts represented the early American battle between the use of
power and internationalism, on the one hand, and isolationism and the withdrawal
from power, on the other. Both viewpoints had their advantages and disadvantages.
An activist foreign policy, though supposedly enlarging democracy, would require the

very power politics, national security state, large peacetime army, and interventionism
that republicans like Thomas Jefferson condemned as threatening to democracy at
home. The other vision of an isolationist and noninterventionist America would
avoid the European state system's power politics and its corruption of republicanism
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at home but would also mean a dangerously limited American influence abroad that
was condemned by realists like Alexander Hamilton as a threat to national security.
To this day, the debate between reformists-interventionists who advocate the use of
power abroad to enlarge democracy and isolationists-noninterventionists who see the
use of power as a matter of narrow focus to protect democratic-capitalism at home
has not been resolved. The reformists-interventionists carried the day against the
challenges of totalitarianism, but once Soviet Communism was defeated, Americans
were back to square one on how to promote a liberal world order.9
With the American national security state a fact since the beginning of the
Cold War, one would think that interventionism as a threat to democracy at home
would be a long dead issue. However, with the return of a conservative Republican
attack on the size of the federal government has come a neo-isolationist fear of the
U.N. and internationalism as threatening the new shift in American federalism
towards the states and away from a large central government.

Although

conservatives have certainly gotten past their fear of the national security state by
their modern acceptance of a large, standing peacetime army, they have been and
still are skeptical of a large central government unduly influenced by the United
Nations. 10 This resurgence of isolationism indicates that Americans are back to
square one on the problem of promoting a liberal world order.
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The Five Conflicting Ideological Components of
the American Liberal World Order

Americans have a vision that their fundamental values of peace, commerce,
free markets, and limited constitutional government are destined to expand
worldwide into an American liberal world order.11 Today, there are five conflict
ideological components of the American liberal world order-- namely conservatism,
neo-isolationism, liberalism, realism, and internationalism--which have evolved from
American exceptionalism and whose fundamental values currently define the
philosophical foundations and boundaries of the humanitarian intervention debate.
Each has implications for the application of morality and justice to international
politics. While each shares the core value of democratic capitalism, each has its own
interpretation of the most appropriate American version of liberal world order. Each
also has been attended by the traditional tension between individual justice and
international order, i.e., between international morality and realism, and the
traditional inner conflicts of American foreign policy between isolationist exemplar
and internationalist crusader.
The most traditional American foreign policy perspective is conservatism,
which is a liberal world order view whose core value is individual freedom and
initiative. It most closely follows the traditional American liberal world order values
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of free markets, limited constitutional government, and the individual's right to
physical safety and property. At the international level, conservative values translate
into free trade, open world markets, the realization of comparative advantage, and,
of course, isolationism. 12 However, starting in the late 1930s and continuing past
the Cold War, the threat, first of Fascism and then Communism, led conservatives
to accept a state-centric view of international relations and to reject their isolationist
past. As one historian noted, the imperatives of the time changed the conflict from
"...between isolationism and internationalism ... " to "... between weak internationalism
and strong internationalism."13 One wing of conservatism, however, returned, after
the Cold War, to the isolationist view of the traditional conservative 19th century
liberal world order. Their current thinking represents a reversion to a narrow, but
still statist, view of America's security interest which gives priority to America's
internal economic and social restoration. It is an America first view whose national
interest focus is on direct security threats, making it a somewhat more narrow view
of the national interest than that of realists. 14
Liberalism, on the other hand, places priority on social justice instead of
individual initiative. It gradually began to take form during the 1930s from the
American ideals of social justice and democracy, which liberals saw as the primary
goals of international politics and as achievable through public policy and
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internationalism. New Deal liberals responded to what they viewed as the need and
the equity of providing a productive slot for every person in the modern, democratic
mass society. They became the first American internationalists in defiance of the
aggression of the Axis powers. They came to view the welfare and security of the
United States as connected to that of the Western democracies. As a result, the
Roosevelt Administration gradually led the U.S. into the Second World War, world
leadership, and toward internationalism. Liberals modified conservative political
theory by making government a partner with the private economy to balance
individual initiative and the collective welfare. Hence, today, unlike conservatives,
they approve of government regulation in order to control capitalism's tendencies
toward market concentration and social indifference. Liberal principles translate at
the international level into global economic management and foreign assistance
through international organizations. Most importantly, because of both foreign and
domestic economic deprivation, as well as the prevalence of oppression abroad,
liberals see the state as an important tool for freedom and social justice. This view
translates internationally into a state-centrist view of international relations. 15
American realism stays true to its progenitor of European power politics by
giving priority to the appropriate focus and expenditure of state power in the pursuit
of the national interest, but develops its own Americanized, intellectual foundation.
Yet it is not America's historical brand of realism, e.g., its Indian Wars and ruthless
cultural expansion. America's 20th century realism, unlike its versions of liberalism
and conservatism, is not a product of American exceptionalism. It is not an originally

15
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American perspective on foreign policy, is not based on traditional liberal world
order values, and is not representative of the values of democratic capitalism.
Rather it is primarily an idea of international politics which concentrates on the
state's security and emphasizes power politics more in the European sense of the
balance of power. It is also a significant part of the American worldview developed
as a response to idealism's failure to secure peace in the 1930s and to prevent the
rise of totalitarianism and harsh power politics during and after the Second World
War. 16
Like liberal internationalism, realism was a response to the age of
totalitarianism and the need to defend against the threats of Fascism and
Communism. Brought to America by German refugees such as Hans Morgenthau
and Henry Kissinger, the alien ideas of realism were formed from the German
culture and the horrors of the Holocaust.

They contradicted American

exceptionalism's rejection of European power politics and came to reject both liberal
and conservative idealism as utopian and isolationism as unrealistic. This form
realism began to significantly influence American foreign policy at the beginning of
the Second World War and continued to do so throughout the Cold War. Despite
its foreign origin, its negative view of human nature, and its emphasis on the state's
national interest, it was eventually appropriated by the principles of democratic
capitalism.

1

In this regard, it played a significant role in protecting Western

6william C. Wohlforth, "Realism and the End of the Cold War," lntemational Security 19 (Winter
94/95): 91.
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democracy and extricating the U.S. from Vietnam by restraining the unbridled and
moralistic use of power in the U.S. containment of the Soviet Union. 17
American internationalism like America itself, is a melting pot, in this case,
of the various American schools of thought on foreign policy. It is a 20th century
creation of American foreign policy leaders and thinkers.

It resulted from its

appropriation of the other American perspectives on foreign policy, except
isolationism. It is a centrist view of these perspectives and presents a consensus on
the desirable goals of American foreign policy. It fuses the moderate wings of
contemporary liberalism and conservatism as well as the more moderate views of
realism and idealism to form a centrist American foreign policy establishment. The
Trilateral Commission and the Council on Foreign Relations are organizations of the
U.S. foreign policy and business elite that provide, along with their allies,
internationalism's intellectual and political leadership. 18
Internationalism may at times waver slightly left or right, but it essentially
protects against international threats to its two primary interests of Western
economic well-being and social democracy. Its leaders may talk more left or right
to please the electorate but, for the most part, come back to the center when making
policy.

Essentially, 'both American realists and idealists have come to see less
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conflict between the real world demands of power politics and the core values of
democratic capitalism. It restrains the intensity of both left and right as well as the
tension between realism and idealism.
Internationalism, within certain limits, place priority on a healthy, capitalist
world economy of social democracies and on their relationship with adjunct, orderly
non-democratic states.

They see a healthy capitalist world economy through

international trade rather than through internal restoration as the most important
precondition to international order. Today, American internationalism, according to
Richard Falk, is the Western foreign policy establishment's world order model based
on the values of "trade, money, international financial institutions and energy policy."
As Charles S. Maier remarks of internationalism, "For now a minimal consensus has

been reached on the primacy of markets with a continuing regulatory role for
government." Essentially, its primary goals of the survival and growth of democratic
capitalism, preferably by the expansion and enlargement of capitalist economies, is
a centrist version of the traditional liberal world order and may be viewed as the
liberal world order's minimal consensus of values designed for an international
economy. 19
Internationalism, however, did not develop as part of some grand design of
world order but rather as a reaction to certain critical points and urgent needs of
international politics after the Second World War and from the necessities of

1
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America's new found power and responsibilities.

It adopted realism while

maintaining the basic values of American exceptionalism. Because of its realist
component, it willingly accepts political and economic interaction with authoritarian
capitalist states as well as Communist states to the extent necessary to secure world
markets and strategic security.

While it has made moderate efforts to secure

freedom abroad, it also recognizes the necessity of protecting the national interest
and using and focusing power appropriately. One might say that it is the adaptation
of the ideals and pragmatism of the Founding Fathers to the modern world.
The Five Components During the Cold War

America's internationalist foreign policy practitioners and intellectuals, whose
liberal world order values were mature adaptations and admixtures of conservatism,
liberalism, and realism, adjusted their principles during the Cold War in favor of
interventionism to meet the threat of Communism. The Cold War, at least in the
beginning, was a period of anomalous ideological alignments in American foreign
policy.

Even most conservative isolationists put aside their beliefs for fear of

Communism. Liberals and conservatives alike were frightened into a unique merger
of ideologies and a new interventionism, which became the Truman Doctrine. The
ideas of realism began to influence, perhaps even to dominate, American idealism.
Until America's involvement in Vietnam, politics did stop at the water's edge,
although the parameters of containment increasingly became a source of
disagreement within U.S. foreign policy circles.
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Conservatives viewed the Cold War as an ideological battle between good and
evil. They, therefore, not only advocated aggressive interventionism against Soviet
power, which culminated in the Reagan Doctrine's policy of enlarging freedom
against communism rather than simply containing it, but also alliances with
oppressive, right-wing anti-Communist governments, which they later claimed were
less oppressive and more conducive to democratic reform than totalitarian ones.
They also came to accept, contrary to traditional American values, a large peacetime
military and a national security state on the theory that both were preferable to
defeat by totalitarianism. Paradoxically, people whose core values were individual
freedom and initiative developed state-centric ideas on foreign policy favoring
interstate justice over individual justice.20
Liberals also embraced American interventionism at the beginning of the Cold
War, in part, from lessons they felt they learned from the Second World War.
Because of their dislike of isolationism, their fear of appeasement, and their desire
to prove their anti-Communist credentials,

they

easily transferred

their

internationalism from Nazi to Soviet aggression but not without eventually some
controversy within their own ranks. They at first accepted aggressive containment,
despite their belief iri the social roots of revolution. But, because of the Viet Nam
War, liberals changed significantly to support a less aggressive form of containment
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and interventionism. After Vietnam, liberals became more conciliatory toward the
Soviet Union and returned to their roots of social injustice as the cause of revolution,
especially in regard to the non-aligned states of the Third World. The improvement
of the economic and social conditions of the underdeveloped states through global
distributive justice came to be seen as the cure for revolution and Soviet influence
in the Third World. As a result, liberals broadened their definition of the national
interest beyond realism's security dilemma to include traditional non-security "global
threats" such as poverty, famine and disease. Security, distributive justice, and global
prosperity came to be viewed as interdependent. They also grew to dislike alliances
with right-wing governments and saw military confrontation and intervention as
tending to uphold corrupt, anti-democratic governments and to divert resources away
from the real breeding grounds of communism. Gradually, liberals placed their
hopes on global, economic management and foreign assistance through international
organizations.

Superpower confrontation was rejected as inflaming East-West

tensions, exacerbating those social conditions encouraging revolution, and increasing
the possibility of a nuclear holocaust. Instead, they advocated compromise and
detente as pragmatic and morally compelling alternatives to confrontational policies.
As their Cold War· reasoning matured, they placed their faith in foreign aid,

disarmament, collective security, international organizations, cooperative treaties, and
a little more world leadership by example than by force. 21
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Realism also became influential in American foreign policy as a response to
totalitarianism. Despite efforts at fidelity to their idealistic roots, Americans could
not ignore the uses of power and the importance of the national interest in an
increasingly dangerous world. For the first time, Americans felt that their survival
and democratic values were threatened, despite the limited, Soviet nuclear arsenal
in the beginning. Americans felt compelled by these events not only to abandon
isolationism but also to act in international politics according to the realities of
power. The result was an American version of realism which began to dominate
American foreign policy. But realists had complex views about the uses of power.
They rejected as irrational the aggressive, globalist view of containment accepted at
first by both conservatives and liberals, which considered Communism a monolithic
threat to be fought by intervention worldwide. They argued that the U.S. emphasis
on ideology was a form of moralism which gave America an exaggerated sense of
power and a self assurance of righteousness that was likely to interfere with the
realistic assessment of the consequences of U.S. foreign policy and the effective focus
and expenditure of U.S. power.

Morgenthau warned that the superpowers'

ideologically motivated moralism blinded them to the limits of power. He argued
that the U.S., by mistakenly acting as if all revolutions were Communist inspired
threats to its security, was misdirecting its power to areas unrelated to the national
interest. Hence, his vocal opposition to America's involvement in Vietnam as the

University of South Carolina Press, 1988), 148-9.
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moralistic misdirection of U.S. power from areas and issues important to its national
interest. 22
Internationalism's role during the Cold War was as important as it was subtle
in defeating Soviet Communism or, perhaps more accurately stated, in protecting the
West while Soviet Communism defeated itself. It accepted the national security state
as a necessity for U.S. and Western security during the Cold War, but it also did not
devour capitalism and civil liberties, contrary to Jeffersonian assumptions, despite the
growth of the powers of the federal government and the increasing social problems
of the Western democracies. Containment was a delicate and painful issue for the
U.S. and its allies, but, despite the folly of Vietnam, somehow, internationalism
managed to restrain isolationism, liberal and conservative moralism, and the
significant but not absolute influence of realism in order to successfully navigate, in
the longrun, a middle course of reasonable parameters for containment and
interventionism. Internationalism guided the U.S. successfully between the Reagan
and Johnson Doctrines and achieved reciprocal restraint between the superpowers
in the nuclear age. But while internationalism also made important, if limited,
strides in promoting human rights, it also showed few reservations about using power
and intervention, regardless of whether or not human rights were advanced, to
protect its core values of democratic capitalism, world economic growth, security ties
with Western Europe, and international order. It was successful at making an uneasy
accord within American foreign policy between realism and idealism to save the

~ary Maxwell, Morality Among Nations, 13; Yale H. Ferguson and Richard W. Mansbach, The
Elusive Quest, 97, 150; Hans Morgenthau, "To Intervene or Not To Intervene," Foreign Affairs 45

(April 1967): 434-36.

132
West, but, as will be seen in regard to the issues of human rights after the Cold War,
the message of internationalism does not bode well for the future of stopping
structure violence and other massive, human rights violations. 23

The Five Components After the Cold War

Once the Cold War ended, Americans and the American foreign policy
establishment again faced the problems of forming the appropriate inter-relationships
among liberal world order values, intervention, international order, interstate,
cosmopolitan, and individual justice, especially in light of the atrocities of ethnic and
religious nationalism and self-determination. To debate the resolution of these
problems, Americans went back to their traditional core liberal world order values,
their particular views on intervention formed from these values, and the particular
views held by each American foreign policy perspective on the relationship in
international politics between justice and order. However, these fundamental values
and assumptions of the various American perspectives on foreign policy could not
resolve the humanitarian intervention debate--at least intellectually and morally in
terms of stopping atrocities and mass, human rights violations--and the passivity of
internationalism in the face of structural violence seems to have decided the issue.
As representatives of each perspective returned to their roots, the ideological
alignments on Cold War intervention broke down, leaving a confusing multitude of
possible options, none of which appeared too promising. Many conservatives and

2.1See Henry Kissinger, "Reflections on Containment," Foreign Affairs 73 (May/June 1994): 113-30,
for a discussion on the maturing of the policy of containment as the Cold War progressed.
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liberals preferred interventionism because of their idealism. Other conservatives
preferred an updated form of isolationism because they felt that American economic
and political security could be protected most effectively, despite such a policy's
inevitable assault on international cooperation, by America's 19th century foreign
policy traditions, including that of being the world's exemplar instead of crusader.
Realists, however, rejected conservative and liberal interventionism as utopian
idealism and neo-isolationism as a modern day head-in-the-sand know-nothingism.
Instead, they preached moderation and preferred a more traditional view of national
security, although they began to accept some of the newly profiled global threats as
possible security issues. But internationalism, as the source of equilibrium among
America's various foreign policy perspectives during the Cold war, pursued
moderation in all areas of post-Cold War international politics, including the use of
military intervention, although it flirted with liberal interventionism in Somalia. And,
today, internationalism still dominates American foreign policy, represents its center,
and is the strongest American influence on the evolution of contemporary
international relations and the future of humanitarian intervention, which, as
internationalist values indicate, is not too promising.

Liberalism
Liberalism today rejects the pursuit of individual justice as conflicting with
international order and, based on its roots of social justice and Wilsonian idealism,
advocates reform humanitarian intervention or nation-building. Since social justice
presupposes all desirable ends in international politics, liberals assume that
international conflict is minimized by democracy plus Wilsonian self-determination
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and the end of global, economic deprivation and political oppression. Hence, international
order is best served in the longrun by a distribution of the world's economic resources such
that the most disadvantaged of the world's people receive the minimum level of assistance
needed to assure them a meaningful quality of life.
In particular, liberals see dysfunctional or failed states debilitated by ethnic conflict and
nationalism as increasing disorder and global threats and civil war as a siren to other states
to cause trouble. Liberals argue that U.S. Cold War moralism exacerbated the problems of
failed states and that such problems as refugee flows and violence move beyond their
borders to exacerbate the forces of social disorder lurking in other troubled states. And
now with the Cold War over, they see no reason that states cannot cooperate more fully
and use their collective power, especially through diplomacy and economic assistance and
sanctions, to solve the problems of failed states, to stop human rights abuses, and to end
structural violence. As part of this worldview, liberals also elevate the newly profiled
global threats to the level of security issues and argue that collective action against these
threats is in the national interest of states, both collectively and individually. These
arguments, not surprisingly, are consistent with the position of liberals during the Cold War
that a society of socially just states presented the best defense against Communist
revolution, whether domestically grown or imported. 24

Z4Tue idea of the dysfunctional or failed state and the controversy over whether dysfunctional states are
a threat to the social order of other states and the international community are not new. The idea of
dysfunctional states in international politics became evident in the aftermath of the French Revolution.
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use of intervention to preserve the balance of power for a nonthreatening equilibrium in Europe. To the
states of continental Europe, order depended upon intervening against revolutionary instability within
states. To Britain, with a body of water between it and the other states of Europe, order depended much
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Liberal inteiventionists, however, make a radical departure from their mature, Cold War
non-confrontational view of international politics, reminiscent of their early support for
intervention in Vietnam, when they support military intervention on behalf of nationbuilding to achieve institutional reform of the target state. But in another sense, their
support of military intetvention is a logical extension of their belief in collective security on
behalf of the world's peace and security, which they charge is threatened by structural
violence and other forms of human rights violations. Accordingly, they advocate enlarging
liberal world order values by a policy of military humanitarian intervention through the
authority of the United Nations and regional organizations, which they claim to be a
morally compelling and concrete step toward defying structural violence, both as genocide
and economic deprivation, as well as protecting U.S. national interests. The American
foreign policy establishment rejects such views as utopian, at least to the extent that they
support the use of force. 25

Conservatism
Conservative interventionists, on the other hand, base their position on the more
traditional values of American exceptionalism instead of those of social justice as advocated
by liberal intetventionists. Accordingly, conservatives want to intervene militarily in non-

democratic and socially dysfunctional or failed states to assure civilian populations of

25Stephen John Stedman, "The New Interventionists,' Foreign Affairs 72 (American and the World
1992/93): 2-10.
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their rights to individual initiative, free markets, and democracy. They see oppressive
states as destroying the freedoms needed for worldwide individual initiative and
democratic capitalism. They argue that the change in the nature of the threat to
freedom does not change American and Western responsibility to preserve freedom
in a still hostile world of such evils as ethnic cleansing, whose immorality and
destructiveness equates with that of Communism and, therefore, threatens freedom
everywhere. They see ethnic nationalists, such as the Bosnian Serbs, as simply
modern versions of historical aggressors, such as the Nazis and the Communists,
against the individual and economic rights of the people. In doing so, they view
intervention in its more traditional sense of aid to help the victims of aggression and
dictatorship earn their freedom.

This view translates into a preference for the

compellent use of force, i.e.,., the use of force against carefully chosen targets to stop
the aggression. Two of the most prominent and eloquent advocates of this position
are former President Reagan and Prime Minister Thatcher who have called for the
international community to arm the Bosnian Government and to punish and stop
Bosnian Serb aggression by carefully selected air strikes. 26
Conservative interventionists reject their 19th century view of isolationism for
the same reason today that they did during the Cold War, namely the threat of
totalitarianism. During the Cold War, they came to see the international community
and the United Nations as useful, if not trusted, instruments against Communism,
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and today they also wish to use the U.N. for collective action against aggressors.
Unlike liberals, who see the U.N. as an instructment to achieve social justice through
a respect for the diversity of states, they see it as an organization to be dominated
by American values and power in the crusade against aggression and to be discarded

if it fails to abide by them. Hence, conservative Republicans showed their disdain
for the international community by advocating a unilateral lifting of the arms
embargo against Bosnia regardless of whether the U.N. agreed. 27
However, like their fellow liberal idealists, the ideas of conservative
interventionists are also rejected by the American foreign policy establishment, not
so much on the basis that they are utopian, but rather because they conflict with the
"national interest." The disorder in the Balkans, the former Soviet Union, and Africa
is claimed by realists and internationalists not to affect the values, security and
prosperity of the United States, at least not to the degree claimed by conservative
interventionists. It is true that the accompanying structural violence and human
rights abuses are an affront to American values, but, according to internationalists,
the refusal to act against them can be reconciled with American values by
recognizing that the costs of intervention in lives and money would be too high, that
the use of force, induding compellence, would likely not resolve the abuses, that an
overextended U.S. would needlessly be exposed to new dangers, and that the

nsenator Dole has a bill before the Senate to lift the arms embargo against the Bosnians,
unilaterally if need be, which President Clinton has threatened to veto. The Republicans were reported
to possibly have the party decipline to override his veto; "Behind the Truce," The Economist, January
14, 1995, p. 48.
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unrealistic pursuit of individual justice would harm the maximization of overall justice
in the longrun.28

Neo-Isolationism

Neo-isolationists, unlike conservative interventionists, have returned to 19th
century traditional, liberal world order values.

The current thinking of neo-

isolationists is a reversion to a narrow view of the national interest, a belief in
America first, especially in economics, a minimalist acceptance of free trade,
sanctions short of force against remaining Communist states, a rejection of the
usefulness of the United Nations, and the idea of the U.S. as an example of liberty
and prosperity to the world.

Accordingly, they believe strongly in democracy's

universal appeal and the doctrine of self-help. They view democratic capitalism as
attractive enough to the world that many will be willing and able to earn their
freedom. They assume that the global consumer eventually will demand a liberal
world order. As a result, they do not see global threats as emergencies in need of
immediate and drastic action, but rather as problems, which are overstated by liberals
and internationalists and that the technology and individual initiative of democratic
capitalism can eventually solve. Consequently, they see reform intervention as a
wasteful diversion of resources from internal economic and social restoration. In
fact, they see intervention limited to resolving only direct threats to the physical
security of the U.S. homeland. Thus, exceptions to the nonintervention norm are even
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more narrow for realists. Their exceptions are so narrow that even threats to oil
kingdoms in the Middle East may not be a matter of the national interest. U.S.
involvement in power politics without a major enemy and an overwhelming threat is
seen as a wasteful form of interventionism.

Certainly, according to this view,

individual justice is a low priority in the liberal world order of neo-isolationists. The
implication is that the pursuit of individual justice is harmful to international order
and overall justice. As to structural violence and human rights abuses, the victims
of these, like the poor, will always be with us. Essentially, neo-isolationism is a
modern faith in American exceptionalism's ability to bring other deserving states into
line with democratic capitalism, which cannot be bothered with the world's
imperfections. 29
Neo-isolationists also reject the idea of the dysfunctional state as a threat to
international order and the U.S. national interest. Instead, they see international
order and democracy as dependent upon the economic and political stability of the
U.S., which is threatened by competition from Europe and Asia and social
disintegration at home. Therefore, the U.S. needs to severely limit its role as world
policeman in order to concentrate on building up its social and economic strength.
While to neo-isolationists the suffering of dysfunctional states is regrettable, the hard
reality is that the oppressed and suffering who cannot earn their freedom will always
be with us and will most of the time be only on the periphery of U.S. interest. In any
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event, their best chance to earn their freedom is in an expanding liberal world order
led by the example of a healthy United States.
For a host of reasons, the American foreign policy establishment also rejects
neo-isolationism. The desirability of democracy abroad, if earned, and the need for
economic improvement at home becomes a rationale for compromising international
human rights abuses and tolerating authoritarian states. Liberals do not like the rigid
noninterventionism of neo-isolationism because it is consistent with that part of Cold
War conservatism which supported right-wing governments, provided they were antiCommunist. Because neo-isolationists are minimally critical of human rights abuses
abroad, especially if they are consistent with U.S. military and economic interests,
liberals see them as insufficiently protective of American values internationally.
Theirs been called an extremist and a narcissistic moralism which discounts the
humanity of others. Their narrow view of the national interest also raises the ire of
realists. Though realists today, like neo-isolationists, are basically anti-interventionist,
especially where humanitarian purposes are concerned, realists reject the neoisolationist limitation of vital national interests to direct security threats.
Intervention to them is still a matter of the appropriate focus and expenditure of the
state's power concerning primary and secondary threats to the national interest,
although such intervention may, on occasion, incidentally cause the moral dividend
of stopping human rights abuses, as in Cambodia, Uganda, and Bangladesh.30
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Pragmatic Neo-isolationism
Other neo-isolationists, termed here pragmatic neo-isolationist, are not the
refugees of Cold War conservatism.

Instead, they are pragmatists and reformed

realists, rather than ideologues, who argue that U.S. foreign policy should have a
domestic focus.

They show that they are not ideologues by recommending, in

contradiction to conservative ideology, that some economic nationalism and
limitations on free trade should be used when beneficial to the U.S. They see
themselves as new post-Cold War realists who might aptly be described as believers
in realism-lite or even perhaps as internationalists in a weak sense. They deny being
isolationist claiming instead that their views allow for a more realistic focus and
expenditure of U.S. power. Like realists, they reject as utopian the hope of liberal
interventionists that increasing interdependence and transnational problems will lead
states into a new cooperation out of enlightened self-interest. They reject as utopian
idealism both the belief in the ability of the U.N. and individual states to make peace
and to reform failed states and the ability of neo-isolationism to expand democracy
by example. While conservative neo-isolationists distrust the U.N, pragmatic neoisolationists simply see it as incapable of effective collective security in a world still
dominated by power politics. 31
Pragmatic neo-isolationists reject the idea of the dysfunctional state as a threat
to international order and the national interest, which leads to their rejection of
reform intervention and nation-building. Neither the extinction of disorder nor the
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triumph of democracy, according to neo-isolationists, is needed for U.S. security.
Doug Bandow, who presents the classic arguments of pragmatic neo-isolationism,
points out that the years of disorder in Africa have had little influence on U.S.
security. He also points out that Somalia's woes are of little impact on the U.S and
that even the war in the former Yugoslavia has not spread into the regional
contagion interventionists predicted. The reality of disorder, concludes Bandow, is
that it "...poses little danger to America and can be contained by other states, met by
more modest steps such as sanctions, or simply ignored." As an alternative to U.S.
intervention, states can take care of the disorder within their own regions, but if they
cannot, the U.S. is still at little risk. 32
Pragmatic neo-isolationists, though sti11 holding that power is at the center of
international politics, argue that the new world order requires a nonconventional,
restricted interpretation of the national interest, since the U.S. is no longer under
threat from another superpower but is facing increasing social disorder at home.
Therefore, the national interest of U.S. foreign policy takes on the different meaning
of retrenchment, in which the U.S. should concentrate on direct threats to its security
in lieu of a continuing global mission. For instance, it is recommended that the U.S.
withdraw most of its forces from Europe to avoid contact with the political instability
of the former Soviet bloc but intervene to destroy clear security threats such as
weapons of mass destruction. Bandow opines that most wars are not related to U.S.
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national interests, but a globalist attempt to extinguish war would place the U.S.
under threats otherwise avoidable. Essentially, their position is that economic and
social challenges at home must take priority subject to the realities of international
politics.33
Pragmatic neo-isolationism is rejected by the U.S. foreign policy establishment
as providing an insufficient rationale for the pursuit of American national interests
on issues where realists say reciprocity is needed for minimum international order
and justice. Likewise, their narrow view of security concerns is seen as ignoring
indirect but serious dangers to the U.S which must be dealt with now if they are not
~tually

to become direct threats. Also, internationalists see such a narrow view

of the national interest as an insensitivity to human rights abuses which unnecessarily
dismisses realism's moral dividend of humanitarian assistance incidental to the use
of power. 34

Realism

Realists today still see intervention in terms of the appropriate focus and
expenditure of U.S. power and the idealism-realism dichotomy in terms of
Morgenthau's attack upon the goals of American exceptionalism, which he saw as
utopian because they represent "abstract principles" displacing "concrete interests."
Realists apply Morgenthau's warning against moralism to today's issues arguing that
it produces an exaggerated sense of state power which encourages unsuccessful and
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morally unconscionable interventions. While policies such as reform intervention
appeal to the ideals of American exceptionalism, they present the risk of American
interventionism degenerating into a new form of moralism just as disastrous as any
of the past. Realists claim instead that maximizing American goals is best done by
the effective, moderate use of power politics. Realists see intervention in a broader
context than neo-isolationists but in a narrower one than either conservative or
liberal idealists. They see the machinations of international politics as too complex
to view only direct threats as matters of vital interest, but they also see intervention
for social reform and democracy as another example of moralism's misguided focus
and expenditure of power. American realists see human rights and global problems
as constrained by the realities of power and the national interest, but they also
recognize that a credible, international human rights regime, within realistic limits,
is becoming a core U.S. value and a part of reciprocity among states. Their view of
the national interest allows for interventions where the subtleties of power present
issues of vital interest to the U.S., including human rights, but not solely based on
human rights. To them, the reform and crusading views of liberal and conservative
interventionists are viewed as moralism likely to resurrect the moral skepticism and
disillusionment whiCh followed the Vietnam War's aftermath. Yet, they also agree
that human rights should be protected where feasible, low in cost, and beneficial to
the national interest. 35
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The realist general opposition to humanitarian intervention is consistent with
its Cold War opposition to ideological intervention.

Consummate realist Henry

Kissinger criticizes the interventions in Somalia and Haiti by providing the basic
realist arguments against the contemporary use of humanitarian intervention and
equating the past abuses of ideological interventions with today's humanitarian ones.
He attacks the risk of American causalities in a place where he argues U.S. national
security is not involved. As in Vietnam, the political will of the American people,
as they become aware that no direct security threat is involved, will not support the
level of causalities needed for nation-building.

Kissinger also questions reform

intervention and nation-building in Haiti. He argues that the local political process
is too complex for nation-building. For instance, the restoration of Haiti means the
initiation of Haitian democracy which surpasses our military and political
capabilities.36
Kissinger also claims that humanitarian intervention is detrimental to a
desirable reconfiguration of international politics after the Cold War, especially in
the former Soviet bloc. Despite its good intentions, unilateral U.S. humanitarian
intervention, according to Kissinger, sets a bad precedent for using moralism and the
maintenance of order as justifications for expansionist policies and is one which
Russia and rogue or imperialist states could use to excuse their expansionism and
aggression. A significant example to Kissinger of using regional order and moralism
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146
as an excuse for aggression is Russia's attitude to its near abroad of those new states
of the former Soviet Union targeted by Russia's renewed but traditional imperialism
in the region. Russia supported the U.N. resolution authorizing the U.S. intervention
in Haiti, Kissinger charges, to help set a convenient precedent legitimizing its own
regional imperialism, which the U.S. is exacerbating by its pronouncements
supporting the regional responsibility of major powers to maintain peace and
international and regional order. Thus, the subsequent conflict in Chechya is to the
international community and the U.S. an "internal affair." For these reasons, the
American foreign policy establishment does not reject realism and the ethic of
consequences but instead feels that it must restrain and temper realism in order for
Americans to maintain a moral vision of their foreign policy and to support a
moderate, international human rights regime. One significant criticism of realism,
which is now a major U.S. foreign policy debate, is that the Soviet Union's demise
resulted from a revolution of ideas, e.g., Gorbachev's reforms, as opposed to changes
in the relative power of states, with the implication that democratic values can break
states out of the security dilemma. Hence, human rights advocates, including some
conservative and liberal interventionists, see internationalism's appropriation of
realism as really the reverse of the path which led to the Cold War's end. In such
a case, structural violence cannot be stopped because of a cowardly and selfish U.S.
foreign policy dominated by realist thinking. 37
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Internationalism
Contemporary futemationalism's centrist position, with its emphasis on international
order and the power of the state as preconditions to economic well-being and political
stability, still appropriates much realist thinking, especially on the effective focus and
expenditure of power. Also indicative of realism's strong influence on internationalism is
the political and economic interaction of the West with authoritarian, Communist, and
other oppressive states in order to enhance the capitalist world economy and international
order. fu turn, human rights are seen as important but secondary to economic stability and
a strong nonintervention norm, meaning that military intervention is going to be rare and
primarily to protect the world economy. Edward Luttwak exemplifies internationalism's
moral reasoning which defines the national interest in terms of economic well-being.
futernationalism's primary foreign policy goal is an environment conducive to conducting
business, which is a peaceful and orderly world without the distraction or disruption of
either conflict or religious moralism, e.g., the activities of Serbs and Iranians. Activities of
these miscreants is not seen in terms of human rights but in terms of preserving an
environment protective of business, such as the secure, constant flow of resources among
states necessary for the functioning of a sophisticated world economy.3 8 Human rights
abuses become significant only once some economic or other security issue forces action.
Luttwak's argument is that Western access to the oil needed for a viable global economy
is a matter of self-preservation justifying military intervention to secure embargoed oil
fields. His moral justification of intervention is based on the ethic of consequences in

38See Benjamin R. Barber, "Jihad vs. McWorld.," The Atlantic Monthly (March 1992): 54-5.
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that there would be great loss of life in both industrial and Third World states were
the world economy to collapse. While military intervention against embargoed oil
fields has yet to arise, Luttwak's ideas were prophetic of the Western
counterintervention against Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. His argument essentially is a
moral one in that the failure of democracy as a result of economic collapse produces
the greatest degree of individual injustice in the world. 39
Nonetheless, Internationalism, despite its appropriation of realist principles,
is based on protecting democratic values at home and securing them abroad. But at
the center of internationalism is the realist-inspired belief that freedom depends upon
the prosperity of the Western economic system, which cannot safely dismiss the ethic
of consequences and give priority to individual justice. Therefore, internationalists
focus and expend U.S. power for the purpose of preserving the global economy and
the welfare of Western democracies. Humanitarian intervention, therefore, is seldom
an option unless, in the process of protecting the global economy, the West also
eases its conscience about masses of starving people shown on television. Hence,
George Bush, the quintessential internationalist, could base intervention, in part, on
protecting human rights in Kuwait and easing the suffering in Somalia. Yet Bill
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Clinton, who accepted the mantle of internationalism, could call the Russian assault
on the civilians of Chechnya an internal affair. Moderation has its price. 40
Internationalism upholds democratic capitalism and encourages a centrist
political worldview, but it does not guarantee human rights or even minimum human
decency in many places. Democracy abroad, though desirable, is not necessary to
world stability and economic well-being.

While loss of freedom at home would

probably be a matter of vital national interest, the lack of democracy in the rest of
the world, although discouraging to internationalist principles, is secondary to the
necessities of a healthy global economy. In order to rationalize their actions of
moral ambiguity on human rights and genocide, internationalists seek a token human
rights regime of some use to the oppressed, which, depending upon one's political
perspective, can be seen as the glass half-empty or half-full.

This calculated

ambiguity of international human rights enforcement rationalizes a pragmatic foreign
policy for internationalists while mitigating the cognitive dissonance between their
ideals and their pragmatism. Internationalism does little, however, to end structural
violence and massive human rights violations, and it certainly provides no
fundamental values supportive of humanitarian intervention.
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Chapter VII
Humanitarian Intervention:
Critique and Conclusions
The Limits of Knowledge and America's
Perspectives on International Politics

Neither the core values of American internationalism nor the acquired
knowledge of humanity about international politics provides the basis for the use of
military humanitarian intervention to end structural violence and other severe human
rights violations. Still unresolved are those problems of international politics which
block the transformation of international morality from interstate justice to individual
justice.

Without resolution of the problems of unpredictability, subjectivity of

judgment, the ethic of consequences, moral and cultural relativism, state legitimacy,
nationalism, and self-determination, there can be no shift from the preference by
political leaders and the people for international order to a perference for individual
justice. And without a strong international committment to individual justice, states
have no basis on which to develop the political will to act militarily against structural
violence.

That is why the international human rights regime, though greatly

strengthened since the 1970s, is still weak in comparison to the state's authority to
take life and liberty from its citizens.

150

151
For Americans, this impasse is a moral dilemma.

Caught between their

idealistic impusles and these insoluble problems and without the benefit of
prescriptive theory and the universal application of the rule of law, Americans fear
that not to intervene is to accept the world's horrific political cruelty but to intervene
is to make themselves martyrs for an unknown objective. In addition, the television
pictures of the dead and suffering wear on the American conscience. But, in any
event, the traditional American perspectives on foreign policy of isolationism,
conservatism, liberalism, realism, and internationalism provide no answers to the
problem of structural violence.
The more historical form of American isolationism certainly is no option in
today's world since it essentailly writes off those in the rest of the world who cannot
earn their own freedom, but it is a reminder of the depth of American
exceptionalism, nationalism, and America's conflict between reform and example to
the rest of the world. Pragmatic isolationism also writes off those in the rest of the
world, but it also is a reminder that Americans must concentrate on their
increaseningly severe social problems at home.

Liberal and conservative

interventionists, on the other hand, want to reform the world, though in different
ways. Liberals want to empower victims of human rights violations by an American
foreign policy of nation-building in failed states, while conservatives want to assist
those worthy of earning their freedom.

But nation-building appears utopian in

concept and cannot get past the ethic of consequences, and the compellence
suggested by conservatives to arm the Bosnians and to bomb the Serbs, though
probably the most realistic form of intervention, is a victim of timing and the West's
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lack of political will. As to realism, it is always a reminder that international politics
cannot escape the ethic of consequences, but it also is now a component of American
internationalism and exceptionalism, which means that even realists cannot discount
international morality, especially involving moral imperatives, such as the goal of
ending genocide.

Internationalism and Intervention

To get the most accurate assessment of the future of humanitarian
intervention, one must look at American internationalism, which controls the other
American perspectives, dominates U.S. foreign policy, and possesses those economic
core values desired worldwide. The priority of American internationalism is on a
prosperous, capitalistic world economy and the security of democracy at home. Due
to internationalism's deference to the ethic of consequences and the national interest
in securing these goals, the commitment to democracy and human rights abroad is
stronger in theory than in reality.

Thus, American foreign policy is often

incompatible with the goals of individual justice and ending structural violence,
although reaosnable, or feeble, efforts, depending upon one's perspective, are made.
These goals also conflict with those of anti-modernest and anti-Western cultures,
making Western humanitarian intervention suspect in the Third World. Under such
circumstances, it is not surprising that the national interest still has priority with
American internationalists and that the thankless task of helping the victims of
structural violence, other than on a very limited basis, e.g., safe zones, is not likely
to take place. The same is true for the Third World where many states are internally

153
divided between the desire for Western prosperity and the desires of ethnic and
survival nationalism.

Is Economic Prosperity the New Moralism?
It is obvious from the way that internationalism is evolving that the victory of
the West over the Soviet Union has not shifted the tension between order and justice
in favor of the individual enough to end structural violence. With no Soviet threat
and its primary goal being a prosperous, secure, and competitive world economy, the
focus of contemporary American internationalism is now more than ever on
structuring a liberal world order which has little to do with stopping the suffering and
death of the shortrun losers of the changes in international politics, despite the
Western desire to enlarge democracy worldwide. Just as internationalist principles
accept losers in the structural adjustments of world markets for longrun economic
stability, they also accept the starvation and genocide of the losers in the structural
adjustments of international politics for the longrun protection of democratic
capitalism. 1
Because intervention will be limited to those few situations where the newly
profiled global threats, increasing fragmentation, ethnic nationalism, and failed states
are seen as threatening the world economy, the question has to be asked if
preservation of the world economy will become the new form of moralism? One
distinct possiblity is that the Western propensity to intervene for non-economic core
values, such as democracy and egregious cases of human rights violations, will be
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minimal with the end of the intense ideological rivalry between the U.S. and the
Soviet Union. 2
The Limits of U.S. Interventionism

The lack of U.S. political will to end structural violence is demonstrated by
the imposing preconditions to humanitarian intervention set by American Presidents
beginning with Reagan.

In 1984, Reagan's Secretary of Defense, Casper W.

Weinberger, prescribed the following preconditions: 1.) the intervention must be
vital to the national interest. 2.) the U.S. must clearly intend to win the conflict.
3.) the U.S. must have clear political and military objectives. 4.) the objectives and
forces used must be capable of doing the job. 5.) the military must have the support
of the American people and their representatives. 6.) the use of force must be a last
resort. Similarly, President Bush's five requirements of warranted stakes, obvious
effectiveness, no effective alternatives, limited commitment in scope and time, and
a favorable cost-benefit ratio eliminated U.S. intervention in most humanitarian
outrages. With President Clinton, the barriers to U.S. intervention on behalf of U.N.
humanitarian efforts have been just as imposing. Most noticeably, U.S. political
support would require a clearly definable objective and scope of operation, a
connection "to concrete political solutions," an efficient, organized U.N. effort (which
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is a terminal obstacle alone), a significant threat to peace and security (always of
ambiguous meaning), and an advancement of U.S. interests. Indicative of realism's
influence in American internationalism is the first U.S. precondition set by Clinton
for the actual use of U.S. troops in such operations, which is the advancement of U.S.
interests. Even amid the cruelty of Bosnia, there have been long-standing limits by
the Clinton Administration on the use of U.S. ground forces there to the enforcement
of an already existing peace agreement and the protection of departing

U.N.

peacekeeper. Likewise, recent suggestions by the Adminstration to expand the
possibility of U.S. assistance to a safer redeployment of any besieged UNPROFOR
II forces aroused great controversy in the U.S. 3
The U.S. official preconditions for intervention set standards which seldom
can be met in the real world and which are clearly a series of responses to such U.S.
failures of intervention as Vietnam and Lebanon. They reflect the ambiguity felt by
Americans concerning the morally perplexing and unpredictable circumstances
surrounding the use of intervention in a world that is still subject to the ethic of
consequences. But acceptable consequences are defined in terms of interests, and
American internationalists, like all people, are not willing to risk casualties and
capital for less than protecting their core values.
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Intervention as a Moral Problem

Rosenau's writings most aptly describe the problems of intervention. First
intervention is a moral problem--one which he unsuccessfully attempted to
circumscribe by the improvement of social science. Today, normative theory still
dominates the study of intervention and the boundary between social science and the
moral question is still unclear. Intervention is unceasingly a matter of choosing
desirable ends and meeting the demands of the real world. The resolution of
intervention's moral question, therefore, will always be problematic. Underlying this
impasse is the inability of Western thought to effectively comprehend the
complextities of societies with different political and cultural values.
Secondly, Rosenau's recent theories on turbulence in international politics
imply certain conclusions about structural violence and humanitarian intervention.
By implication, injustice is currently the byproduct of the impersonal forces that
regulate world order. Though unintended by Rosenau, his metaphor of the stock
market to explain the continuity between order and disorder has pessimistic
implications for the pursuit of justice. He compares the continuity and change of
world order to the short term wide swings in stock prices which flatten out over the
long run. The steep peaks and valleys turn into gentle slopes over the long run.
The implications for the actors during this process, according to Rosenau, depends
upon their responses. Some "prosper" while others "founder," but order prevails in
the longrun. Although the stockmarket maintains longrun order, it cannot remain
orderly without many winners and losers among its investors, and too much
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concentration on the short run to safeguard investors surely will destroy order in the
long run. 4
The winners and losers of world order, unlike those of the stockmarket, are
the winners and losers of the struggle for justice, which is a sideshow in the world's
efforts to maintain order among states. The losers are the sacrificial atrocities to
world order supposedly to assure a better life for the greatest number of people.
The loosers include the victims of atrocities in the Balkans, the former Soviet Union,
Africa, and wherever people suffer from violent political conflict. If the maintenance
of longrun order provides the best political protection for humanity through the
reasonably stable relationships of states, then the valleys of losers along the way are
the manifestations of the necessary world injustices needed to maintain the world for
the winners.
Interestingly, Rosenau, in discussing his metaphor of the stock market, offers
no moral accounting for the losers probably because he sees order as patterns and
structures and he is still baffled by the moral problems of international politics. One
inference that can be drawn from Rosenau's lack of moral explanations for shortrun
winners and losers is that there is a traditional ethos of international politics
accepting the sacrifiCial necessity of some killing both within and among states, as
suggested by Hedley Bull, to preserve both international and domestic order.
Injustice then is a Darwinian byproduct of realist assumptions about the roles of
power and the national interest in preserving international order, despite some
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advances in favor of human rights.

The result is a virulent form of structural

violence based on the assumption by humanity--whether because of epistemic, moral,
or sturctural causes--that it is circumscribed in protecting the rights, justice, and life
of the individual by the necessities of international politics. This assumption is also
strong in the West, which set the precedent during World War II of mass slaughter
of noncombatants as an acceptable part of total war--a precedent of a world with few
moral restraints on the behavior of states when their survival is at stake. Of this fact,
Third World states have taken notice. Under these circumstances, it is not too
difficult to see why R.J. Vincent wrote that there is no "justice constituency" in the
international community for the needs and demands of the individual.5
With international politics still controlled by realist and state-centric
principles, interstate justice still has overwhelming priority over saving lives and
relieving suffering, as can be seen from recent international efforts at humanitarian
intervention. In Somalia, humanitarian intervention transformed a country gripped
by famine and tribal conflict, which had killed hundreds of thousands, into a land of
relative economic security for the majority of its civilian population. This outcome
saved many lives, but it is mainly remembered in the U.S. for its failure in nationbuilding and the fact that Mogadishu has returned to chaos. Despite saving many
lives in Somalia, Americans still think in terms of political failure rather than
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humanitarian success there.6 In Bosnia, according to Jim Hoagland, "For all the
weaknesses, the U.N. force has been feeding and protecting the populations of
Sarajevo and other Muslin-controlled towns. The withdrawal (of the U.N. force] will
mean death for a large number of Muslims." Yet success in Bosnia is usually
discussed in terms of an eventual political arrangement instead of saving lives. 7

The Limits of Moral Action

Yet the idea of an evolving international justice in favor of the individual
cannot be fully discounted, especially in the area of human rights. Nor can foreign
policy thinkers and practitioners be dismissed as reprobates for their acquiescence
to structural violence. First, post-Cold War peacekeeping has involved attempting
to use international military force in the middle of a war of cruelty to save the lives
of innocent non-combatants while trying to assuage the fanatical feelings of the
combatants--a thankless task requiring almost impossible feats of diplomatic
dexterity. Secondly, a strong argument can be made that foreign policy practitioners
refuse to act against structural violence because they are forced to negotiate in
international politics with gangsters, whom they would incarcerate if they were free
to do so. Even assuming that a gangster can be distinquished from a leader of
legitimate political authority by some type of international consensus, there is even
a bigger problem. Regardless of the cause--evil forces, impersonal, deterministic
mechanisms, and so forth--gangsters hold power over the lives of many people
6
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limiting the power of foreign policy practitioners to obtain moral ends, similar to the
limits of those dealing with hostage takers whose imprudent decisions could cause
even greater loss of life.
In addition, there is the reality that being world policeman and social worker

is an overwhelming burden. Though a simple and often repeated argument against
intervention, it is also a valid one. In a world containing primarily authoritarian
states and a significant number of civil and international wars at any one time,
effective reform intervention and nation-building would require almost limitless
power and resources of the international community's most powerful members, i.e.,
of the United States and Western Europe. This problem is exemplified by the U.N.'s
current overwhelming responsibilities of peacekeeping without adequate funding from
the United States.8
Another problem is that overwhelming force is often needed for victory
against the complexity of reciprocal violence in ethnically conflicted states, which
presents extreme practical and moral dilemmas for the intervenor states, especially
in light of their increaseningly demanding publics.

The threat of quagmire by

survival nationalism raises the moral and practical problem of the intervenor's lack
of will to sacrifice its young for the welfare of others. The state's national will
historically is connected to the purpose of defending the national interest. Citizens
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are conditioned to sacrifice against their enemies not to stop the suffering of others
but to save their own states. They are conditioned to supporting their own states
against foreign aggression and not to supporting foreign populations abused by their
own leaders. Therefore, unless there is a change in the traditional attitude of citizens
concerning the national interest, war to impose peace overseas for the sake of others
is likely to be less sustainable than the more traditional war against external
aggression. 9
Today's more demanding citizens are aware of the potential for military
quagmire and unnecessary loss of life and, therefore, carefully scrutinize their
governments' interventions. As a result, Western intervenor states must be highly
confident of public support before intervening According to Edward Luttwak, the
increasing sensitivity of societies to war casualties is becoming a limiting factor in the
government's use of intervention At the same time, this new sensitivity to casualties
may be unexpectantly deleterious to the morality of war and work against the use of
force for humanitarian purposes. For instance, in Chechnya, Russians bomb civilians
in Grozny to limit their military casualties and, thus, limit the domestic opposition
to Yelsin's war. 10

9

James N. Rosenau, "Intervention as a Scientific Concept," 166.

10

James N. Rosenau, "Intervention as a Scientific Concept," 166-7; Edward N. Luttwak, "Where Are
the Great Powers?" Foreign Affairs 73 (July/August 1994): 25-6; See "Russians Selected Civilian
Targets to Hit," Richmond Times-Dispatch, 5 January 1994, p. Al.

162
What Is To Be Done?

With all said and done, the important question for Americans is how to avoid
cyncism and disillusionment about the future of morality in international politics and,
more specifically, about the future of human rights. One answer is the hope that we
can see beyond our moral limitations in international politics to the possibility of
realistic, incremental intrusions against death and suffering. This can be done by
devising a coherent political philosophy of international morality and human rights
as the basis of American foreign policy. Here, WOMP's vision of developing over
time new world order values--through consciousness-raising in governments, publics,
IOs, NGOs, regional, cultural, and ethnic groups--is applicable to the idea of a
greater emphasis on individual justice and the extension of the idea of national
security to include the newly profiled global threats, for it reinforces the idea that
Western idealism, while not stopping structural violence, provides the hope for
incremental advances in the protection of human rights and the evolution of values
over time that theoretically will result in global justice.
The hope is that small, incremental changes in the international human rights regime
will gradually erode international amorality and will eventually lead to a seachange
in international politics in favor of justice for the individual. While there may be
little political will for military humanitarian intervention, hopefully the will of those
pursuing the ostensibly insignificant but eventually meaningful victories like Helsinki
may contribute to drastic changes in favor of human rights like the fall of the Soviet
Union.
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Indeed, Helzinki gives meaning to the idea of consciousness-raising in the
longrun. In 1986, George Kennan attacked the Helsinki Accords as a "high-minded"
but unrealistic "international code of behavior" which depended upon the naive hope
for fundamental, internal reform within the Soviet Union. But now historians, and
even some realists, are beginning to accept the important contribution that the
Helsinki Accords' human rights provisions made to the Soviet Union's demise.
According to Kissinger, "The European Security Conference... accelerated the
collapse of the Soviet Empire" and "... heroic reformers in Eastern Europe used [the
human rights provisions] as a rallying point in their fights to free their countries from
Soviet domination."11 The lesson here is to never underestimate deonotological
principles holding certain behavior inherently moral or immoral regardless of foreign
policy consequences in the making of foreign policy. Such principles were placed in
the Helzinki Accords, admittedly by parties who saw some diplomatic gain and few
minuses, but which nonetheless incrementally lead to consciousness-raising in favor
of a stronger international human rights regime and the enlargement of democracy.
The achievements of a foreign policy emphasizing human rights are gradual, faltering,
and unpredictable but nevertheless are real.
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